Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 36, issue 3, 1981

California school finance: The 1970s decade pp. 391-412

W Stubblebine and David Kennard

The post-Proposition 13 environment in California and its consequences for education pp. 413-423

Werner Hirsch

Local authority education expenditure in England and Wales: Why standards differ and the impact of government grants pp. 425-439

Richard Jackman and John Papadachi

On setting the agenda for Pennsylvania school finance reform: An exercise in giving policy advice pp. 449-474

Robert Inman

Imperfect capital markets and the public provision of education pp. 481-507

Paul Hare and D. Ulph

An equity perspective on community college finance pp. 515-532

Susan Nelson and David Breneman

The finance of recurrent education: Some theoretical considerations pp. 537-550

Maurice Peston

The role of the state in financing recurrent education: Lessons from European experience pp. 551-571

Howard Glennerster

Comments on M. Peston and H. Glennerster pp. 573-577

Mark Blaug

The university department as a non-profit labor cooperative pp. 585-612

Estelle James and Egon Neuberger

Extra-governmental powers in public schooling: The unions and the courts pp. 619-637

E. West and R. Staaf

Comments on E. G. West and R. J. Staaf pp. 641-645

Ronald Ehrenberg

Rejoinder pp. 647-650

E. West and R. Staaf

Volume 36, issue 2, 1981

Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model pp. 209-234

W. Welch

The advantages of contingent valuation methods for benefit-cost analysis pp. 235-252

David Brookshire and Thomas Crocker

Political and economic determinants of county government pay pp. 253-271

Bernard Lentz

A median voter analysis of variations in the use of property taxes among local governments pp. 273-285

David Sjoquist

Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models pp. 301-312

Henry Chappell

Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test pp. 313-322

Thomas McGuire

Coalitions under demand revealing pp. 323-328

T. Tideman and Gordon Tullock

The ‘crowding out’ effect of federal government outlay decisions: An empirical note pp. 329-336

Richard Cebula, Christopher Carlos and James Koch

The construction of the demand for public goods and the theory of income redistribution pp. 337-344

Richard McKenzie

Daylight Savings: An endogenous law pp. 345-349

James Adams

Reviews pp. 351-371

Ulrich Lith, Morgan Reynolds, Joseph Reid, Geoffrey Brennan, Jürgen Backhaus and Gordon Tullock

Volume 36, issue 1, 1981

Some advantages of social control: An individualist defense pp. 3-16

Lester Hunt

Utility-maximizing behavior in organized anarchies: An empirical investigation of the Breneman thesis pp. 17-32

Fred Thompson

The Minister's memos: The re-election issue pp. 33-41

Gareth Locksley

An analysis of factors affecting differential assessment legislation pp. 43-52

Rod Ziemer, Fred White and Ivery Clifton

The expenditure effects of municipal annexation pp. 53-62

Stephen Mehay

The economics of choice in the allocation of Federal grants: An empirical test pp. 63-73

John Gist and R. Hill

Pareto optimality as a guide to income redistribution pp. 75-87

E. Pasour

Approval voting, Condorcet's principle, and runoff elections pp. 89-114

Peter Fishburn and Steven Brams

Strategic decisions under one-stage multi-candidate voting systems pp. 115-134

Samuel Merrill

Voting as an act of contribution pp. 135-140

Melvin Hinich

The inherent disadvantage of the presidential party in midterm congressional elections pp. 141-146

Randall Calvert and R. Isaac

Rank-dominance in income distributions pp. 147-151

Rubin Saposnik

A further characterization of Borda ranking method pp. 153-158

Shmuel Nitzan and Ariel Rubinstein

Optimally allocating campaign expenditures pp. 159-164

Stuart Nagel

Political participation under the unit rule: A research note pp. 165-169

William Collins

Politics as a filter pp. 171-177

George Daly

The Buchanan-Tullock model: Some extensions pp. 179-186

Milton Kafoglis and Richard Cebula

The incentives of regulators: Evidence from banking pp. 187-192

Robert Michaels and Lionel Kalish

An approach to empirical measures of voting paradoxes pp. 193-194

John Dobra and Gordon Tullock

Mr. Friedman's strictures on Murder at the Margin pp. 195-196

Marshall Jevons

Reviews pp. 197-208

Robert Tollison, James Buchanan, Barry Baysinger, Richard Carter and Gordon Tullock

Volume 35, issue 5, 1980

Agriculture in development: A coalitional analysis pp. 513-527

Robert Bates and William Rogerson

Bureaucratic productivity: The case of agricultural research pp. 529-547

Vernon Ruttan

The impact of rational participation models on voting attitudes pp. 549-564

Gregory Brunk

The probability-choice perspective in voter decision making models pp. 565-574

Jerome Black

Voter turnout and the benefits of voting pp. 575-585

John Filer and Lawrence Kenny

A general theory of interpersonal exchange pp. 587-606

Jon Cauley and Todd Sandler

Optimal fiscal illusion and the size of government pp. 607-622

E. West and Stanley Winer

The influence of state-level economic conditions on presidential elections pp. 623-631

Burton Abrams

Reviews pp. 633-635

Israel Kirzner and Gordon Tullock

Volume 35, issue 4, 1980

Ambiguity in spatial models of policy formation pp. 385-402

Richard McKelvey

Social homogeneity and Condorcet's paradox pp. 403-419

Peter Fishburn and William Gehrlein

Preference expression and misrepresentation in points voting schemes pp. 421-436

Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Paroush and Shlomo Lampert

On strategy-proofness and single peakedness pp. 437-455

Herve Moulin

Running off empty: Run-off point systems pp. 457-468

Jeffrey Richelson

Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum pp. 469-481

Friedrich Breyer and Roy Gardner

The comparative likelihood of an equivocal outcome under the plurality, Condorcet, and Borda voting procedures pp. 483-491

Raphael Gillett

The provision of a public good under Cournot behavior: Stability conditions pp. 493-501

Ralph Frasca

Strongly nonmanipulable multi-valued collective choice rules pp. 503-509

Allan Feldman

Review pp. 511-512

James Bennett

Volume 35, issue 3, 1980

Some tests of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis pp. 257-266

F. Cummings and Wayne Ruhter

The effect of tax elasticity on government spending pp. 267-275

Eleanor Craig and A. Heins

Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism pp. 277-286

Randall Holcombe

The economics of the women's movement pp. 287-295

Janet Hunt and Paul Rubin

A bureaucratic theory of regulation pp. 297-313

Richard McKenzie and Hugh Macaulay

On the economics of voter turnout in local school elections pp. 315-331

Daniel Rubinfeld and Randall Thomas

Bureaucratic responses to tax limitation amendments pp. 333-348

Mark Toma and Eugenia Toma

Voting behaviour in a system of concordant democracy pp. 349-362

Heinrich Ursprung

Incentives in public decision-making pp. 379-382

Edward Clarke

Volume 35, issue 2, 1980

On the evaluation of corporate contributions pp. 129-136

Gerald Keim, Roger Meiners and Louis Frey

Corporate contributions: Some additional considerations pp. 137-143

James Bennett and Manuel Johnson

The evaluation of corporate contributions: A reply pp. 145-149

Ferdinand Levy and Gloria Shatto

Vote trading: An experimental study pp. 151-184

Richard McKelvey and Peter Ordeshook

The Electoral College and voter participation rates: An exploratory note pp. 185-190

Richard Cebula and Dennis Murphy

Monopolies, market interdependencies and the logic of collective action: some critical comments on Mancur Olson's group theory pp. 191-195

Hersch Fischler

On the size of vote trades pp. 197-203

James Enelow

Routes and paths of comparison and choice pp. 205-218

Murat Sertel and Alexander Bellen

Impossibility results in the axiomatic theory of intertemporal choice pp. 219-227

Edward Packel

An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games pp. 229-239

Edward Packel and John Deegan

The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism pp. 241-252

Roy Gardner

Reviews pp. 253-256

Gordon Tullock and Peter Hill

Volume 35, issue 1, 1980

Revenue sharing and local public spending: The Italian experience pp. 3-15

Giorgio Brosio, David Hyman and Walter Santagata

Optimal jurisdictions and the economic theory of the state: Or, anarchy and one-world government are only corner solutions pp. 17-26

Laurence Moss

Economic competition and political competition: A comment pp. 27-36

William Brown and Gary Santoni

Externalities and zoning pp. 37-43

William Fischel

Are public goods public goods? pp. 45-57

Jacob Meerman

Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control pp. 59-74

Gene Mumy

The market for special interest campaign funds: An exploratory approach pp. 75-83

Jonathan Silberman and Gilbert Yochum

Efficiency and compensation of public officials pp. 85-95

Uri Ben-Zion and Menahem Spiegel

The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups pp. 97-120

W. Welch

Public choice pp. 121-121

Peter Bernholz

Reviews pp. 123-127

W. Eecke and Karen Vaughn