Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 131, issue 3, 2007

Economic and security consequences of supreme values pp. 259-280

Arye Hillman

Political institutions and economic growth reconsidered pp. 281-292

Jakob de Haan

The effectiveness of institutional borrowing restrictions: Empirical evidence from Spanish municipalities pp. 293-313

Fermín Cabasés, Pedro Pascual Arzoz and Jaime Vallés-Giménez

Outsourcing in contests pp. 315-331

Frode Meland and Odd Rune Straume

The turnout ‘gap’ and the costs of voting – a comparison of participation at the 2001 general and 2002 local elections in England pp. 333-344

Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher

Political economy of the U.S. temporary duty suspension program: An empirical note pp. 345-350

Omer Gokcekus and Amber Barth

Choosing a runoff election threshold pp. 351-364

Jeffrey O’Neill

Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario pp. 365-386

Kevin Morrison

Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election pp. 387-411

Valentino Larcinese

The effects of alternative power-sharing arrangements: Do “moderating” institutions moderate party strategies and government policy outputs? pp. 413-434

Samuel Merrill and James Adams

Changing minds? Not in Congress! pp. 435-451

Keith Poole

Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest pp. 453-464

Lambert Schoonbeek

Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings pp. 465-468

Richard Potthoff and Steven Brams

Campaign resources and electoral success: Evidence from the 2002 French parliamentary elections pp. 469-489

Gil Epstein and Raphael Franck

Goods or resource contests? pp. 491-499

Martin Kolmar

David F. Prindle, The Paradox of Democratic Capitalism: Politics and Economics in American Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. USD 49.95 (cloth) pp. 501-503

Randall Holcombe

Beyond conventional economics: The limits of rational behaviour in political decision making pp. 505-507

Bryan Caplan

Volume 131, issue 1, 2007

Lobbying, corruption and political influence pp. 1-21

Nauro Campos and Francesco Giovannoni

Government transparency and policymaking pp. 23-44

Justin Fox

Political business cycles at the municipal level pp. 45-64

Linda Veiga and Francisco Veiga

Reinforcement vs. change: The political influence of the media pp. 65-81

Ascension Andina-Diaz

Flags of our fathers: Voting on Confederate symbols in the State of Georgia pp. 83-99

Michael Reksulak, Gökhan Karahan and William Shughart

Immigration and income redistribution: A political economy analysis pp. 101-116

Karin Mayr-Dorn

Legislature size and government spending in Italian regions: Forecasting the effects of a reform pp. 117-125

Nadia Fiorino and Roberto Ricciuti

Inefficient households and the mix of government spending pp. 127-140

Dan Anderberg

Political support and tax reforms with an application to Italy pp. 141-155

Paola Profeta

The growth effects of fiscal policy in Greece 1960–2000 pp. 157-175

Konstantinos Angelopoulos and Apostolis Philippopoulos

The charitable activities of terrorist organizations pp. 177-195

Pierre-Emmanuel Ly

Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums pp. 197-215

Randall Holcombe and Lawrence Kenny

Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation pp. 217-242

Per Fredriksson and Daniel Millimet

The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all! pp. 243-247

Georgios Chortareas and Stephen Miller

Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism pp. 249-251

Robert Lawson

William A. Fischel, ed., The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2006, xxi + 339 pages. USD 30.00 (paper) pp. 253-255

Thomas McCaleb

Volume 130, issue 3, 2007

Organized crime and the 1960 presidential election pp. 251-266

John Binder

The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world pp. 267-292

Christian Bjørnskov, Axel Dreher and Justina A. V. Fischer

Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence pp. 293-310

John Patty and Roberto Weber

Public versus private production and economies of scale pp. 311-328

Henrik Christoffersen, Martin Paldam and Allan Würtz

Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Comment pp. 329-335

Johannes Münster

Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation pp. 337-346

Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi

A sheriff, two bullets and three problems pp. 347-362

Mike Felgenhauer

Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio? pp. 363-380

Peter Schwarz

Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy pp. 381-393

Per Fredriksson and Jim Wollscheid

1 dictator=2 voters pp. 395-400

Antonio Quesada

A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union pp. 401-436

Francesco Lagona and Fabio Padovano

Why party and how much? The Soviet State and the party finance pp. 437-456

Eugenia Belova and Valery Lazarev

Esteem-based contributions and optimality in public goods supply pp. 457-470

Geoffrey Brennan and Michael Brooks

Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption pp. 471-493

Omar Azfar and William Nelson

Michael Bacharach, Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. xxiii + 214 pages. USD 35.00 (cloth) pp. 495-497

Roy Gardner

Gordon Tullock, Public Goods, Redistribution and Rent Seeking, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005, 153 + vii pp., 2005. USD 75.00 (cloth) pp. 499-501

Daniel Sutter

Pivotal power brokers: Theory and evidence on political fundraising pp. 503-503

Franklin Mixon, Chena Crocker and H. Black

Volume 130, issue 1, 2007

Determinants of generalized trust: A cross-country comparison pp. 1-21

Christian Bjørnskov

An explanation of the continuing federal government mandate of single-member congressional districts pp. 23-40

Stephen Calabrese

Efficient anarchy pp. 41-53

Peter Leeson

Another look at anti-scalping laws: Theory and evidence pp. 55-77

Craig Depken

Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government pp. 79-98

Reiner Eichenberger and Mark Schelker

The tulipmania: Fact or artifact? pp. 99-114

Earl Thompson

Why feed the Leviathan? pp. 115-128

Pablo Guillen, Christiane Schwieren and Gianandrea Staffiero

A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The Open Rule Equilibrium and Coalition Formation pp. 129-135

David Primo

Do politicians’ preferences correspond to those of the voters? An investigation of political representation pp. 137-162

Hanna Ågren, Matz Dahlberg and Eva Mörk

An Empirical Note on Economic Freedom and Income Inequality pp. 163-177

John Carter

The Smallpox Eradication Game pp. 179-207

Scott Barrett

The debt wish: Rent seeking by business groups and the structure of corporate borrowing in India pp. 209-223

Sumit Majumdar and Kunal Sen

The outcome-prediction strategy in cases denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court pp. 225-237

Saul Brenner, Joseph Whitmeyer and Harold Spaeth

Mathias Kifmann on “health insurance in a democracy: Why is it public and why are premiums income related?” pp. 239-242

Wolfram Richter

Health insurance in a democracy: A reply to Richter pp. 243-243

Mathias Kifmann

Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence pp. 245-247

Peter Leeson

Understanding Democracy: An Introduction to Public Choice pp. 249-250

Edward Lopez