Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

From Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 179, issue 3, 2019

Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism pp. 169-174

Timothy Mathews and Shane Sanders

The attack and defense of weakest-link networks pp. 175-194

Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson and Roman Sheremeta

Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence pp. 195-208

Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis and Lucas Rentschler

A game-theoretic analysis of international trade and political conflict over external territories pp. 209-228

Yang-Ming Chang and Manaf Sellak

A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers pp. 229-248

Aniruddha Bagchi, Joao Faria and Timothy Mathews

The role of noise in alliance formation and collusion in conflicts pp. 249-266

James W. Boudreau, Shane Sanders and Nicholas Shunda

Stag hunt contests and alliance formation pp. 267-285

James W. Boudreau, Lucas Rentschler and Shane Sanders

Simple analytics of the impact of terror generation on attacker–defender interactions pp. 287-299

Timothy Mathews, Aniruddha Bagchi and Joao Faria

A model of terrorism and counterterrorism with location choices pp. 301-313

Yang Jiao and Zijun Luo

Volume 179, issue 1, 2019

Introduction to a special issue in honor of Kenneth Arrow pp. 1-6

Elizabeth Maggie Penn

Weak rationalizability and Arrovian impossibility theorems for responsive social choice pp. 7-40

John Duggan

Social welfare with net utilities pp. 41-49

Jon Eguia and Dimitrios Xefteris

Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective pp. 51-95

Olivier Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Breton and Dominique Lepelley

Why Arrow’s theorem matters for political theory even if preference cycles never occur pp. 97-111

Sean Ingham

Reflections on Arrow’s theorem and voting rules pp. 113-124

Nicholas R. Miller

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields pp. 125-131

Wulf Gaertner

Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem pp. 133-144

Donald G. Saari

A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives pp. 145-164

John W. Patty and Elizabeth Maggie Penn

Remembering Kenneth Arrow: discount rates pp. 165-167

Kenneth A. Shepsle

Volume 178, issue 3, 2019

Affinity, arming, consequences, and perceptions: an introduction pp. 319-327

Todd Sandler

Terrorism and affinity of nations pp. 329-347

Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler

Problems of commitment in arming and war: how insecurity and destruction matter pp. 349-369

Michelle Garfinkel and Constantinos Syropoulos

On the human consequences of terrorism pp. 371-396

Daniel Arce

UN involvement and civil war peace agreement implementation pp. 397-416

Wakako Maekawa, Barış Arı and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis

Democratic skepticism and support for terrorism in the Palestinian Territories pp. 417-443

James A. Piazza

Security policy preferences of EU citizens: Do terrorist events affect them? pp. 445-471

Athina Economou and Christos Kollias

Violence and the perception of risk associated with hosting refugees pp. 473-492

Alex Braithwaite, Tiffany S. Chu, Justin Curtis and Faten Ghosn

Terrorism and subjective financial well-being: micro-level evidence from Pakistan pp. 493-512

Khusrav Gaibulloev, Gerel Oyun and Javed Younas

Volume 178, issue 1, 2019

Valuable legacy? The effect of inherited fiscal rules pp. 3-30

Csaba Tóth

Evolving hierarchical preferences and behavioral economic policies pp. 31-52

Jan Schnellenbach

The elimination paradox: apportionment in the Democratic Party pp. 53-65

Michael A. Jones, David McCune and Jennifer Wilson

Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach pp. 67-93

Steven Brams, D. Marc Kilgour and Richard F. Potthoff

Titles for me but not for thee: transitional gains trap of property rights extension in Colombia pp. 95-114

Perry Ferrell

Candidate competition and voter learning in the 2000–2012 US presidential primaries pp. 115-151

George Deltas and Mattias K Polborn

Regulation and government debt pp. 153-178

Niclas Berggren and Christian Bjørnskov

How robust is the welfare state when facing open borders? An evolutionary game-theoretic model pp. 179-195

Urs Steiner Brandt and Gert Svendsen

Beyond market failure and government failure pp. 197-216

Glenn Furton and Adam Martin

Land lotteries, long-term wealth, and political selection pp. 217-230

Jason Poulos

A banana republic? The effects of inconsistencies in the counting of votes on voting behavior pp. 231-265

Niklas Potrafke and Felix Roesel

Collective decision-making of voters with heterogeneous levels of rationality pp. 267-287

Youzong Xu

State capacity and public choice: a critical survey pp. 289-309

Ennio Emanuele Piano

Matthew S. Shugart and Rein Taagepera: Votes from seats: logical models of electoral systems pp. 311-313

Kenneth Bunker

Evan Osborne: Self-regulation and human progress: how society gains when we govern less pp. 315-317

Liya Palagashvili

Volume 177, issue 3, 2018

Public choice as positive economics. Introduction to the special issue honoring Francesco Forte pp. 189-197

Silvia Fedeli

Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and institutional design pp. 199-216

Georg Vanberg

An economic theory of a hybrid (competitive authoritarian or illiberal) regime pp. 217-233

Ronald Wintrobe

Coercion and equity with centralization of government: how the unification of Italy impacted the southern regions pp. 235-264

Giorgio Brosio

Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS pp. 265-285

Silvia Fedeli, Leone Leonida and Michele Santoni

Public debt stabilization: the relevance of policymakers’ time horizons pp. 287-299

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Marco Di Pietro, Enrico Saltari and Willi Semmler

Introduction to welfare economics pp. 301-317

Francesco Forte

Volume 177, issue 1, 2018

Overlapping political budget cycles pp. 1-27

Dirk Foremny, Ronny Freier, Marc-Daniel Moessinger and Mustafa Yeter

Bargaining and the effectiveness of economic development incentives: an evaluation of the Texas chapter 313 program pp. 29-51

Nathan Jensen

Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size pp. 53-66

Christos Mavridis and Marco Serena

Fast, frugal and correct? An experimental study on the influence of time scarcity and quantity of information on the voter decision making process pp. 67-86

Michal Tóth and Roman Chytilek

Rank effects in political promotions pp. 87-109

Jaakko Meriläinen and Janne Tukiainen

Does corruption throw sand into or grease the wheels of financial sector development? pp. 111-133

Arusha Cooray and Friedrich Schneider

A capture theory of committees pp. 135-154

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

The effect of democratic decision-making on investment in reputation pp. 155-164

Ruth Ben-Yashar, Miriam Krausz and Shmuel Nitzan

Arm your friends and save on defense? The impact of arms exports on military expenditures pp. 165-187

Oliver Pamp, Florian Dendorfer and Paul W. Thurner