Public Choice

1966 - 2025

Current editor(s): WIlliam F. Shughart II

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Volume 122, issue 3, 2005

Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry pp. 251-276

Tomaso Duso

The role of intermediaries in corruption pp. 277-298

Güzin Bayar

Keeping the other candidate guessing: Electoral competition when preferences are private information pp. 299-318

Adam Meirowitz

Anyone for higher speed limits? – Self-interested and adaptive political preferences pp. 319-331

Olof Johansson-Stenman and Peter Martinsson

Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures pp. 333-354

Glenn Parker

A logistic growth theory of public expenditures: A study of five countries over 100 years pp. 355-393

Massimo Florio and Sara Colautti

Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities? pp. 395-416

Robert Dur and Hein Roelfsema

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy pp. 417-448

Lars Feld

Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis pp. 449-465

Marko Köthenbürger

Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates pp. 467-482

Amihai Glazer and Mark Gradstein

Supreme Court consensus and dissent: Estimating the role of the selection screen pp. 483-499

Brian Goff

Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The economics of budget deficits. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 153, ed. by Mark Blaug. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, MA, U.S.A.: Edward Elgar, 2002. 2 vols.; 1, 112 pages. USD 370.00/GBP 245.00 (cloth) pp. 501-512

Daniel Mitchell

Volume 122, issue 1, 2005

Editorial Commentary - Gordon Tullock: The man and his scholarship pp. 1-8

Charles Rowley

Representative versus direct democracy: The role of informational asymmetries pp. 9-38

Anke Kessler

Testing the Mill hypothesis of fiscal illusion pp. 39-68

Rupert Sausgruber and Jean-Robert Tyran

Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth? pp. 69-97

Pierre-Guillaume Méon and Khalid Sekkat

Does free trade really reduce growth? Further testing using the economic freedom index pp. 99-114

Niclas Berggren and Henrik Jordahl

Partisan stabilization policy and voter control pp. 115-132

David Kiefer

Tax morale in Latin America pp. 133-157

Benno Torgler

Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness? pp. 159-175

Carsten Hefeker and Katharina Michaelowa

Suicide-bombing as inter-generational investment pp. 177-198

Jean-Paul Azam

Radicalization as a reaction to failure: An economic model of Islamic extremism pp. 199-220

Mario Ferrero

Party competition in a heterogeneous electorate: The role of dominant-issue voters pp. 221-243

Ivo Bischoff

L.-A. Gerard-Varet, S.-C. Kolm, and J. Mercier Ythier (Eds.), The economics of reciprocity, giving and altruism. Houndmills and London: Palgrave Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. x + 387 pages. USD 79.95/GBP 65.50 (cloth) pp. 245-247

Hazem Ghobarah

Steven J. Brams, Biblical games: Game theory and the Hebrew Bible. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 220 pages. USD 50.00 (cloth); 17.95 (paper) pp. 248-249

Tyler Cowen

Volume 121, issue 3, 2004

A Public Choice Analysis of Endangered Species Listings pp. 263-277

R. Rawls and David Laband

Collusion, Collective Action and Protection: Theory and Evidence pp. 279-308

Richard Damania, Per Fredriksson and Thomas Osang

Tax Britannica: Nineteenth Century Tariffs and British National Income pp. 309-333

Sami Dakhlia and John Nye

Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration pp. 335-361

Alberto Chong and Luisa Zanforlin

The Persistence of Corruption and Regulatory Compliance Failures: Theory and Evidence pp. 363-390

Richard Damania, Per Fredriksson and Muthukumara Mani

Exclusive Committee Assignments and Party Pressure in the U.S. House of Representatives pp. 391-412

K. Kanthak

Party Polarization and the Business Cycle in the United States pp. 413-430

Edward Lopez and Carlos Ramirez

The Advantages of Pure Forms of Parliamentary Democracy over Mixed Forms pp. 431-453

Charles Blankart and Dennis Mueller

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information pp. 455-480

Alejandro Caparros, Jean-Christophe Pereau and Tarik Tazdaït

Explaining the Enhanced HIPC Initiative: A Response to Michaelowa (2003) pp. 481-483

Peter Hjertholm

Why HIPC II Cannot be Explained on the Basis of Economic Theory – A Response to Peter Hjertholm pp. 485-486

Katharina Michaelowa

A Neo-Downsian Model of the Alternative Vote as a Mechanism for Mitigating Ethnic Conflict in Plural Societies pp. 487-506

Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman

The alternative vote and interethnic moderation: A reply to Fraenkel and Grofman pp. 507-517

Donald Horowitz

Geoffrey Brennan and Francis G. Castles (Eds.), Australia Reshaped pp. 517-520

Giuseppe Eusepi

Volume 121, issue 1, 2004

Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes pp. 1-24

Gerald Pech

Monotonicity and its Cognates in the Theory of Choice pp. 25-49

Hannu Nurmi

A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology pp. 51-67

Claudio Bonilla

Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime. Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game pp. 69-82

Luciano Andreozzi

Public School Music: Notes on the Public Provision of a Quasi-Private Good pp. 83-98

Laura Langbein

A Stiglerian View on Banking Supervision pp. 99-130

Friedrich Heinemann and Martin Schüler

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency pp. 131-155

Georgios Chortareas and Stephen Miller

Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections pp. 157-177

Hans Gersbach

Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament pp. 179-211

Abdul Noury

The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock pp. 213-238

Roger Congleton

Social Norms and the Paradox of Elections’ Turnout pp. 239-255

João Amaro de Matos and Pedro Barros

Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression pp. 257-259

Jim Couch

George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work pp. 260-262

Bryan Caplan