Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 93, issue 3-4, 1997

Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good pp. 221-44

Miguel Gouveia

The Economics of Political Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of the Not Very Greedy Grandfathers pp. 245-70

Jeffrey Milyo

Committee Characteristics and Re-election Margins: An Empirical Investigation of the US House pp. 271-85

W. Crain and John T Sullivan

Rhetoric and Rationality: A Study of Democratization in the Soviet Union pp. 287-314

Anderson, Richard D, and Bernard Grofman

An Analysis of Voter Predictive Dimensions and Recovery of the Underlying Issue Space pp. 315-34

Tom Tanner

Club Theory: Thirty Years Later pp. 335-55

Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart

Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982: A Public Choice Analysis of Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives pp. 357-71

Franklin Mixon and Kamal Upadhyaya

A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict pp. 373-88

Hugh M Neary

Self-Imposed Term Limits pp. 389-94

Edward Glaeser

The European Central Bank: Independence, Accountability and Strategy: A Review pp. 395-426

Jakob de Haan

The Bundesbank's Path to Independence: Evidence from the 1950s pp. 427-53

Helge Berger

Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy pp. 455-75

Toke Aidt

Tullock's Rent-Seeking Contest with a Minimum Expenditure Requirement pp. 477-86

Lambert Schoonbeek and Peter Kooreman

Who Wants the Euro--And Why? Economic Explanations of Public Attitudes towards a Single European Currency pp. 487-510

Manfred Gärtner

Volume 93, issue 3, 1997

Majority rule and the public provision of a private good pp. 221-244

Miguel Gouveia

The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers pp. 245-270

Jeffrey Milyo

Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House pp. 271-285

W. Crain and John Sullivan

Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union pp. 287-314

Richard Anderson and Bernard Grofman

An analysis of voter predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space pp. 315-334

Tom Tanner

Club theory: Thirty years later pp. 335-355

Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart

Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982: A public choice analysis of turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives pp. 357-371

Franklin Mixon and Kamal Upadhyaya

A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict pp. 373-388

Hugh Neary

Self-imposed term limits pp. 389-394

Edward Glaeser

The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review pp. 395-426

Jakob de Haan

The Bundesbank's path to independence: Evidence from the 1950s pp. 427-453

Helge Berger

Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy pp. 455-475

Toke Aidt

Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement pp. 477-486

Lambert Schoonbeek and Peter Kooreman

Who wants the euro – and why? Economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single European currency pp. 487-510

Manfred Gärtner

Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke and Richard E. Wagner, Trade protection in the United States pp. 511-514

Thomas Willett

Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair division: From cake cutting to dispute resolution pp. 514-517

Joe Oppenheimer

John M. Carey, Term limits and legislative representation pp. 517-522

Elizabeth Garrett

Albert Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance pp. 523-524

James Buchanan

Roger Middleton, Government versus the market: The growth of the public sector, economic management, and British economic performance, 1890–1979 pp. 525-527

Brian Goff

Volume 93, issue 1-2, 1997

Empirical Evaluation of Bureaucratic Models of Inefficiency pp. 1-18

William Duncombe, Jerry Miner and John Ruggiero

Politics and the Pursuit of Fame pp. 19-35

Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter

Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State pp. 37-53

Gary M Anderson and Peter Boettke

Imperfect Rent Dissipation with Unionized Labor pp. 55-75

Martin Rama

Democide and Genocide as Rent-Seeking Activities pp. 77-97

Gerald W Scully

Endogenizing the Median Voter: Public Choice Goes to School pp. 99-118

Stephanie Dunne, W. Reed and James Wilbanks

Learning the Structure of a Simple Rent-Seeking Game pp. 119-30

Derek J Clark

The Strategic Behavior of the Italian Left in a Risk-Sharing Framework pp. 131-48

Pietro Navarra and Diego Lignana

Generational Accounting and Intergenerational Welfare pp. 149-63

Bernd Raffelhuschen and Alf Erling Risa

Stagflationary Bias and the Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages in a Unionized Economy pp. 165-78

Robin Cubitt

Pressure and the Division of a Public Budget pp. 179-95

Derek J Clark

Volume 92, issue 3-4, 1997

Optimal Effort Allocation by U.S. Senators: The Role of Constituency Size pp. 221-29

Cary M Atlas, Robert J Hendershott and Mark A Zupan

Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement pp. 231-42

Willem Thorbecke

If You Can't Please Everyone, Must You Only Please Yourself? Personal or Party Ideologies and Senate Roll Call Voting pp. 243-60

Eric Uslaner

An Empirical Test of Neutrality and the Crowding-Out Hypothesis pp. 261-79

Eric Brunner

On Distinguishing between Leviathan and Public Interest Governments in a Federal State pp. 281-99

Sohrab Abizadeh and Philippe Cyrenne

Human Capital, Committee Power and Legislative Outcomes pp. 301-16

Jason Saving

Empirical Evidence on a Special-Interest-Group Perspective to Antitrust pp. 317-35

Delorme, Charles D,, W Frame and David R Kamerschen

A Market Based Evaluation of the Election versus Appointment of Regulatory Commissioners pp. 337-51

Joseph A Fields, Linda S Klein and James M Sfiridis

Learning and Signalling by Advisor Selection pp. 353-67

Wilko Letterie and Otto Swank

Rent-Seeking and Political Tenure: First Estimates pp. 369-85

Patrick McNutt

Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence for the United States pp. 387-406

Fredrik Carlsen

Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Survey pp. 407-27

Simon Price

Time-Consistent Monetary Policy under Output Persistence pp. 429-37

Manfred Gärtner

Volume 92, issue 1-2, 1997

Donald Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure: Review Article pp. 1-13

Lott, John R,

Donald Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure: Review Article pp. 15-26

Charles Rowley

A Multinomial Logit Analysis of the Influence of Policy Variables and Board Experience on FOMC Voting Behavior pp. 27-39

Stuart Allen, Jeremy Bray and Terry G Seaks

Non-redundant Groups, the Assurance Game and the Origins of Collective Action pp. 41-53

Rene Cortazar

Congressional Committees and the Political Economy of Federal Outlays pp. 55-73

R Michael Alvarez and Jason Saving

The Role of Tax Bases and Collections Costs in the Determination of Income Tax Rates, Seigniorage and Inflation pp. 75-90

Lawrence Kenny and Mark Toma

Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response pp. 91-108

Paul Pecorino

Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained pp. 109-26

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale

A Comparison of Three Institutions for Monetary Policy When Central Bankers Have Private Objectives pp. 127-43

Hans Peter Gruner

The Barely Revealed Preference behind Road Investment Priorities pp. 145-68

Lasse Fridstrom and Rune Elvik

Voter Information and Power Dilution: Evidence from Sicilian Provincial Elections pp. 169-80

Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio

Local Government Grants and Income Tax Revenue: Redistributive Politics in Norway 1900-1990 pp. 181-97

Lars-Erik Borge and Jorn Rattso