Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 32, issue 1, 1977

Political coalition bargaining behaviour pp. 1-10

Jeffrey Callen and Leslie Roos

The unified solution of the Cross/Coddington model of the bargaining process pp. 11-38

Alan Carling

The demand for government transfers: A look at the recipients pp. 39-50

Charles Knoeber

The application of an agency decisionmaking model pp. 51-65

David Shapiro and Robert Shelton

Unanimity in the supreme court: A game-theoretic explanation of the decision in the white house tapes case pp. 67-83

Steven Brams and Douglas Muzzio

Citizen ignorance and political activity pp. 85-99

Thomas Dalton

A two-stage hybrid mechanism for collective choice pp. 101-111

Earl Brubaker

An analysis of migration patterns and local government policy toward public education in the United States pp. 113-121

Richard Cebula

A note on progression and public sector size pp. 123-129

Geoffrey Brennan

A note on political participation as consumption behavior pp. 131-135

W. Crain and Thomas Deaton

A concise proof of theorem on manipulation of social choice functions pp. 137-142

Peter Gärdenfors

State budget sizes and the marginal productivity of governors: An extension pp. 143-149

Rik Hafer

More on nonwhite migration, welfare levels, and the political process pp. 151-154

Rishi Kumar

Nonwhite migration, welfare, and politics—A reply pp. 155-156

Richard Cebula

Book reviews pp. 157-174

Bruno Frey, John Harsanyi, James Buchanan, Eric Uslaner, Jeffrey Richelson, Nicholas Miller and Harold Hochman

Volume 31, issue 1, 1977

Presidential strategy for the appointment of supreme court justices pp. 1-22

Stuart Teger

Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection pp. 23-35

William Johnson

Market structure and campaign contributions pp. 37-52

Russell Pittman

An economic approach to school integration: Public choice with tie-ins pp. 53-77

Thomas Borcherding

Conditions on social choice functions pp. 79-110

Jeffrey Richelson

Legislative profits and the economic theory of representative voting: An empirical investigation pp. 111-119

Burton Abrams

An empirical investigation of voting on energy issues pp. 121-128

Albert Danielsen and Paul Rubin

On the efficiency of federal R&D spending: A public choice approach pp. 129-133

Albert Link

Probability of a tie election pp. 135-138

Howard Margolis

Bureaucratic performance and budgetary reward: A reply and reformulation pp. 139-141

Ronald Warren

Bureaucratic performance and budgetary reward: A test of the hypotheses with an alternative specification pp. 143-145

Thomas McCaleb

The expanding public sector: Wagner squared pp. 147-150

James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock

A note on the decision rules of public regulatory agencies pp. 151-155

Charles Wright

Campaign expenditures and election outcomes: A critical note pp. 157-162

J. Giertz and Dennis Sullivan

Volume 30, issue 1, 1977

The dilemma of a paretian liberal: Some consequences of Sen's theorem pp. 1-21

John Aldrich

Social preference” and game theory: A comment on “the dilemma of a paretian liberal pp. 23-28

Nicholas Miller

Liberal games: Further comments on social choice and game theory pp. 29-34

John Aldrich

Some new impossibility theorems pp. 35-42

John Ferejohn and David Grether

The Borda game pp. 43-50

Roy Gardner

Logrolling, vote trading, and the paradox of voting: A game-theoretical overview pp. 51-75

Nicholas Miller

Dynamic games of collective action pp. 77-105

Norman Schofield

Homogeneity, independence, and power indices pp. 107-118

Philip Straffin

Volume 29, issue 2, 1977

Alternative versions of the demand-revealing process pp. 15-26

Martin Loeb

Practical problems and practical solutions pp. 27-35

Gordon Tullock

Some aspects of the demand-revealing process pp. 37-49

Edward Clarke

The demand-revealing process as a welfare indicator pp. 51-63

Gordon Tullock

Justice in voting by demand revelation pp. 65-70

I. Good

Ethical foundations of the demand-revealing process pp. 71-77

T. Nicolaus Tideman

Imperfect personal information and the demand revealing process: A sampling approach pp. 79-94

Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont

The group incentive properties of mechanisms for the provision of public goods pp. 95-102

Elaine Bennett and David Conn

Demand-revealing process, coalitions, and public goods pp. 103-105

Gordon Tullock

Some limitations of demand revelaing processes pp. 107-124

Theodore Groves and John Ledyard

Some limitations of demand revealing processes: Comment pp. 125-128

T. Nicolaus Tideman and Gordon Tullock

Some limitations of the groves-ledyard optimal mechanism pp. 129-137

Joseph Greenberg, Robert Mackay and Nicolaus Tideman

Reply to comments by Tidemand and Tullock and Greenberg, Mackay and Tideman on some limitations of demand revealing processes pp. 139-143

Theodore Groves and John Ledyard

Volume 29, issue 1, 1977

Constitutional power in experimental health service and delivery systems pp. 1-18

J. Coleman, S. Wu and S. Feld

Donor optimization and the food stamp program pp. 19-35

J. Giertz and Dennis Sullivan

Bureaucratic compliance as a game on the unit square pp. 37-51

Gary Miller

Equal access vs. Selective access: A critique of public goods theory pp. 53-71

Kenneth Goldin

Prisoner's dilemma, logrolling and cyclical group preferences pp. 73-84

Peter Bernholz

Spillovers, migration and public school expenditures: The repetition of an experiment pp. 85-93

Kenneth Greene

Economic theory of the constitutional separation of powers pp. 95-107

Morris Silver

A competitive model of local government organization: Implications for the process of community formation within metropolitan regions pp. 109-125

Robert Premus

Revenue structure, fiscal illusion and budgetary choice: Comment pp. 127-130

Marilyn Flowers

Revenue structure, fiscal illusion, and budgetary choice: Reply pp. 131-132

Richard Wagner

More on the vote winning and vote losing qualities of minimum wage laws pp. 133-137

William Keech

The appeal of minimum wage laws: A dynamic analysis pp. 139-141

Randall Holcombe and John Metcalf

Shifting public choice on minimum wages pp. 143-147

E. West

Pareto-optimality and gains-from-trade: A public choice interpretation pp. 149-153

Charles Rowley, Martin Walker and Brian Beavis

The electoral college and the rational vote: A correction pp. 155-156

James Kau and Paul Rubin