Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 184, issue C, 2019

Investment under uncertainty with financial constraints

Patrick Bolton, Neng Wang and Jinqiang Yang

Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation

Krittanai Laohakunakorn, Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

Matching with partners and projects

Antonio Nicolo', Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav

Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types

Tingjun Liu and Dan Bernhardt

Information and Inequality

Xiaowen Lei

Learning in crowded markets

Péter Kondor and Adam Zawadowski

Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

Dynamic information acquisition and time-varying uncertainty

Zhifeng Cai

Persuasion with limited communication capacity

Maël Le Treust and Tristan Tomala

On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Controls, belief updating, and bias in medical RCTs

Gilles Chemla and Christopher A. Hennessy

An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

Tibor Heumann

Optimal crowdfunding design

Matthew Ellman and Sjaak Hurkens

Fuel for economic growth?

Johan Gars and Conny Olovsson

The industry supply function and the long-run competitive equilibrium with heterogeneous firms

Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo

Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

Mehmet Karakaya, Bettina Klaus and Jan Christoph Schlegel

Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties

Aytek Erdil and Taro Kumano

Volume 183, issue C, 2019

Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating pp. 1-45

Stefania Minardi and Andrei Savochkin

Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality pp. 46-75

Prajit K. Dutta and Paolo Siconolfi

Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces pp. 76-105

Huiyi Guo

Learning to believe in simple equilibria in a complex OLG economy - evidence from the lab pp. 106-182

Jasmina Arifovic, Cars Hommes and Isabelle Salle

Leverage dynamics and credit quality pp. 183-212

Guillermo Ordonez, David Perez-Reyna and Motohiro Yogo

Majority rule in the absence of a majority pp. 213-257

Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato

Private communication in competing mechanism games pp. 258-283

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

Self-confirming price dispersion in monetary economies pp. 284-311

Garth Baughman and Stanislav Rabinovich

Generalized entropy and model uncertainty pp. 312-343

Alexander Meyer-Gohde

Strategic real options pp. 344-383

Aaron M. Kolb

On the consensus effect pp. 384-416

David Dillenberger and Collin Raymond

Verifiability and group formation in markets pp. 417-477

Suzanne Scotchmer and Chris Shannon

A theory of sticky rents: Search and bargaining with incomplete information pp. 478-519

Joshua Gallin and Randal Verbrugge

Endogenous discounting, wariness, and efficient capital taxation pp. 520-545

Aloisio Araujo, Juan Pablo Gama, Rodrigo Novinski and Mario R. Pascoa

Constrained implementation pp. 546-567

Takashi Hayashi and Michele Lombardi

Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search pp. 568-593

S. Mohammad R. Davoodalhosseini

Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure pp. 594-624

Youcheng Lou, Sahar Parsa, Debraj Ray, Duan Li and Shouyang Wang

Endogenous second moments: A unified approach to fluctuations in risk, dispersion, and uncertainty pp. 625-660

Ludwig Straub and Robert Ulbricht

Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets pp. 661-697

Shmuel Baruch and Lawrence R. Glosten

Revealed preference and identification pp. 698-739

Leandro Gorno

Learning and self-confirming long-run biases pp. 740-785

Pierpaolo Battigalli, A. Francetich, G. Lanzani and Massimo Marinacci

Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games pp. 786-822

Philippe Bich

Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: Contests and Cournot oligopoly pp. 823-841

Adriana Gama and David Rietzke

A contraction for sovereign debt models pp. 842-875

Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador

Intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets pp. 876-906

Ed Nosal, Yuet-Yee Wong and Randall Wright

Capital immobility and the reach for yield pp. 907-951

Alan Moreira

Asset shortages, liquidity and speculative bubbles pp. 952-990

Gaetano Bloise and A. Citanna

Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity pp. 991-1029

Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication pp. 1030-1056

Marilda Sotomayor

Try before you buy: A theory of dynamic information acquisition pp. 1057-1093

Ruitian Lang

Optimal contracting in networks pp. 1094-1153

Ali Jadbabaie and Ali Kakhbod

Is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation? pp. 1154-1176

D. Beauchêne

Volume 182, issue C, 2019

An impossibility theorem for wealth in heterogeneous-agent models with limited heterogeneity pp. 1-24

John Stachurski and Alexis Akira Toda

Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains pp. 25-105

Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng

The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments pp. 106-142

Deniz Dizdar, Benny Moldovanu and Nora Szech

Market selection with idiosyncratic uncertainty pp. 143-160

Markus Sihvonen

No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors pp. 161-184

Alia Gizatulina and Ziv Hellman

Private Bayesian persuasion pp. 185-217

Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko

Public goods with ambiguity in large economies pp. 218-246

Narayana Kocherlakota and Yangwei Song

Efficient investments in the implementation problem pp. 247-278

Kentaro Tomoeda

Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition pp. 279-328

Yunan Li

Savings, asset scarcity, and monetary policy pp. 329-359

Lukas Altermatt

Information acquisition and use by networked players pp. 360-401

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information pp. 402-432

Vinicius Carrasco, William Fuchs and Satoshi Fukuda