Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 64, issue 3, 1990

The Impact of Citizen Influence on Local Government Expenditure pp. 201-12

Paul G Farnham

Efficient Use of Reference Group Cues in a Single Dimension pp. 213-27

Bernard Grofman and Barbara Norrander

Multi-party Competition with Exit: A Comment of Duverger's Law pp. 229-38

Brian D Humes

Fiscal Variables and Growth: A Cross-Sectional Analysis pp. 239-51

Ricardo Martin and Mohsen Fardmanesh

State Lotteries as Duopoly Transfer Mechanisms pp. 253-64

Robert Martin and Bruce Yandle

Cycle Avoiding Trajectories, Strategic Agendas, and the Duality of Memory and Foresight: An Informal Exposition pp. 265-77

Nicholas R Miller, Bernard Grofman and Scott L Feld

Efficient Renk-Seeking under Varying Cost Structures pp. 279-90

Chris Paul and Al Wilhite

Investments in Rent-Seeking pp. 291-97

R Kenneth Godwin

Volume 64, issue 2, 1990

The Political Market for Real Income Redistribution through Choice of the Weights in COLAS pp. 103-20

Robert L Basmann, Charles A. Diamond, Gerald Scully and Daniel Slottje

Economic Effects of a Conflict-Prone World Order pp. 121-34

Tyler Cowen

Redistributive Politics: A Theory of Taxation for an Incumbent in a Democracy pp. 135-53

Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppenheimer

Determinants of the U.S. Wheat Producer Support Price: Do Presidential Elections Matter? pp. 155-65

Harald Von Witzke

Reform City Councils and Municipal Employees pp. 167-77

Jeffrey Zax

Demand Revealing--Two Minor Notes pp. 179-84

Gordon Tullock

Bureaucratic Behavior and the Choice of Labor Input: A Study of Municipal Governments pp. 185-90

Asghar Zardkoohi and Gary Giroux

Volume 64, issue 1, 1990

The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation pp. 1-20

Joseph Harrington

Susceptibility to Manipulation pp. 21-41

Donald G Saari

Admissible and Sincere Strategies under Approval Voting pp. 43-55

Cyril Carter

Efficacy in Small Electorates under Plurality and Approval Voting pp. 57-71

Amnon Rapoport and Dan S Felsenthal

The Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote: The Effects of a Caucus pp. 73-92

Sven Berg

Monopoly, Price Discrimination, and Rent-Seeking pp. 93-100

Nava Kahana and Eliakim Katz

A Note on Nanson's Rule: A Note pp. 101-02

P C Fishburn

Volume 63, issue 3, 1989

Campaign spending and Senate elections, 1978–84 pp. 201-219

Kevin Grier

Fiscal illusion, budget maximizers, and dynamic equilibrium pp. 221-235

Robert Logan and J. O'Brien

Looking beyond reelection: Revising assumptions about the factors motivating congressional behavior pp. 237-252

Glenn Parker

Intercity competition and the size of the local public work force pp. 253-265

Mark Schneider

Initiatives and government expenditures pp. 267-277

Jeffrey Zax

Further thoughts on rent-seeking, bureaucratic output, and the price of complements pp. 279-281

Bruce Benson

Chicago political economy: A public choice perspective pp. 283-292

William Mitchell

Chicago Political Economy pp. 293-297

Robert Tollison

Book review pp. 299-300

Randall Holcombe

Volume 63, issue 2, 1989

Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success pp. 101-112

Jack Hirshleifer

The determinants of off-budget activity of state and local governments pp. 113-123

Michael Marlow and David Joulfaian

Competition of newspapers and the location of political parties pp. 125-147

Norbert Schulz and Joachim Weimann

The size of the state, economic growth and the efficient utilization of national resources pp. 149-164

Gerald Scully

Nonprofit organizations: Revised theory and new evidence pp. 165-174

Edwin West

Do legislators' votes reflect constituency preference? A simple way to evaluate the Senate pp. 175-181

Robert Higgs

Book reviews pp. 183-200

Daniel McMillen, William Niskanen, Wayne Brough, Geoffrey Brennan, Gordon Tullock, Kolpin Van, Loren Lomasky, Peter Aranson, Joe Head, Thomas Dye and John Dryzek

Volume 63, issue 1, 1989

A democratic model of the “rent-sought” benefit cycle pp. 1-14

Michael Beenstock

Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats pp. 15-41

Jan Brueckner and Kevin O'Brien

Legitimacy as a capital asset of the state pp. 43-61

Giulio Gallarotti

Political instability in Africa: A rent-seeking approach pp. 63-72

John Mbaku and Chris Paul

Monopoly power and monitoring: A test using the Gonzalez and Mehay model pp. 73-78

Gary Giroux

Combining rent-seeking and public choice theory in the analysis of tariffs versus quotas pp. 79-86

William Kaempfer and Thomas Willett

Nonconventional costs of rent-seeking: X-inefficiency in the political process pp. 87-91

E. Pasour

Reviews pp. 93-100

Brian Goff, Charles Rowley and William Mitchell

Volume 62, issue 3, 1989

Religion, liberty and economic development: An empirical investigation pp. 201-215

Fred Glahe and Frank Vorhies

The assurance problem in a laboratory market pp. 217-236

R. Isaac, David Schmidtz and James Walker

The state of nature in the shadow of contract formation: Adding a missing link to J.M. Buchanan's social contract theory pp. 237-251

Hans-Jörg Schmidt-Trenz

“Relational goods” and participation: Incorporating sociability into a theory of rational action pp. 253-285

Carole Uhlaner

Monopoly deregulation in the presence of Tullock activities pp. 287-293

Raul Fabella

Reviews pp. 295-300

Allan Schmid, Michael Cain and Paul Abramson

Volume 62, issue 2, 1989

Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy pp. 101-118

Roger Congleton

Concealed takings: Capture and rent-seeking in the Indian Sugar Industry pp. 119-138

Shyam Kamath

An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking pp. 139-151

Edward Millner and Michael Pratt

The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process pp. 155-172

Ulrich Witt

Political successions and the growth of government pp. 173-179

Mwangi Kimenyi and William Shughart

A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions pp. 181-186

Michael Munger

Does transferability affect the social costs of licensing? pp. 187-190

Asghar Zardkoohi and Michael Pustay

Volume 62, issue 1, 1989

The retention of state governors pp. 1-13

James Adams and Lawrence Kenny

The determinants of minimum wage rates pp. 15-24

André Blais, Jean-Michel Cousineau and Kenneth McRoberts

Explaining collective action with rational models pp. 25-39

David Goetze and Peter Galderisi

Interest group demand for taxation pp. 41-61

William Hunter and Michael Nelson

Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension pp. 63-69

Philip Grossman

Bureaucracy, publicness and local government expenditures revisited: Comment pp. 71-77

Rodolfo Gonzalez, Roger Folsom and Stephen Mehay

Bureaucracy and the ‘publicness’ of local public goods: A reply to Gonzalez, Folsom and Mehay pp. 79-82

Paul Wyckoff

Less than unanimous agreement on the reason for unanimous agreement: Comment pp. 83-87

Dwight Lee

Non-optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule: Reply pp. 89-92

Randall Holcombe

Book reviews pp. 93-100

Mark Toma, G. Choate, William Mitchell, Michael Munger, Randall Holcombe and Donald Wittman