Journal of Economic Theory
1969 - 2026
Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.
Volume 235, issue C, 2026
- Covert learning and disclosure

- Matteo Escudé
- Information design with endogenous state verification

- Lily Ling Yang
- Localized perfection

- Enxian Chen, Lei Qiao, Xiang Sun and Yeneng Sun
- Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders

- Akitoshi Muramoto and Takeharu Sogo
- Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals

- Renato Paes Leme, Jon Schneider and Hanrui Zhang
- Credit rationing in unsecured debt markets

- V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Toàn Phan and Yiannis Vailakis
- Expectation and confusion: Evidence and theory

- Heng Chen and Yicheng Liu
- Positive and negative selection in bargaining

- Dongkyu Chang, Duk Gyoo Kim and Wooyoung Lim
- Which experiments test a model?

- Paul J. Healy and Greg Leo
- The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions

- Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg Baranov
- Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity

- Remo Isch-Taudien and Fabienne Schneider
- Learning through imitation: An experiment

- Marina Agranov, Gabriel Lopez-Moctezuma, Philipp Strack and Omer Tamuz
- The Hard Problem and the Tyranny of the Losers

- Stan Cheung, Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani
- The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments

- Daniel Krähmer
- Reference-dependent choice bracketing

- Pauline Vorjohann
Volume 234, issue C, 2026
- Blockchain congestion facilitates currency competition

- Maxi Guennewig
- Evidence design and voluntary disclosure

- Denis Shishkin
- Player strength and effort in contests

- Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler
- Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields

- Javier Bianchi and Saki Bigio
- Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828]

- Sonny Biswas, Kostas Koufopoulos and Thi Mai Nguyen
- Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

- Margarita Kirneva and Matías Núñez
- Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules

- Jacob Coreno and Ivan Balbuzanov
- Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered

- Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Pierre Picard
- Cautiousness when experts disagree

- Antoine Bommier, Adrien Fabre, Arnaud Goussebaïle and Daniel Heyen
- Meta-preference, endogenous preference formation and dynamic choice

- Takashi Hayashi
Volume 233, issue C, 2026
- Stochastic sorting

- Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout
- Learning about ambiguous long-term prospects

- Hongseok Choi
- On the relationship between damage and deception

- Joel Sobel
- Culture and communication

- Rajiv Sethi and Muhamet Yildiz
- Elimination by (subjective) aspects: a characterization

- Pedram Heydari
- Investment subsidies with spillovers and endogenous private information: Why Pigou got it all right

- Luca V.A. Colombo, Gianluca Femminis and Alessandro Pavan
- Limit-of-All-Finite equilibria in infinite normal-form games

- Francesc Dilmé
Volume 232, issue C, 2026
- Dominance and optimality

- Xienan Cheng and Tilman Börgers
- Nominal rigidities, rational inattention, and the optimal monetary policy

- Shengliang Ou, Penghui Yin, Donghai Zhang and Renbin Zhang
- Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information

- Xu Lang and Zaifu Yang
- The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union

- Sihao Chen, David Cook, Haichao Fan and Juanyi Xu
- Managing the expectations of buyers with reference-dependent preferences

- Nathan Hancart
- On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities

- Xiang Sun, Qianfeng Tang, Mingjun Xiao and Jun Zhang
- Coasian dynamics and endogenous learning

- Tuomas Laiho and Julia Salmi
- Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding

- Luis Araujo, Ryuichiro Izumi and Fabrizio Mattesini
- Sequential network design

- Yang Sun, Wei Zhao and Junjie Zhou
- When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions

- Isa Hafalir, Onur Kesten, Katerina Sherstyuk and Cong Tao
- Information design for social learning on a recommendation platform

- Chen Lyu
- Preferences for the resolution of risk and ambiguity

- Alexander L. Brown, Huiyi Guo and Hyundam Je
Volume 231, issue C, 2026
- Higher-order forward guidance

- Marc Dordal i Carreras and Seung Joo Lee
- Partially constructed sequential equilibrium

- Joel Watson
- Robust product design and pricing

- Kyungmin Kim and Nenad Kos
- Middlemen, inventories and economic dynamics

- Chao Gu, Lu Wang and Randall Wright
- The multiple-volunteers principle

- Susanne Goldlücke and Thomas Tröger
- Corrigendum to “The screening role of market tightness in a competitive search equilibrium with adverse selection” [Journal of Economic Theory 225 (2025) 105995]

- Hung-Chi Chang and Yiting Li
- Optimal screening with securities

- Nicolas Figueroa and Nicolas Inostroza
- A model of network formation for the overnight interbank market: When is core-periphery an illusion?

- Mikhail Anufriev, Andrea Deghi, Valentyn Panchenko and Paolo Pin
- Intertemporal bundling

- Jingfeng Lu and Wenbo Zhao
- Comment on “Assignment problems with complementarities” [J. Econ. Theory 165 (2016) 209-241]

- Daniel Kornbluth, Alexey Kushnir, Thanh Nguyen and Rakesh Vohra
- Competitive price discrimination, imperfect information, and consumer search

- Carl-Christian Groh
| |