Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 158, issue PB, 2015

Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction pp. 407-426

Alessandro Pavan and Xavier Vives

Information and volatility pp. 427-465

Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris

Cournot competition and the social value of information pp. 466-506

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

Characterizing social value of information pp. 507-535

Takashi Ui and Yasunori Yoshizawa

Information and strategic behavior pp. 536-557

Marzena Rostek and Marek Weretka

Private information and sunspots in sequential asset markets pp. 558-584

Jess Benhabib and Pengfei Wang

Information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle pp. 585-633

Taneli Mäkinen and Björn Ohl

Liquid bundles pp. 634-655

Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole

Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer pp. 656-678

Filip Matejka

Market composition and price informativeness in a large market with endogenous order types pp. 679-696

Edouard Challe and Edouard Chrétien

Should we regulate financial information? pp. 697-720

Pablo Kurlat and Laura Veldkamp

Coordination with flexible information acquisition pp. 721-738

Ming Yang

Information quality and crises in regime-change games pp. 739-768

Felipe Iachan and Plamen T. Nenov

Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets pp. 769-786

Giacomo Rondina and Myungkyu Shim

Investment horizons and asset prices under asymmetric information pp. 787-837

Elias Albagli

Reprint of: Information percolation in segmented markets pp. 838-869

Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud and Gustavo Manso

Volume 158, issue PA, 2015

Endogenous budget constraints in auctions pp. 1-20

Justin Burkett

Calibration without reduction for non-expected utility pp. 21-32

David Freeman

Subjective independence and concave expected utility pp. 33-53

Ehud Lehrer and Roee Teper

Efficient assignment with interdependent values pp. 54-86

Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim and Fuhito Kojima

Weak assumption and iterative admissibility pp. 87-101

Chih-Chun Yang

Reciprocal contracting pp. 102-126

Michael Peters

Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions pp. 127-164

Christoph Schottmüller

Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money pp. 165-185

Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama

Optimal choice of health and retirement in a life-cycle model pp. 186-212

Michael Kuhn, Stefan Wrzaczek, Alexia Fürnkranz-Prskawetz and Gustav Feichtinger

On the nonemptiness of the α-core of discontinuous games: Transferable and nontransferable utilities pp. 213-231

Metin Uyanık

Dynamic choice in a complex world pp. 232-258

Murali Agastya and Arkadii Slinko

Complexity and repeated implementation pp. 259-292

Jihong Lee and Hamid Sabourian

Which demand systems can be generated by discrete choice? pp. 293-307

Mark Armstrong and John Vickers

Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule pp. 308-318

Anna Bogomolnaia

Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences pp. 319-335

Audrey Hu and Liang Zou

Impure altruism and impure selfishness pp. 336-370

Kota Saito

Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection pp. 371-406

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Volume 157, issue C, 2015

A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems pp. 1-27

Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa

Public information in Markov games pp. 28-48

Andrew Kloosterman

Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information pp. 49-75

Qingmin Liu

Minimum cost connection networks: Truth-telling and implementation pp. 76-99

Jens Leth Hougaard and Mich Tvede

Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games pp. 100-127

Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi

Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring pp. 128-145

Yves Guéron

Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects pp. 146-171

Philippe Mongin and Marcus Pivato

Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution pp. 172-187

Jonathan Newton and Simon Angus

Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring pp. 188-211

Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang

Key leaders in social networks pp. 212-235

Junjie Zhou and Ying-Ju Chen

Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities pp. 236-254

Peter Borm, Yuan Ju and David Wettstein

Innovation by entrants and incumbents pp. 255-294

Daron Acemoglu and Dan Cao

Matching markets under (in)complete information pp. 295-314

Lars Ehlers and Jordi Masso

Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets pp. 315-348

Francesco Nava

Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains pp. 349-383

Alexander Reffgen

The value of information under unawareness pp. 384-396

Spyros Galanis

Unemployment risk and wage differentials pp. 397-424

Roberto Pinheiro and Ludo Visschers

Approachability with delayed information pp. 425-444

David Lagziel and Ehud Lehrer

History-dependent risk attitude pp. 445-477

David Dillenberger and Kareen Rozen

Breakdown in multilateral negotiations pp. 478-484

Daniel Göller and Michael Hewer

Optimal central bank lending pp. 485-516

Andreas Schabert

Product line design pp. 517-526

Simon Anderson and Levent Celik

On the private provision of public goods on networks pp. 527-552

Nizar Allouch

Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring pp. 553-605

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

Decreasing aversion under ambiguity pp. 606-623

Frédéric Cherbonnier and Christian Gollier

On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory pp. 624-647

Geoffroy de Clippel

Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals pp. 648-667

Simone Galperti

Knowledge spillovers in cities: An auction approach pp. 668-698

Victor Couture

Variational Bewley preferences pp. 699-729

José Faro

Put–Call Parity and market frictions pp. 730-762

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci

Banking bubbles and financial crises pp. 763-792

Jianjun Miao and Pengfei Wang

Intertemporal coordination with delay options pp. 793-810

Luis Araujo and Bernardo Guimaraes

Blockbusting: Brokers and the dynamics of segregation pp. 811-841

Amine Ouazad

Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors pp. 842-878

Milo Bianchi and Philippe Jehiel

Exchangeable capacities, parameters and incomplete theories pp. 879-917

Larry Epstein and Kyoungwon Seo

An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values pp. 918-958

Dieter Balkenborg and Miltiadis Makris

On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly pp. 959-972

David McAdams

Optimal entry timing pp. 973-1000

Aaron M. Kolb

On the Mitra–Wan forest management problem in continuous time pp. 1001-1040

Giorgio Fabbri, Silvia Faggian and Giuseppe Freni

Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players pp. 1041-1055

Joyee Deb and Ehud Kalai

Indeterminacy and sunspots in two-sector RBC models with generalized no-income-effect preferences pp. 1056-1080

Frédéric Dufourt, Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti

The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller pp. 1081-1113

Hans Gersbach, Hans Haller and Jürg Müller

Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market pp. 1114-1129

Rodrigo Velez

Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics pp. 1130-1158

Julien Hugonnier, Semyon Malamud and Erwan Morellec

Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation pp. 1159-1187

Robert Evans and Sönje Reiche