Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Does Political Reform Increase Wealth?: Or, Why the Difference between the Chicago and Virginia Schools Is Really an Elasticity Question pp. 219-27: Lott, John R,
Building Majority Coalitions for Sub-Majority Benefit Distributions pp. 229-49: Kenneth N Bickers and Robert M Stein
Mechanisms for Rent Transfers: Subcontracting among Military Aircraft Manufacturers pp. 251-69: Barbara Alexander
An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power pp. 271-99: David Epstein
Shareholder Wealth Effects of Legislative Events: The Case of Airline Deregulation pp. 301-31: Rajiv D Banker, Somnath Das and Chin S Ou
A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure pp. 333-50: Peter Moser
The Political Economy of Distribution in Developing Countries: A Rent-Seeking Approach pp. 351-73: Karl R Pedersen
Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989 pp. 375-95: Thomas R Cusack
Real and Perceived Effects of Changing the Grant System from Specific to General Grants pp. 397-416: Lasse Oulasvirta
Erratum: Setting the Record Straight: A Note on Sophisticated Voting under Borda's Method pp. 433: Dan S Felsenthal

The Demand Revealing Process: To Distribute the Surplus pp. 107-26: Martin J Bailey
Slowing Monetary Growth since 1984: A Public Choice Explanation pp. 127-37: Tony Caporale, Dwight R Lee and Richard K Vedder
How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists pp. 139-47: David Lowery and Virginia Gray
Where Is the Rectangle? pp. 149-59: Gordon Tullock
Trade Unions, Nonneutrality and Stagflation pp. 161-78: Nicola Acocella and Giuseppe Ciccarone
Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany pp. 179-97: Helge Berger and Ulrich Woitek
Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information: A Comment pp. 199-207: Randolph Sloof
Choosing among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games: A Reply to Sloof pp. 209-14: Eric Rasmusen

Expected Closeness and Turnout: An Empirical Analysis for the German General Elections, 1983-1994 pp. 3-25: Gebhard Kirchgässner and Anne Meyer Zu Himmern
Do People Care about Democracy? An Experiment Exploring the Value of Voting Rights pp. 27-47: Werner Guth and Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
Do People Care about Democracy?: Comment pp. 49-51: Arthur Schram
Do People Care about Democracy?: Comment pp. 53-55: Bruno Frey
Econometric Estimations of Popularity Functions: A Case Study for Austria pp. 57-88: Reinhard Neck and Sohbet Karbuz
Fairness and Competence in Democratic Decisions pp. 89-105: Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Iris Bohnet and Bruno Frey

Introduction: The Relevance of Public Choice for Constitutional Political Economy pp. 1-10: Charles Rowley
Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey pp. 11-53: Stefan Voigt
Constitutions for New Democracies: Reflections of Turmoil or Agents of Stability? pp. 55-72: Peter C Ordeshook
Toward a New Constitution for a Future Country pp. 73-115: Martin J Bailey
The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments pp. 117-38: James Buchanan
The Prohibition-Repeal Amendments: A Natural Experiment in Interest Group Influence pp. 139-63: Michael Munger and Thomas Schaller
Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from California's State Legislative Races pp. 165-84: Kermit Daniel and Lott, John R,
Choosing Free Trade without Amending the U.S. Constitution pp. 185-200: Willem Thorbecke
Marginal Cost Sharing and the Articles of Confederation pp. 201-13: Keith L Dougherty and Michael J G Cain
On the (Relative) Unimportance of a Balanced Budget pp. 215-33: Laura Razzolini and William Shughart
Public Choice in a Federal System pp. 235-54: Jean-Luc Migue
Federalism and the European Union: A Constitutional Perspective pp. 255-80: Dennis Mueller
Subsidiarity and Ecologically Based Taxation: A European Constitutional Perspective pp. 281-310: Jurgen G Backhaus
Rule and Policy Spaces and Economic Progress: Lessons for Third World Countries pp. 311-24: Gerald W Scully

Finance Industry PAC Contributions to U.S. Senators, 1983-88 pp. 219-29: Christine Loucks
Implementation of the Thompson Mechanism pp. 231-43: Martin J Bailey
Equilibrium and Efficiency in an Organized Vote Market pp. 245-65: Tomas Philipson and James Snyder
The Political Economy of Taking and Just Compensation pp. 267-82: Fred G Esposto
Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games pp. 283-303: Keisuke Iida
Income Redistribution: An International Perspective pp. 305-23: John Horowitz and Cecil Bohanon
The Olson Ratio and Indirectly Endogenous Rent pp. 325-37: Raul Fabella
Social Order through Constitutional Choice: A Contractarian Proposal pp. 339-61: Niclas Berggren
An Examination of the Causal Relationship between Government Spending and Revenue: A Cointegration Analysis pp. 363-74: George Hondroyiannis and Evangelia Papapetrou
Public Choice, Technology and Industrialization in Tanzania: Some Paradoxes Resolved pp. 375-92: Jeffrey James
Local Governments' Monopoly Power and Local Tax Reform: Theory and Evidence from the U.K pp. 393-417: John Ashworth and Norman Gemmell

Public Sector Unions and Public Spending pp. 1-16: Michael Marlow and William Orzechowski
Setting the Record Straight: A Note on Sophisticated Voting under Borda's Method pp. 17-25: Dan S Felsenthal
Bureaucracy, Altruisme, and Monetary Policy: A Note from a Forecasting Perspective pp. 27-34: Mounts, W Stewart, and Clifford Sowell
The Cost Disease and Government Growth: Qualifications to Baumol pp. 35-52: J. Stephen Ferris and Edwin G West
(Non)equivalence in a Federalism: Dual Tax Shares, Flypaper Effects and Leviathan pp. 53-62: J Richard Aronson and Vincent G Munley
If People Vote Because They Like to, Then Why Do So Many of Them Lie? pp. 63-76: William Harbaugh
"Bru-u-u-uce": The Simple Economics of Mob Goods pp. 77-91: Allan C DeSerpa and Roger L Faith
The Incentive Effects of Property Taxes on Local Governments pp. 93-111: Edward Glaeser
Innovations, Externalities and the Problem of Economic Progress pp. 113-30: Ulrich Witt
Employment Service: Public or Private? pp. 131-62: Peter Zweifel and Christoph Zaborowski
Central Bank Independence: A Paneldata Approach pp. 163-82: Sylvester Eijffinger, Maarten van Rooij and Eric Schaling
Government Spending Cycles: Ideological or Opportunistic? pp. 183-200: Hendrik van Dalen and Otto Swank
The Role of Common Law in Environmental Policy: Comment pp. 201-05: Reimund Schwarze
Common Law and the Environment: Reply pp. 207-09: Fritz Sollner

Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic? pp. 183-200: Hendrik Dalen and Otto Swank