Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 163, issue 3, 2015

In memory of Cotton Mather Lindsay (6/17/1940–1/16/2015) pp. 223-224

Michael Maloney and Robert Tollison

The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements pp. 225-246

Marco Faillo, Stefania Ottone and Lorenzo Sacconi

The UN Goldstone Report and retraction: an empirical investigation pp. 247-266

Arye Hillman and Niklas Potrafke

The political economics of redistribution, inequality and tax avoidance pp. 267-287

Carlos Bethencourt and Lars Kunze

Primaries: the unifying force pp. 289-305

Rafael Hortala-Vallve and Hannes Mueller

Partial fiscal decentralization and sub-national government fiscal discipline: empirical evidence from OECD countries pp. 307-320

Zareh Asatryan, Lars Feld and Benny Geys

Does immigration impact institutions? pp. 321-335

J. Clark, Robert Lawson, Alex Nowrasteh, Benjamin Powell and Ryan Murphy

On the relationship between corruption and migration: empirical evidence from a gravity model of migration pp. 337-354

Marie Poprawe

Does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention? pp. 355-377

Hans Pitlik and Luděk Kouba

Public choice, social choice, and political economy pp. 379-387

Dennis Mueller

Armin Steinbach: Economic policy coordination in the Euro-area pp. 389-391

Sebastian Dullien

Michael J. Glennon: National Security and Double Government pp. 393-396

Christopher Coyne

Avner Greif, Lynne Kiesling, and John V. C. Nye (eds.), Institutions, Innovation, and Industrialization: Essays in Economic History and Development pp. 397-399

Douglas Allen

Adam Smith and Bruce Yandle: Bootleggers and Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics pp. 401-403

Diana Thomas

William Easterly, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor pp. 405-408

Claudia Williamson

Jacob T. Levy: Rationalism, Pluralism, and Freedom pp. 409-412

Mark Koyama

Volume 163, issue 1, 2015

Introduction to the Public Choice Society at 50 years symposium pp. 1-5

Edward Lopez

Buchanan’s anti-conservatism pp. 7-13

Geoffrey Brennan

Virginia political economy: a rational reconstruction pp. 15-29

Richard Wagner

The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups pp. 31-52

Keith Dougherty, Julian Edward and Robi Ragan

The past, present and future of Virginia Political Economy pp. 53-65

Peter Boettke and Alain Marciano

Vincent Ostrom’s revolutionary science of association pp. 67-83

Michael Fotos

The Bloomington Workshop: multiple methods, interdisciplinary research, and collective action pp. 85-93

James Walker

Governing their commons: Elinor and Vincent Ostrom and the Bloomington School pp. 95-109

Roberta Herzberg

Public Administration, Public Choice and the Ostroms: the achievements, the failure, the promise pp. 111-127

Paul Aligica

Public choice perspectives on intellectual property pp. 129-151

Eli Dourado and Alexander Tabarrok

The strange history of social choice, and the contribution of the Public Choice Society to its fifth revival pp. 153-165

Iain McLean

Constitutional law in social choice perspective pp. 167-186

Maxwell Stearns

House money effects on trust and reciprocity pp. 187-199

Daniel Houser and Erte Xiao

Further towards a theory of the emergence of property pp. 201-222

Bart Wilson

Volume 162, issue 3, 2015

In remembrance of Gordon Tullock pp. 225-227

J. Clark and Dwight Lee

Thanks to Gordon Tullock pp. 229-233

Roger Congleton

Remembering Gordon Tullock pp. 235-238

T. Nicolaus Tideman

Gordon Tullock: gone but surely not forgotten pp. 239-241

Bruce Yandle

Olson’s Logic of Collective Action at fifty pp. 243-262

Paul Pecorino

How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation pp. 263-285

Antoine Cazals and Alexandre Sauquet

Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling pp. 287-305

Ilia Murtazashvili and Jennifer Murtazashvili

Legitimacy and the cost of government pp. 307-328

Niclas Berggren, Christian Bjørnskov and David Lipka

Strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty pp. 329-350

Konstantinos Matakos and Dimitrios Xefteris

The rule of law and constitutionalism in Muslim countries pp. 351-380

Jerg Gutmann and Stefan Voigt

Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies pp. 381-404

Michael Dorsch, Karl Dunz and Paul Maarek

Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect pp. 405-423

Haldun Evrenk and Chien-Yuan Sher

Global economic crisis and corruption pp. 425-445

Artjoms Ivlevs and Timothy Hinks

Erratum to: Global economic crisis and corruption pp. 447-449

Artjoms Ivlevs and Timothy Hinks

Massimo Florio, Applied welfare economics: cost–benefit analysis of projects and policies pp. 451-452

David Hollanders

William R. Keech, Economic Politics in the United States: The Costs and Risks of Democracy pp. 453-454

Michael Munger

John Dunn: Breaking Democracy’s Spell pp. 455-457

Michael Munger

Paul Dragos Aligica: Institutional diversity and political economy: the Ostroms and beyond pp. 459-462

Karol Sołtan

Benjamin Powell, Out of poverty: sweatshops in the global economy pp. 463-465

Christopher Coyne

David Emanuel Andersson and Stefano Moroni (eds): Cities and private planning: property rights, entrepreneurship, and transaction costs pp. 467-469

Alexander Salter

Volume 162, issue 1, 2015

Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament pp. 1-24

Thomas Braendle

Is there a local knowledge advantage in federations? Evidence from a natural experiment pp. 25-42

André Schultz and Alexander Libman

Signature requirements and citizen initiatives: Quasi-experimental evidence from Germany pp. 43-56

Felix Arnold and Ronny Freier

Tax structure and corruption: cross-country evidence pp. 57-78

Yongzheng Liu and Haibo Feng

Explaining party ideological stances pp. 79-96

Luigi Curini

The occupations of regulators influence occupational regulation: evidence from the US private security industry pp. 97-117

Brian Meehan and Bruce Benson

Voting and the economic cycle pp. 119-133

John Maloney and Andrew Pickering

Voluntary public health insurance pp. 135-157

Catarina Goulão

Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights pp. 159-182

Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev

Mobilization, cost of voting and turnout: a natural randomized experiment with double elections pp. 183-199

Christine Fauvelle-Aymar and Abel François

Denise Minger, Death by food pyramid: how shoddy science, sketchy politics and shady special interests have ruined our health pp. 201-203

Adam Hoffer

Tim Groseclose, Cheating: an insider’s report on the use of race in admissions at UCLA pp. 205-209

D. Roderick Kiewiet

Peter H. Schuck: Why government fails so often: and how it can do better pp. 211-213

Matt Ryan

David Skarbek: The social order of the underworld: how prison gangs govern the American penal system pp. 215-217

Graham Denyer Willis

Peter T. Leeson, Anarchy unbound: why self-governance works better than you think pp. 219-221

Stergios Skaperdas