Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Public choice and three ethical properties of politics pp. 241-255: Joe Oppenheimer
Using factions to estimate preference intensity: Improving upon one person/one vote pp. 257-268: Robert Bordley
The effects of voter mobility on agenda controllers pp. 269-278: Gary Pecquet
Reverse revenue sharing: A modest proposal pp. 279-289: Dwight Lee
A local regulator's rewards for conformity in policy pp. 291-302: Eli Noam
Ceilings on campaign spending: Hypothesis and partial test with Canadian data pp. 313-331: K. Palda and Kristian Palda

On the role of social norms in a market economy pp. 113-137: Gordon Bergsten
Interrelationships among public spending preferences: A micro analysis pp. 139-153: James Ferris
Causality testing of the popularity function: An empirical investigation for the Federal Republic of Germany, 1971–1982 pp. 155-173: Gebhard Kirchgässner
Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks pp. 175-191: Eugenia Toma and Mark Toma
Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Comment pp. 193-195: Arthur Rolnick
Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks: Reply pp. 197-198: Eugenia Toma and Mark Toma
Some simple geometry of the welfare loss from competitive monopolies pp. 199-206: David Colander
Marginal lobbying cost and the optimal amount of rent seeking pp. 207-213: Dwight Lee
Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat: Comment pp. 215-219: Michael Marlow
Federal budget cuts: Rejoinder pp. 221-222: David Laband
Review pp. 223-224: Michael Kurth

Congressional rationality and spatial voting pp. 3-17: Gregory Brunk
Expenditures and votes: In search of downward-sloping curves in the United States and Great Britain pp. 19-34: Alfred Cuzán and Richard Heggen
Tax systems and tax shares pp. 35-47: Arthur Denzau and Robert Mackay
‘Putting one over on the boss’: The political economy of strategic behavior in organizations pp. 49-71: Thomas Hammond and Jeffrey Horn
Monopoly rent seeking under conditions of uncertainty pp. 73-87: Joseph Jadlow
Bureaucracy and the divisibility of local public output pp. 89-101: Rodolfo Gonzalez and Stephen Mehay
Follow-up on the review of E.S. Savas' book, Privatizing the public sector: How to shrink government, by L.E. Lomasky (1984), Public Choice 43(2): 217–219 pp. 103-103: Dwight Lee
The basic facts pp. 104-104: E. Savas
Response to E.S. Savas pp. 105-106: Loren Lomasky
Reviews pp. 107-111: Philip Coelho, Gordon Tullcok and Gordon Tullock

Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences pp. 397-410: Peter Fishburn and Steven Brams
The political business cycle under rational voting behavior pp. 411-430: Ulrich Lächler
Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter pp. 431-441: Ingemar Hansson and Charles Stuart
Electoral equilibrium in double member districts pp. 443-451: Gary Cox
Can a party represent its constituency? pp. 453-456: Amoz Kats
The Canadian constitutional amending formula: Bargaining in the past and the future pp. 457-480: D. Kilgour and Terrence Levesque
The spatial distribution of public services: A structural model of voting, educational production, and the government's allocation of educational inputs pp. 481-500: Donald Haurin and H. Gill
Philantropic motives and contribution policy: A note pp. 501-505: Joseph Deutsch

The economics of choice in the allocation of intergovernmental grants to local authories pp. 285-296: Gershon Alperovich
Railway abandonments, cross-subsidies, and the theory of regulation pp. 297-305: William Dougan
An economic theory of governability: Choosing policy and optimizing performance pp. 307-337: Mark Lichbach
The effect of governmental structure on special district expenditures pp. 339-348: Stephen Mehay
Democracy, creeping socialism, and ideological socialism in rent-seeking societies pp. 349-366: Erich Weede
Are charities efficient ‘firms’? A preliminary test of the UK charitable sector pp. 367-373: John Cullis, Philip Jones and Constantine Thanassoulas
Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates pp. 375-383: Arthur Denzau and Kevin Grier
Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election pp. 385-388: James Kau and Paul Rubin

Introduction to the series pp. vii-vii: Allan Meltzer, Tomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal
The pure theory of large two-candidate elections pp. 7-41: John Ledyard
Expectations about voter choices pp. 49-59: Peter Coughlin
Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model pp. 61-102: Richard McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook
Theories of regulation and the deregulation movement pp. 103-145: Theodore Keeler
The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC) pp. 147-191: Barry Weingast
The political economy of Canadian constitution-making: the Canadian economic-union issue pp. 201-249: Thomas Courchene
An analysis of constitutional change, Canada, 1980–82 pp. 251-272: Albert Breton
A comment on the papers by Thomas Courchene and Albert Breton pp. 273-278: Stanley Winer
On the analysis of constitutional change in Canada pp. 279-283: Mark Sproule-Jones