Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Alternate rationales for severance pay compensation under airline deregulation pp. 351-369: Joseph Cordes and Robert Goldfarb
From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods pp. 371-386: Jack Hirshleifer
An experiment in the demand-revealing process pp. 387-401: T. Tideman
Tests of a rational theory of the size of government pp. 403-418: Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard
Further tests of a rational theory of the size of government pp. 419-421: Gordon Tullock
Rejoinder to Gordon Tullock pp. 423-426: Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard
Logrolling and high demand committee review pp. 427-434: Bruce Benson
Privatization of public goods pp. 435-440: Robert Staaf
Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions pp. 441-448: Robert Blewett and Roger Congleton
A note on voter participation rates in the United States pp. 449-450: Richard Cebula
A limited defense of Pareto optimal redistribution: Comment pp. 451-454: E. Pasour
Reviews pp. 455-460: Joseph Reid, Robert Sugden and Dwight Lee

Editor's note pp. i-i: Gordon Tullock
An approach to empirical studies of voting paradoxes: An update and extension pp. 241-250: John Dobra
On the stability of legislative outcomes pp. 251-260: Stephen Hoenack
Why so much stability?: Another opinion pp. 261-270: Richard Niemi
The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence pp. 271-283: James Bennett and William Orzechowski
The impact of tenure on the flow of federal benefits to SMSA's pp. 285-293: Lisa Kiel and Richard McKenzie
Banking sector influence on the relationship of Congress to the Federal Reserve System pp. 295-306: Neil Skaggs and Cheryl Wasserkrug
The Tiebout hypothesis in the United States: An analysis of black consumer-voters, 1970–75 pp. 307-310: Richard Cebula and K. Avery
Federal budget cuts: Bureaucrats trim the meat, not the fat pp. 311-314: David Laband
On the Margolis ‘thought experiment,’ and the applicability of demand-revealing mechanisms to large-group decisions pp. 315-319: Earl Brubaker
Reply to Brubaker and Tullock pp. 321-325: Howard Margolis
Editorial note pp. 325-325: Gordon Tullock
Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Comment pp. 327-331: Dwight Lee
Conflicting analysis of a ‘Conflicting commons’: Reply pp. 333-335: Bruce Yandle
Reviews pp. 337-349: Howard Dickman, William Mitchell, George Uhimchuk and John Dobra

Introduction pp. 1-5: Allan Meltzer, Peter Ordeshook and Thomas Romer
A strategic calculus of voting pp. 7-53: Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
Models of voter turnout: a brief idiosyncratic review pp. 55-61: Bernard Grofman
A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics pp. 63-100: John Aldrich
The objectives of private and public judges pp. 133-137: Paul Rubin
The objectives of private and public judges pp. 139-143: Chester Spatt
Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits pp. 145-175: Lewis Kornhauser
Control of conflicts of interest in class-action suits pp. 177-179: Chester Spatt
The evolution of tax structures pp. 181-222: James Alt
Is there a demand for progressivity? pp. 223-228: Gerald Kramer
Implications of dynamic optimal taxation for the evolution of tax structures pp. 229-235: Finn Kydland

Variation of the electorate: Veto and purge pp. 237-247: Roy Gardner
Scoring rule sensitivity to weight selection pp. 249-261: William Gehrlein and Peter Fishburn
Winners, blockers, and the status quo: Simple collective decision games and the core pp. 263-279: James Laing, Sampei Nakabayashi and Benjamin Slotznick
Some experimental results that fail to support the competitive solution pp. 281-291: Richard McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook
The power of the chairman pp. 293-305: Richard Niemi, Bo Bjurulf and Gordon Blewis
A note on the paradox of voting: Anonymous preference profiles and May's formula pp. 307-316: Sven Berg and Bo Bjurulf
On Plott's pairwise symmetry condition for majority rule equilibrium pp. 317-321: James Enelow and Melvin Hinisch
An exegesis of Farquharson's Theory of Voting pp. 323-328: Richard Niemi
On evaluating income distributions: Rank dominance, the Suppes-Sen grading principle of justice, and Pareto optimality pp. 329-336: Rubin Saposnik

Philanthropic motives and contribution policy pp. 117-133: Uri Ben-Zion and Uriel Spiegel
Demands for public spending: An attitudinal approach pp. 135-154: James Ferris
Random timing of elections and the political business cycle pp. 155-164: Victor Ginsburgh and Philippe Michel
On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states pp. 165-174: Randall Holcombe and Asghar Zardkoohi
Expenditure effects of metropolitan tax base sharing: A public choice analysis pp. 175-186: Dolores Martin and James Schmidt
An analysis of support for tax limitation referenda pp. 187-194: Robert Stein, Keith Hamm and Patricia Freeman
In search of optimum ‘relative unanimity’ pp. 195-201: Richard Cebula and Milton Kafoglis
Economic competition and political competition: An empirical note pp. 203-209: Thomas Dilorenzo
Institutional entropy, again pp. 211-216: Richard Auster
A note on demand-revealing pp. 217-225: Howard Margolis
A further consideration of coalitions under the demand-revealing process pp. 227-230: Melville McMillan
Towards a theory of yes-no-voting: A comment pp. 231-232: Friedel Bolle

Editorial pp. 5-5: Gordon Tullock
Public choice in local judicial systems pp. 7-19: Josef Broder and Allan Schmid
Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees pp. 21-39: Elizabeth Hoffman and Charles Plott
Political terrorism and the size of government: A positive institutional analysis of violent political activity pp. 41-52: Richard Kirk
Presidential politics, budget deficits, and monetary policy in the United States; 1960–1976 pp. 53-69: Leroy Laney and Thomas Willett
The determination of local public expenditures and the principal and agent relation: A case study pp. 71-87: Sharon Megdal
Recontracting, trustworthiness, and the stability of vote exchanges pp. 89-94: James Coleman
Property rights in bureaucracies and bureaucratic efficiency pp. 95-99: John Dobra
Addictive goods and the growth of government pp. 101-103: Franz Jessen
Economic agents and the level of pollution control pp. 105-109: Bruce Yandle
Review pp. 111-116: Gordon Tullock