Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Median voters, political systems and public policies: An empirical test pp. 201-219: George Boyne
Voting and not voting at the same time pp. 221-229: W. Crain, Donald Leavens and Lynn Abbot
The rational behavior theory of voting participation: Evidence from the 1970 and 1982 elections pp. 231-242: Garey Durden and Patricia Gaynor
Expenditures and receipts: Testing for causality in state and local government finances pp. 243-255: Michael Marlow and Neela Manage
A note on senatorial mass mailing expenditure and the quest for reelection pp. 257-265: John Mikesell
Labor PAC contributions and labor legislation: A simultaneous logit approach pp. 267-276: Allen Wilhite and John Theilmann
Distant friends and nearby enemies: The politics of legislative coalition formation pp. 277-284: Thomas Hammond and Gary Miller
Externalities, agency structure, and the level of transfers pp. 285-287: John Lott
Public employees' consumption of government goods: The case of education pp. 289-296: Eugenia Toma and James Long

Retrospective voting: An experimental study pp. 101-130: Kenneth Collier, Richard McKelvey, Peter Ordeshook and Kenneth Williams
The optimal size of government pp. 131-147: Philip Grossman
The tradeoff between equality and efficiency: Short-run politics and long-run realities pp. 149-165: Dwight Lee
The growth of government: A protection explanation pp. 167-174: Michael Bordo and Daniel Landau
Political accountability for price stability and unemployment in a multi-party system with coalition governments pp. 181-186: Paul Renaud and Frans Winden
Altruism as a source of self-interested behavior pp. 187-192: Robert Schenk

The cameralists: A public choice perspective pp. 3-20: Juergen Backhaus and Richard Wagner
Legislative ratings as a metric of goal cohesion within interest groups: Business vs. labor pp. 21-39: C. Hetzner and Stu Westin
Statutory changes in state income taxes: An indirect test of fiscal illusion pp. 41-51: William Hunter and Charles Scott
Chameleon voters and public choice pp. 53-78: Timur Kuran
Notes on the mass media as an economic institution pp. 79-95: Daniel Orr
Federal deficits and the real rate of interest in the United States: A note pp. 97-100: Richard Cebula

Explaining differences in state growth: Catching up versus Olson pp. 201-213: Clark Nardinelli, Myles Wallace and John Warner
A note on Pryor's criticism of Olson's rise and decline of nations pp. 215-222: Erich Weede
Executive veto, legislative override, and structure-induced equilibrium pp. 227-244: John Carter and David Schap
Municipal annexation and local monopoly power pp. 245-255: Rodolfo Gonzalez and Stephen Mehay
Budgetgames and the private and social demand for mixed public goods pp. 257-272: Hans Groot and Evert Pommer
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition pp. 273-297: Assar Lindbeck and Jörgen Weibull

A median-voter model of economic regulation pp. 125-142: Burton Abrams and Kenneth Lewis
Inflation and political instability in eight Latin American countries 1946-83 pp. 143-168: Martin Paldam
Political cheating pp. 169-186: John Lott
An instrumental-variables approach to income redistribution pp. 187-192: T. Tideman and R. Morris Coats
Capital intensity and the federal sector: Some further evidence pp. 193-199: Gabriel Obermann

Presidential address Fourteen years of European Public Choice Society research pp. 3-14: Charles Blankart
The Downsian model of electoral participation: Formal theory and empirical analysis of the constituency size effect pp. 15-33: Stephen Hansen, Thomas Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal
Scale economies and rent-seeking in legislative parties pp. 35-55: Kenneth Koford
Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament pp. 57-73: Bjørn Rasch
The rise and evolution of public pension systems pp. 75-100: H. Verbon

A general constitutional possibility theorem pp. 249-265: Peter Bernholz
Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule pp. 267-284: Norman Schofield
The stability of logrolling: An expectations approach pp. 285-294: James Enelow
Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes pp. 295-313: John Chamberlin
Cooperation among egoists in Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games pp. 315-331: Barton Lipman
Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms pp. 333-343: Susan Cohen

The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments pp. 117-128: Peter Bloch
Persuading Caesar: A new interpretation of Farquharson's problem pp. 129-140: J. Budziszewski
Equity, efficiency and environmental quality pp. 141-159: George Daly and Thomas Mayor
The political economy of restriction of choice pp. 161-172: Stephen Littlechild and J. Wiseman
The congressional foundations of agency performance pp. 173-190: Mathew McCubbins and Talbot Page
The political economy of state level welfare benefits pp. 209-219: William Sander and J. Giertz
Money and politics in a small open economy pp. 221-239: Stanley Winer

Rational egoism versus adaptive egoism as fundamental postulate for a descriptive theory of human behavior pp. 3-23: Dennis Mueller
The political economy of swarming in honeybees: Voting-with-the-wings, decision-making costs, and the unanimity rule pp. 25-38: Janet Landa
A public choice approach to international organization pp. 39-57: Roland Vaubel
Regulating the function, not the industry pp. 59-70: Bruce Yandle and Elizabeth Young
Research note Partial single-peakedness: An extension and clarification pp. 71-80: Scott Feld and Bernard Grofman
Optimal quantity of a controversial good or service pp. 81-86: Robert Kohn
Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets pp. 87-92: John Lott
Rent-seeking, distributional coalitions, taxes, relative prices and economic growth pp. 93-100: Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway
Is democracy regressive? A comment on political participation pp. 101-107: Philip Jones and John Cullis
Reviews pp. 109-115: Charles Rowley, William Dougan and Dwight Lee