Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 153, issue 3, 2012

Elinor Ostrom (1933–2012) pp. 263-268

Roberta Herzberg and Barbara Allen

On choosing the alternative with the best median evaluation pp. 269-277

Jean-François Laslier

Nine points of the law: evidentiary rules and the costs of litigation pp. 279-285

Karl Wärneryd

The institutional dimension of election design pp. 287-293

Paul Edelman

Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures pp. 295-327

Georgios Efthyvoulou

Voting and economic factors in French elections for the European Parliament pp. 329-340

Antoine Auberger

Contests—a comparison of timing and information structures pp. 341-355

Sandra Ludwig

Why suicide-terrorists get educated, and what to do about it pp. 357-373

Jean-Paul Azam

Federal legislative activism in Australia: a new approach to testing Wagner’s law pp. 375-392

Stephen Kirchner

Is German domestic social policy politically controversial? pp. 393-418

Niklas Potrafke

On the optimal number of representatives pp. 419-445

Emmanuelle Auriol and Robert Gary-Bobo

Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004 pp. 447-467

Peter Roozendaal, Madeleine Hosli and Caspar Heetman

Adam Smith or Machiavelli? Political incentives for contracting out local public services pp. 469-485

Anders Sundell and Victor Lapuente

Tolerance and economic growth revisited: a note pp. 487-494

Eduard Bomhoff and Grace Lee

Tolerance and growth: modeling the empirical relationship pp. 495-502

Niclas Berggren and Mikael Elinder

Robert I. Rotberg: Transformative political leadership: making a difference in the developing world pp. 503-505

Michael McBride

Adrian Vermeule: The system of the constitution pp. 507-509

Jeremy Horpedahl

Mark Pennington: Robust political economy: classical liberalism and the future of public policy pp. 511-513

Peter Boettke

Andrei Shleifer: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators pp. 515-517

Paul Mahoney

Erratum to: Andrei Shleifer: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators pp. 519-519

Paul Mahoney

Volume 153, issue 1, 2012

Remembering Bill Niskanen: pursuing economics as a public science in the service of liberty pp. 1-7

Richard Wagner

Choosing for others: A neglected element in the theory of collective action pp. 9-16

James Buchanan and Y. Yoon

Travel visas pp. 17-36

Robert Lawson and Jayme Lemke

Why fight secession? Evidence of economic motivations from the American Civil War pp. 37-54

Zachary Liscow

Revealing information in electoral competition pp. 55-68

Mike Felgenhauer

The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests pp. 69-82

Paul Schweinzer and Ella Segev

Costs of taxation and the size of government pp. 83-115

Jørgen Andersen

Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa pp. 117-147

Paul Collier and Pedro Vicente

The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests: Incentives crowd out cooperation pp. 149-161

Heinrich Ursprung

Estimation of party positions: A comment on Schofield and Zakharov (2010) pp. 163-169

Monika Köppl-Turyna

Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits pp. 171-190

Russell Sobel and Matt Ryan

Regulators and Redskins pp. 191-204

Bentley Coffey, Patrick McLaughlin and Robert Tollison

Persistent rent extraction pp. 205-213

Leif Helland and Rune Sørensen

Determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities pp. 215-233

Linda Veiga

Correcting mistakes: cognitive dissonance and political attitudes in Sweden and the United States pp. 235-249

Mikael Elinder

Shmuel Nitzan: Collective preference and choice pp. 251-252

Daniel Sutter

Timothy Besley, Torsten Person: Pillars of prosperity: the political economics of development clusters pp. 253-255

Claudia Williamson

Peter J. Boettke: Living economics: yesterday, today, and tomorrow pp. 257-259

Richard Wagner

Erratum to: Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements pp. 261-261

Pierre Courtois and Guillaume Haeringer

Volume 152, issue 3, 2012

Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The Calculus of Consent at 50 pp. 245-252

Georg Vanberg and Viktor Vanberg

Genesis pp. 253-255

James Buchanan

My path to The Calculus of Consent pp. 257-257

Gordon Tullock

States without romance pp. 259-263

Richard Adelstein

From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem pp. 265-271

Peter Bernholz

Growing up with The Calculus of Consent pp. 273-278

Roger Congleton

From The Calculus of Consent to The Calculus of Dissent: a personal promenade in the constitutional square pp. 279-283

Giuseppe Eusepi

From The Calculus of Consent to public choice and to public economics in a public choice approach pp. 285-288

Francesco Forte

The Calculus of Consent reflected pp. 289-292

Alan Hamlin

Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent pp. 293-298

Charles Plott

From the Open Society to The Calculus of Consent: a long journey pp. 299-302

Pierre Salmon

Public choice and public life pp. 303-309

Randy Simmons

1966 pp. 311-312

Robert Tollison

The Calculus of Consent: some Swedish connections pp. 313-321

Niclas Berggren

Public choice and political philosophy pp. 323-327

Loren Lomasky

James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus pp. 329-332

Dennis Mueller

Learning how the world works in order to make it work ‘better’ pp. 333-337

Pedro Puy Fraga

The Calculus of Consent and real world constitution-making pp. 339-344

Sujai Shivakumar

The Calculus of Consent at fifty: the development of public choice in Japan pp. 345-349

Akira Yokoyama

Politics-as-exchange and The Calculus of Consent pp. 351-358

Geoffrey Brennan

Toward an integrated theory of human cooperation: an ongoing research agenda pp. 359-363

Zhihong Mo

The market as a cooperative endeavour pp. 365-370

Robert Sugden

Property rights, the social contract and the requirements for democratic government: reflections on The Calculus of Consent pp. 371-380

Dan Usher

Methodological and normative individualism in The Calculus pp. 381-388

Viktor Vanberg

Redistribution as income insurance? pp. 389-392

Roland Vaubel

The Calculus of Consent: a compass for my professional journey pp. 393-396

Richard Wagner

Constitutional effectiveness pp. 397-401

Albert Breton

Buchanan and Tullock’s apple pp. 403-406

Keith Dougherty

Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on pp. 407-413

Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard

Coercion, the state, and the obligations of citizenship pp. 415-421

Michael Munger

The Calculus of Consent: reforming political science pp. 423-426

Peter Ordeshook

Buchanan’s opening to constitutional choice and meta-levels of analysis pp. 427-431

Vincent Ostrom

Meeting Plato’s challenge? pp. 433-437

Michael Baurmann

The consents of The Calculus pp. 439-443

Hartmut Kliemt

The unanimity rule revisited: the case of revisions of hybrid constitutions pp. 445-449

Christian Kirchner

Markets, votes, and The Calculus of Consent pp. 451-453

Francesco Parisi

Constitutional neutrality among economic policies pp. 455-459

Guido Pincione

Economics of collective choice—the missing dimension of constitutional theory pp. 461-466

Suri Ratnapala

Volume 152, issue 1, 2012

The life and times of Gordon Tullock pp. 3-27

Charles Rowley and Daniel Houser

The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock pp. 29-46

Charles Rowley

Gordon Tullock and Public Choice pp. 47-60

Dennis Mueller

Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures pp. 61-72

Michael Munger

The economic theory of rent seeking pp. 73-82

Robert Tollison

Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock pp. 83-95

Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast

Gordon Tullock’s contribution to bureaucracy pp. 97-101

William Niskanen

What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that pp. 103-114

Michael Reksulak and William Shughart

Autocracy and coups d’etat pp. 115-130

Ronald Wintrobe

The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock pp. 131-146

Roger Congleton

Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent pp. 147-161

Bernard Grofman, Thomas Brunell and Scott Feld

Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk pp. 163-180

David Levy and Sandra Peart

Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter? pp. 181-201

Barbara Luppi and Francesco Parisi

Gordon Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics pp. 203-210

Janet Landa

Gordon Tullock and experimental economics pp. 211-222

Daniel Houser and Thomas Stratmann

Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock pp. 223-244

Richard Wallick