Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 182, issue 3, 2020

Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state pp. 233-242

Mehrdad Vahabi

A theory of predatory welfare state and citizen welfare: the French case pp. 243-271

Mehrdad Vahabi, Philippe Batifoulier and Nicolas Silva

Regulating quack medicine pp. 273-286

Peter Leeson, M. Scott King and Tate J. Fegley

Progressive Democracy: the ideology of the modern predatory state pp. 287-301

Randall Holcombe

The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations: beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking pp. 303-329

Bruce Benson

Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy pp. 331-352

Peter Boettke and Rosolino A. Candela

Wealth-destroying states pp. 353-371

Jennifer Murtazashvili and Ilia Murtazashvili

Why did pre-modern states adopt Big-God religions? pp. 373-394

Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya

Zakat: Islam’s missed opportunity to limit predatory taxation pp. 395-416

Timur Kuran

State predation in historical perspective: the case of Ottoman müsadere practice during 1695–1839 pp. 417-442

Yasin Arslantaş, Antoine Pietri and Mehrdad Vahabi

Two bandits or more? The case of Viking Age England pp. 443-457

Gert Svendsen

Trade and the predatory state: Ricardian exchange with armed competition for resources—a diagrammatic exposition pp. 459-494

Martin McGuire

Pareto-minimality in the jungle pp. 495-508

Bertrand Crettez

Volume 182, issue 1, 2020

Better the devil you know? Reelected politicians and policy outcomes under no term limits pp. 1-16

Fernando Aragon and Ricardo Pique

Ideology or voters? A quasi-experimental test of why left-wing governments spend more pp. 17-48

Benoît Le Maux, Kristýna Dostálová and Fabio Padovano

Unpacking the unknown: a method for identifying status quo distributions pp. 49-72

Ryan J. Vander Wielen and Michael J. Vander Wielen

Politicians’ coherence and government debt pp. 73-91

Giorgio Bellettini and Paolo Roberti

Silent promotion of agendas: campaign contributions and ideological polarization pp. 93-117

Hideo Konishi and Chen-Yu Pan

Selecting the runoff pair pp. 119-137

James Green-Armytage and T. Nicolaus Tideman

Rent seeking as an evolving process: the case of the Ancien Régime pp. 139-155

Robert Ekelund and Mark Thornton

Correction to: Rent seeking as an evolving process: the case of the Ancien Régime pp. 157-157

Robert Ekelund and Mark Thornton

Psychological game theory in public choice pp. 159-180

Gregory DeAngelo and Bryan McCannon

A study of triggering events: When do political regimes change? pp. 181-199

Martin Paldam

Pot and ladle: a formula for estimating the distribution of seats under the Jefferson–D’Hondt method pp. 201-227

Jarosław Flis, Wojciech Słomczyński and Dariusz Stolicki

Michael C. Munger: Tomorrow 3.0: transaction costs and the sharing economy pp. 229-232

Diana W. Thomas

Volume 181, issue 3, 2019

The effects of decentralization on special interest groups pp. 191-213

Robert F. Salvino, Gregory Randolph, Geoffrey K. Turnbull and Michael T. Tasto

Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries pp. 215-238

Dodge Cahan, Luisa Doerr and Niklas Potrafke

Did the fed raise interest rates before elections? pp. 239-273

Alexander Dentler

The Coleman–Shapley index: being decisive within the coalition of the interested pp. 275-289

André Casajus and Frank Huettner

Political change and turnovers: How do political principals consider organizational, individual, and performance information? pp. 291-308

Bong Hwan Kim and Sounman Hong

Fairness and qualitative portfolio allocation in multiparty governments pp. 309-330

Alejandro Ecker and Thomas M. Meyer

The effect of incumbency on ideological and valence perceptions of parties in multilevel polities pp. 331-349

Susumu Shikano and Dominic Nyhuis

Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition pp. 351-373

Hakan Genc and Serkan Küçükşenel

An economic theory of economic analysis: the case of the School of Salamanca pp. 375-397

Clara Jace

Identifiability, state repression, and the onset of ethnic conflict pp. 399-422

Christine S. Mele and David A. Siegel

Volume 181, issue 1, 2019

Rent seeking at 52: an introduction to a special issue of public choice pp. 1-4

Matthew D. Mitchell

On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft pp. 5-12

Roger Congleton

Rents and economic development: the perspective of Why Nations Fail pp. 13-28

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson

Is development uniquely modern? Ancient Athens on the doorstep pp. 29-47

Federica Carugati, Josiah Ober and Barry R. Weingast

Measuring rent-seeking pp. 49-69

David N. Laband and John Sophocleus

Rent-seeking in the classroom and textbooks: Where are we after 50 years? pp. 71-82

Joshua Hall, Josh Matti and Amir Borges Ferreira Neto

Tullock and the welfare costs of corruption: there is a “political Coase Theorem” pp. 83-100

Michael Munger

A culture of rent seeking pp. 101-126

Ginny Seung Choi and Virgil Henry Storr

Transitional gains and rent extraction pp. 127-139

Randall Holcombe

The efficiency of regulatory arbitrage pp. 141-166

Vlad Tarko and Andrew Farrant

Uncontestable favoritism pp. 167-190

Matthew D. Mitchell

Volume 180, issue 3, 2019

Do sanctions lead to a decline in civil liberties? pp. 191-215

Antonis Adam and Sofia Tsarsitalidou

An empirical examination of institutions and cross-country incarceration rates pp. 217-242

Daniel J. D’Amico and Claudia R. Williamson

Adaptation and central banking pp. 243-256

Alexander Salter and William Luther

Is civic duty the solution to the paradox of voting? pp. 257-283

Abel François and Olivier Gergaud

The incumbent’s preference for imperfect commitment pp. 285-300

Matthias Wrede

Political regimes and publicly provided goods: why democracy needs development pp. 301-331

Martin Roessler

Electoral systems and trade-policy outcomes: the effects of personal-vote incentives on barriers to international trade pp. 333-352

Patrick Wagner and Michael Plouffe

Is the market for digital privacy a failure? pp. 353-381

Caleb Fuller

Sabotage in team contests pp. 383-405

Serhat Doğan, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

Intra-party politics and interest groups: missing links in explaining government effectiveness pp. 407-427

Andrea Ceron, Luigi Curini and Fedra Negri

Elections, recession expectations and excessive debt: an unholy trinity pp. 429-449

Frank Bohn and Francisco Veiga

Crowdfunding defense pp. 451-467

Garrett R. Wood

“Mao’s last revolution”: a dictator’s loyalty–competence tradeoff pp. 469-500

Ying Bai and Titi Zhou

Randall G. Holcombe: Political capitalism: how economic and political power is made and maintained pp. 501-503

Bryan P. Cutsinger

Milan Vaishnav, When crime pays: money and muscle in Indian politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017. xxiii + 410 pages. USD 40.00 (cloth) pp. 505-509

Shruti Rajagopalan

Volume 180, issue 1, 2019

Regressive effects of regulation pp. 1-10

Diana W. Thomas

Reapplying behavioral symmetry: public choice and choice architecture pp. 11-25

Michael David Thomas

Do the poor want to be regulated? Public opinion surveys on regulation in the United States, 1981–2002 pp. 27-42

Jeremy Horpedahl

RegData 2.2: a panel dataset on US federal regulations pp. 43-55

Patrick A. McLaughlin and Oliver Sherouse

How do federal regulations affect consumer prices? An analysis of the regressive effects of regulation pp. 57-90

Dustin Chambers, Courtney A. Collins and Alan Krause

Regressive effects of regulation on wages pp. 91-103

James Bailey, Diana W. Thomas and Joseph R. Anderson

Stratification by regulation: Are bootleggers and Baptists biased? pp. 105-130

Sean Mulholland

Regulation and poverty: an empirical examination of the relationship between the incidence of federal regulation and the occurrence of poverty across the US states pp. 131-144

Dustin Chambers, Patrick A. McLaughlin and Laura Stanley

Banking regulation, regulatory capture and inequality pp. 145-164

G. P. Manish and Colin O’Reilly

Barriers to prosperity: the harmful impact of entry regulations on income inequality pp. 165-190

Dustin Chambers, Patrick A. McLaughlin and Laura Stanley