Journal of Economic Theory
1969 - 2025
Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell From Elsevier Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 185, issue C, 2020
- Community enforcement using modal actions

- Sam Jindani
- Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring

- Maximilian Mihm and Russell Toth
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria

- Olivier Bochet and Norovsambuu Tumennasan
- Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture

- Ingela Alger, Jörgen Weibull and Laurent Lehmann
- Obvious manipulations

- Peter Troyan and Thayer Morrill
- Competitive real options under private information

- Leandro Gorno and Felipe Iachan
- Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment

- Alexander Koch and Julia Nafziger
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

- Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Hannu Vartiainen
- Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule

- Justin Burkett and Kyle Woodward
- All or nothing: State capacity and optimal public goods provision

- Felix Bierbrauer and Justus Winkelmann
- Targeted search in matching markets

- Anton Cheremukhin, Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria and Antonella Tutino
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics

- William Sandholm, Segismundo Izquierdo and Luis Izquierdo
- More apples vs. better apples: Distribution and innovation-driven growth

- Robert Kane and Pietro Peretto
- Social norms in networks

- Philip Ushchev and Yves Zenou
- Risk apportionment: The dual story

- Louis R. Eeckhoudt, Roger Laeven and Harris Schlesinger
- Incomplete market demand tests for Kreps-Porteus-Selden preferences

- Felix Kubler, Larry Selden and Xiao Wei
Volume 184, issue C, 2019
- Investment under uncertainty with financial constraints

- Patrick Bolton, Neng Wang and Jinqiang Yang
- Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation

- Krittanai Laohakunakorn, Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin
- Matching with partners and projects

- Antonio Nicolo', Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav
- Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types

- Tingjun Liu and Dan Bernhardt
- Information and Inequality

- Xiaowen Lei
- Learning in crowded markets

- Péter Kondor and Adam Zawadowski
- Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

- Alvaro J. Name-Correa and Huseyin Yildirim
- Dynamic information acquisition and time-varying uncertainty

- Zhifeng Cai
- Persuasion with limited communication capacity

- Maël Le Treust and Tristan Tomala
- On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

- Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C. Yannelis
- Controls, belief updating, and bias in medical RCTs

- Gilles Chemla and Christopher A. Hennessy
- An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals

- Tibor Heumann
- Optimal crowdfunding design

- Matthew Ellman and Sjaak Hurkens
- Fuel for economic growth?

- Johan Gars and Conny Olovsson
- The industry supply function and the long-run competitive equilibrium with heterogeneous firms

- Ignacio Esponda and Demian Pouzo
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants

- Mehmet Karakaya, Bettina Klaus and Jan Christoph Schlegel
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties

- Aytek Erdil and Taro Kumano
Volume 183, issue C, 2019
- Subjective contingencies and limited Bayesian updating pp. 1-45

- Stefania Minardi and Andrei Savochkin
- Asynchronous games with transfers: Uniqueness and optimality pp. 46-75

- Prajit K. Dutta and Paolo Siconolfi
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces pp. 76-105

- Huiyi Guo
- Learning to believe in simple equilibria in a complex OLG economy - evidence from the lab pp. 106-182

- Jasmina Arifovic, Cars Hommes and Isabelle Salle
- Leverage dynamics and credit quality pp. 183-212

- Guillermo Ordonez, David Perez-Reyna and Motohiro Yogo
- Majority rule in the absence of a majority pp. 213-257

- Klaus Nehring and Marcus Pivato
- Private communication in competing mechanism games pp. 258-283

- Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser
- Self-confirming price dispersion in monetary economies pp. 284-311

- Garth Baughman and Stanislav Rabinovich
- Generalized entropy and model uncertainty pp. 312-343

- Alexander Meyer-Gohde
- Strategic real options pp. 344-383

- Aaron M. Kolb
- On the consensus effect pp. 384-416

- David Dillenberger and Collin Raymond
- Verifiability and group formation in markets pp. 417-477

- Suzanne Scotchmer and Chris Shannon
- A theory of sticky rents: Search and bargaining with incomplete information pp. 478-519

- Joshua Gallin and Randal Verbrugge
- Endogenous discounting, wariness, and efficient capital taxation pp. 520-545

- Aloisio Araujo, Juan Pablo Gama, Rodrigo Novinski and Mario R. Pascoa
- Constrained implementation pp. 546-567

- Takashi Hayashi and Michele Lombardi
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search pp. 568-593

- S. Mohammad R. Davoodalhosseini
- Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure pp. 594-624

- Youcheng Lou, Sahar Parsa, Debraj Ray, Duan Li and Shouyang Wang
- Endogenous second moments: A unified approach to fluctuations in risk, dispersion, and uncertainty pp. 625-660

- Ludwig Straub and Robert Ulbricht
- Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets pp. 661-697

- Shmuel Baruch and Lawrence R. Glosten
- Revealed preference and identification pp. 698-739

- Leandro Gorno
- Learning and self-confirming long-run biases pp. 740-785

- Pierpaolo Battigalli, A. Francetich, G. Lanzani and Massimo Marinacci
- Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games pp. 786-822

- Philippe Bich
- Monotone comparative statics in games with non-monotonic best-replies: Contests and Cournot oligopoly pp. 823-841

- Adriana Gama and David Rietzke
- A contraction for sovereign debt models pp. 842-875

- Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador
- Intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets pp. 876-906

- Ed Nosal, Yuet-Yee Wong and Randall Wright
- Capital immobility and the reach for yield pp. 907-951

- Alan Moreira
- Asset shortages, liquidity and speculative bubbles pp. 952-990

- Gaetano Bloise and A. Citanna
- Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity pp. 991-1029

- Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan
- Competition and cooperation in a two-sided matching market with replication pp. 1030-1056

- Marilda Sotomayor
- Try before you buy: A theory of dynamic information acquisition pp. 1057-1093

- Ruitian Lang
- Optimal contracting in networks pp. 1094-1153

- Ali Jadbabaie and Ali Kakhbod
- Is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation? pp. 1154-1176

- D. Beauchêne
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