Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 61, issue 3, 1989

Economic policy advice and political preferences pp. 201-216

Peter Coughlin

Declining electoral competitiveness in the House of Representatives: The differential impact of improved transportation technology pp. 217-228

Douglas Hart and Michael Munger

Government size, productivity, and economic growth: The post-war experience pp. 229-245

Edgar Peden and Michael Bradley

Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement? pp. 247-260

Mark Toma

The presence of moral hazard in budget breaking pp. 261-267

Martin Gaynor

On the economic incentives for taking bribes pp. 269-275

Rajeev Goel and Daniel Rich

The impossibility of a desirable minimal state pp. 277-284

Dwight Lee

A note on seniority and political competition pp. 285-288

Randall Holcombe

Volume 61, issue 2, 1989

A general probabilistic spatial theory of elections pp. 101-113

James Enelow and Melvin Hinich

The median voter model in public choice theory pp. 115-125

Randall Holcombe

Niskanen effects in the California Community Colleges pp. 127-140

Shirley Kress

On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option pp. 141-152

Dwight Lee and Todd Sandler

Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents pp. 153-166

J. Smith and Shlomo Weber

Nuclear consequences of the welfare state revisited: Danger in the data pp. 167-169

Robert Ayanian

Welfare policies and migration of the poor in the United States: An empirical note pp. 171-176

Richard Cebula and James Koch

The Tullock-Bastiat hypothesis and Rawlsian distribution strategies pp. 177-181

Lowell Gallaway and Richard Vedder

Production costs and deregulation pp. 183-186

John Lott and Morgan Reynolds

Constitutional order in a federal republic pp. 187-192

Richard Wagner

Volume 61, issue 1, 1989

The selection of public utility commissioners: A re-examination of the importance of institutional setting pp. 1-13

William Boyes and John McDowell

A theory of leadership and deference in constitutional construction pp. 15-27

James Buchanan and Viktor Vanberg

Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not pp. 29-39

Amihai Glazer and Bernard Grofman

Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution pp. 41-74

Timur Kuran

Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians pp. 75-96

John Lott and W. Reed

Superdissipation pp. 97-98

Robert Tollison

Volume 60, issue 3, 1989

The Calculus of Consent: Enduring contributions to public choice and political science pp. 201-210

William Mitchell

Disposable income, unemployment, inflation and state spending in a dynamic political-economic model pp. 211-239

F. Ploeg

Putting the puzzle together: Why people join public interest groups pp. 241-257

Lawrence Rothenberg

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior pp. 259-282

Arthur Schram and Frans Winden

Earmarking as a deterrent to rent-seeking pp. 283-291

Thomas Wyrick and Roger Arnold

Reviews pp. 293-298

Vincent Ostrom, Viktor Vanberg and Robert Tollison

Volume 60, issue 2, 1989

A test for pure or apparent ideology in congressional voting pp. 101-111

Michael Davis and Philip Porter

Rent-seeking in arts policy pp. 113-121

William Grampp

The stability of stated preferences for public goods: Evidence from recent budget games pp. 123-132

Hans Groot and Evert Pommer

Rent-seeking for budgetary allocation: Preliminary results for 20 countries pp. 133-144

Eliakim Katz and Jacob Rosenberg

Representative versus direct democracy: Are there any expenditure differences? pp. 145-154

Rexford Santerre

Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates pp. 155-175

Stephen Wright and William Riker

Equilibrium employment of inputs by a rent-seeking firm pp. 177-184

David Levy

Constituencies, ideology, and the demand for abortion legislation pp. 185-191

Marshall Medoff

Reviews pp. 193-199

Randall Holcombe, P. Hill and Randy Simmons

Volume 60, issue 1, 1989

The rationally uninformed electorate: Some experimental evidence pp. 3-29

Kenneth Collier, Peter Ordeshook and Kenneth Williams

Conjectural variations and the nature of equilibrium in rent-seeking models pp. 31-39

Robert Michaels

Public employees in political firms: Part B. Civil service and militancy pp. 41-54

Joseph Reid and Michael Kurth

The paradox of politics and policy in redistributing income pp. 55-70

Gerald Scully and Daniel Slottje

The public's indifference map between inflation and unemployment: Empirical evidence for the Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies pp. 71-85

David Smyth and Pami Dua

Budget deficits and interest rates in the United States pp. 87-92

Kanhaya Gupta

More on budget deficits and interest rates in the United States pp. 93-97

Richard Cebula

Volume 59, issue 3, 1988

The use of inputs by the Federal Reserve System: An extended model pp. 205-214

Stuart Allen, Donald McCrickard, Phillip Cartwright and Charles Delorme

Rent-seeking and second best economics pp. 215-224

Mahmudul Anam and Eliakim Katz

Fiscal expansion and political instability in the Iberic-Latin region pp. 225-238

Alfred Cuzán, Stephanie Moussalli and Charles Bundrick

Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making pp. 239-252

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman

Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era pp. 253-262

Joseph Reid and Michael Kurth

Antitrust actions and the budgeting process pp. 263-275

Bruce Yandle

Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Comment pp. 277-285

Abdur Chowdhury

Expenditures and receipts in state and local government finances: Reply pp. 287-290

Michael Marlow and Neela Manage

Volume 59, issue 2, 1988

The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems pp. 101-120

Donald Saari and Jill Newenhizen

The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen pp. 121-131

Steven Brams, Peter Fishburn and Samuel Merrill

Is approval voting an ‘unmitigated evil’?: A response to Brams, Fishburn, and Merrill pp. 133-147

Donald Saari and Jill Newenhizen

Proportional representation: An empirical evaluation of single-stage, non-ranked voting procedures pp. 151-165

Amnon Rapoport, Dan Felsenthal and Zeev Maoz

The Borda count in n-dimensional issue space pp. 167-176

Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman

Is vote-selling desirable? pp. 177-194

Jeffrey Weiss

The distribution of income, incomplete information and the rank and Pareto criteria pp. 195-202

Rubin Saposnik

Volume 59, issue 1, 1988

A public choice theory of the great contraction pp. 3-23

Gary Anderson, William Shughart and Robert Tollison

Rent-seeking and optimal regulation in replenishable resource industries pp. 25-36

Eliakim Katz and J. Smith

Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk pp. 37-50

Scott Feld, Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller

Theory of competitive regulatory equilibrium pp. 51-66

John Goodman and Philip Porter

Alterable electorates in the context of residential mobility pp. 67-82

Alain Mingat and Pierre Salmon

The lemon principle, democratic politics, and Frank Knight's First Law of Talk pp. 83-87

William Kern

Constitutional changes in the FASB: A note pp. 89-94

Timothy Sutton