Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2026

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 236, issue C, 2026

Investment sophistication and wealth inequality

Ehsan Azarmsa

Classical matching via network formation

Evan Sadler

Hold-up in the absence of individual rationality: Asymptotic efficiency and gradualism

Prabal Roy Chowdhury and Kunal Sengupta

Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism

Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa

When Lasry-Lions meet Krugman: A mean-field game theory of spatial dynamics

M. Bahlali, Raouf Boucekkine and Q. Petit

Time use and heterogeneous markups

Brian C. Albrecht, Thomas Phelan and Nick Pretnar

Robustly optimal voting rule

Noriaki Kiguchi, Shinpei Noguchi and Yuta Takahashi

Informational inertia and the Taylor principle

Alexander Meyer-Gohde and Mary Tzaawa-Krenzler

On the efficiency of runnable banking arrangements

David Andolfatto and Ed Nosal

Managing persuasion robustly: The optimality of quota rules

Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan and Yingkai Li

When can less be more? Inducing dealer responses in RFQ platforms

Bart Zhou Yueshen and Junyuan Zou

Recursive preferences and ambiguity attitudes

Massimo Marinacci, Giulio Principi and Lorenzo Stanca

On preference for simplicity and probability weighting

Lasse Mononen

Government trading and efficiency in imperfectly competitive financial markets

Daniel Neuhann and Michael Sockin

A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Jérôme Renault

Local non-bossiness

Eduardo Duque-Rosas, Juan S. Pereyra and Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Volume 235, issue C, 2026

Covert learning and disclosure

Matteo Escudé

Information design with endogenous state verification

Ling Yang

Localized perfection

Enxian Chen, Lei Qiao, Xiang Sun and Yeneng Sun

Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders

Akitoshi Muramoto and Takeharu Sogo

Nonbossy mechanisms: Mechanism design robust to secondary goals

Renato Paes Leme, Jon Schneider and Hanrui Zhang

Credit rationing in unsecured debt markets

V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Toàn Phan and Yiannis Vailakis

Expectation and confusion: Evidence and theory

Heng Chen and Yicheng Liu

Positive and negative selection in bargaining

Dongkyu Chang, Duk Gyoo Kim and Wooyoung Lim

Which experiments test a model?

Paul J. Healy and Greg Leo

The VCG mechanism, the core, and assignment stages in auctions

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg Baranov

Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity

Remo Isch-Taudien and Fabienne Schneider

Learning through imitation: An experiment

Marina Agranov, Gabriel Lopez-Moctezuma, Philipp Strack and Omer Tamuz

The Hard Problem and the Tyranny of the Losers

Stan Cheung, Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani

The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments

Daniel Krähmer

Reference-dependent choice bracketing

Pauline Vorjohann

Volume 234, issue C, 2026

Blockchain congestion facilitates currency competition

Maxi Guennewig

Evidence design and voluntary disclosure

Denis Shishkin

Player strength and effort in contests

Thomas Giebe and Oliver Gürtler

Portfolio choice and settlement frictions: A theory of endogenous convenience yields

Javier Bianchi and Saki Bigio

Revisiting “A theory of debt maturity and innovation” [J. Econ. Theory 218 (2024) 105828]

Sonny Biswas, Kostas Koufopoulos and Thi Mai Nguyen

Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in Majority voting

Margarita Kirneva and Matías Núñez

Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules

Jacob Coreno and Ivan Balbuzanov

Self-insurance and market insurance substitutability: An established tenet reconsidered

Jean-Marc Bourgeon and Pierre Picard

Cautiousness when experts disagree

Antoine Bommier, Adrien Fabre, Arnaud Goussebaïle and Daniel Heyen

Meta-preference, endogenous preference formation and dynamic choice

Takashi Hayashi

Volume 233, issue C, 2026

Stochastic sorting

Hector Chade and Jan Eeckhout

Learning about ambiguous long-term prospects

Hongseok Choi

On the relationship between damage and deception

Joel Sobel

Culture and communication

Rajiv Sethi and Muhamet Yildiz

Elimination by (subjective) aspects: a characterization

Pedram Heydari

Investment subsidies with spillovers and endogenous private information: Why Pigou got it all right

Luca V.A. Colombo, Gianluca Femminis and Alessandro Pavan

Limit-of-All-Finite equilibria in infinite normal-form games

Francesc Dilmé

Volume 232, issue C, 2026

Dominance and optimality

Xienan Cheng and Tilman Börgers

Nominal rigidities, rational inattention, and the optimal monetary policy

Shengliang Ou, Penghui Yin, Donghai Zhang and Renbin Zhang

Random allocations of multiple objects with incomplete information

Xu Lang and Zaifu Yang

The shocks matter: Labor mobility and the welfare cost of a currency union

Sihao Chen, David Cook, Haichao Fan and Juanyi Xu

Managing the expectations of buyers with reference-dependent preferences

Nathan Hancart

On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities

Xiang Sun, Qianfeng Tang, Mingjun Xiao and Jun Zhang

Coasian dynamics and endogenous learning

Tuomas Laiho and Julia Salmi

Bank runs and interventions with wholesale funding

Luis Araujo, Ryuichiro Izumi and Fabrizio Mattesini

Sequential network design

Yang Sun, Wei Zhao and Junjie Zhou

When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions

Isa Hafalir, Onur Kesten, Katerina Sherstyuk and Cong Tao

Information design for social learning on a recommendation platform

Chen Lyu

Preferences for the resolution of risk and ambiguity

Alexander L. Brown, Huiyi Guo and Hyundam Je