Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2026

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 237, issue C, 2026

When is the trend the cycle?

Dan Cao, L’Huillier, Jean-Paul and Donghoon Yoo

The Isolation index and variations on relative exposure

Casilda Lasso de la Vega and Oscar Volij

The comparative statics of dominance

Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander and Mark Whitmeyer

Value of information in social learning

Hiroto Sato and Konan Shimizu

Intergenerational cultural transmission with social interactions as an evolutionary game

Jiabin Wu

Temporary exclusion in repeated contests

Yaron Azrieli

Optimal stopping under volatility ambiguity

Wenbin Cao, Xiaowei Chen, Yinghui Ye and Wei Yuan

The extreme points of mean-preserving contractions

Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack and Mark Whitmeyer

Reserve matching with thresholds

Suat Evren

When monetary policy for financial stability backfires: Communication with strategic banks

Giampaolo Bonomi and Ali Uppal

Volume 236, issue C, 2026

Investment sophistication and wealth inequality

Ehsan Azarmsa

Classical matching via network formation

Evan Sadler

Hold-up in the absence of individual rationality: Asymptotic efficiency and gradualism

Prabal Roy Chowdhury and Kunal Sengupta

Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa

When Lasry-Lions meet Krugman: A mean-field game theory of spatial dynamics

M. Bahlali, Raouf Boucekkine and Q. Petit

Time use and heterogeneous markups

Brian C. Albrecht, Thomas Phelan and Nick Pretnar

Robustly optimal voting rule

Noriaki Kiguchi, Shinpei Noguchi and Yuta Takahashi

Informational inertia and the Taylor principle

Alexander Meyer-Gohde and Mary Tzaawa-Krenzler

On the efficiency of runnable banking arrangements

David Andolfatto and Ed Nosal

Managing persuasion robustly: The optimality of quota rules

Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan and Yingkai Li

When can less be more? Inducing dealer responses in RFQ platforms

Bart Zhou Yueshen and Junyuan Zou

Recursive preferences and ambiguity attitudes

Massimo Marinacci, Giulio Principi and Lorenzo Stanca

On preference for simplicity and probability weighting

Lasse Mononen

Government trading and efficiency in imperfectly competitive financial markets

Daniel Neuhann and Michael Sockin

A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Jérôme Renault

Local non-bossiness

Eduardo Duque-Rosas, Juan S. Pereyra and Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Volume 235, issue C, 2026

Covert learning and disclosure

Matteo Escudé

Information design with endogenous state verification

Ling Yang

Localized perfection

Enxian Chen, Lei Qiao, Xiang Sun and Yeneng Sun

Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders

Akitoshi Muramoto and Takeharu Sogo

Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals

Renato Paes Leme, Jon Schneider and Hanrui Zhang

Credit rationing in unsecured debt markets

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Toàn Phan and Yiannis Vailakis

Expectation and confusion: Evidence and theory

Heng Chen and Yicheng Liu

Positive and negative selection in bargaining

Dongkyu Chang, Duk Gyoo Kim and Wooyoung Lim

Which experiments test a model?

Paul J. Healy and Greg Leo

The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg Baranov

Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity

Remo Isch-Taudien and Fabienne Schneider

Learning through imitation: An experiment

Marina Agranov, Gabriel Lopez-Moctezuma, Philipp Strack and Omer Tamuz

The Hard Problem and the Tyranny of the Losers

Stan Cheung, Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani

The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments

Daniel Krähmer

Reference-dependent choice bracketing

Pauline Vorjohann

Volume 234, issue C, 2026

Blockchain congestion facilitates currency competition

Maxi Guennewig

Evidence design and voluntary disclosure

Denis Shishkin

Player strength and effort in contests

Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler

Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields

Javier Bianchi and Saki Bigio

Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828]

Sonny Biswas, Kostas Koufopoulos and Thi Mai Nguyen

Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

Margarita Kirneva and Matías Núñez

Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules

Jacob Coreno and Ivan Balbuzanov

Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered

Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Pierre Picard

Cautiousness when experts disagree

Antoine Bommier, Adrien Fabre, Arnaud Goussebaïle and Daniel Heyen

Meta-preference, endogenous preference formation and dynamic choice

Takashi Hayashi