Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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The limits of the equity-efficiency tradeoff pp. 425-436: Donald Keenan and Paul Rubin
Distribution of jointly owned private goods by the demand-revealing process: Applications to divorce settlements and estate administration pp. 437-457: Charles Laine
Government expenditure and economic growth in the developed countries: 1952–76 pp. 459-477: Daniel Landau
The experimental search for free riders: Some reflections and observations pp. 479-490: Thomas McCaleb and Richard Wagner
Tocqueville and public choice pp. 491-508: L. Wade
Politics, deficits, and the Laffer curve pp. 509-517: Roger Waud
Voter power and electricity prices pp. 519-525: Walter Primeaux and Patrick Mann
The public interest and rent seeking pp. 527-529: E. Pasour
Reviews pp. 531-534: James Buchanan and Frank Forman

On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy pp. 313-335: Clark Robinson and Gerry Suchanek
Can donations reduce a donor's welfare? pp. 337-347: Jeffrey Weiss
The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation pp. 349-370: Shmuel Nitzan
A precise restatement and extension of Black's theorem on voting orders pp. 371-376: Richard Niemi and Rodney Gretlein
Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity pp. 377-387: Sven Berg
A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions pp. 389-403: Samuel Merrill
An application of the multicandidate calculus of voting to the 1972 and 1976 German federal elections pp. 405-424: Lee Dutter

Money and votes reconsidered: congressional elections, 1972–1982 pp. 7-62: Gary Jacobson
Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of Representatives pp. 63-111: Keith Poole and Thomas Romer
The specification of models of campaign finance pp. 113-119: James Kau and Paul Rubin
Demographic factors affecting constitutional decisions: the case of municipal charters pp. 121-162: Steven Maser
Progressive reform as induced institutional preferences pp. 163-181: Gary Miller
Constitutional change and agenda control pp. 183-217: Arthur Denzau
A positive theory of in-kind transfers and the negative income tax pp. 231-265: Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard
A taxonomy of public provision pp. 267-303: Russell Roberts

Efficient rents 1 rent-seeking behavior in the long-run pp. 227-246: William Corcoran and Gordon Karels
Efficient rents 2 free entry and efficient rent seeking pp. 247-258: Richard Higgins, William Shughart and Robert Tollison
Efficient rents 3 back to the bog pp. 259-263: Gordon Tullock
The by-product theory of revolution: Some empirical evidence pp. 265-274: Phillip Cartwright, Charles Delorme and Norman Wood
Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability pp. 275-287: Jeffrey Hill
The effectiveness of savings and loan political action committees pp. 289-304: Linda Johnson
New evidence on financial crowding out pp. 305-309: Richard Cebula
Legislator specialization and the size of government pp. 311-315: W. Crain, Robert Tollison, Brian Goff and Diek Carlson
Revealed preference for economics journals: Citations as dollar votes pp. 317-324: David Laband and John Sophocleus
On private charity and altruism pp. 325-332: Oded Stark

A precise method for evaluating election schemes pp. 113-123: Robert Bordley
The political viability of rule-based monetary policy pp. 125-140: Henry Chappell and William Keech
State and prospect of public choice: A European view pp. 141-161: Bruno Frey
How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators pp. 163-172: Amihai Glazer and M. Robbins
Majority voting and Pareto optimality pp. 173-186: John Goodman and Philip Porter
The political economy of constitutional federalism pp. 187-195: Alan Hamlin
Tax shares and government spending in a median voter model pp. 197-205: Randall Holcombe and Steven B Caudill
Interstate migration, income and public school expenditures: An update of an experiment pp. 207-214: Garland Hadley
The political timing of errors in inflation forecasts pp. 215-220: John Hill and Scott Smith
From weakest-link to best-shot: Correction pp. 221-223: Jack Hirshleifer

A model of majority voting and growth in government expenditure pp. 3-17: Allan Feldman
Running against the status quo: Institutions for direct democracy referenda and allocations over time pp. 19-43: Daniel Ingberman
The politics of flatland pp. 45-60: Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz
The real costs of tuition tax credits pp. 61-70: Edwin West
Prison overcrowding pp. 71-78: J. Giertz and Peter Nardulli
Economic incentives under contract supply of local government services pp. 79-86: Stephen Mehay and Rodolfo Gonzalez
Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture pp. 87-94: Wm. Mounts, Clifford Sowell and James Lindley
Rent-seeking, noncompensated transfers, and laws of succession: A property rights view pp. 95-102: David Sisk
Remorse, elation, and the paradox of voting pp. 103-106: T. Tideman
Reviews pp. 107-112: Morgan Reynolds