Journal of Economic Theory
1969 - 2025
Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell
From Elsevier
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Volume 145, issue 6, 2010
- Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems pp. 2055-2077

- Borys Grochulski and Narayana Kocherlakota
- Unemployment insurance with hidden savings pp. 2078-2107

- Matthew Mitchell and Yuzhe Zhang
- Directed search with multi-vacancy firms pp. 2108-2132

- Benjamin Lester
- Consumption dynamics in general equilibrium: A characterisation when markets are incomplete pp. 2133-2185

- Pablo Beker and Subir Chattopadhyay
- Overlapping risk adjusted sets of priors and the existence of efficient allocations and equilibria with short-selling pp. 2186-2202

- R.A. Dana and Cuong Le van
- Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations pp. 2203-2217

- Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni, Rann Smorodinsky and Jonathan Weinstein
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets pp. 2218-2240

- Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Markus Walzl
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information pp. 2241-2259

- Hitoshi Matsushima, Koichi Miyazaki and Nobuyuki Yagi
- Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents pp. 2260-2281

- Alia Gizatulina and Martin Hellwig
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction pp. 2282-2308

- Sushil Bikhchandani
- Testing the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibria pp. 2309-2331

- Timothy Cason, Daniel Friedman and Ed Hopkins
- On behavioral complementarity and its implications pp. 2332-2355

- Christopher Chambers, Federico Echenique and Eran Shmaya
- The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games pp. 2356-2379

- Akira Okada
- Externalities, potential, value and consistency pp. 2380-2411

- Bhaskar Dutta, Lars Ehlers and Anirban Kar
- Repeated moral hazard with effort persistence pp. 2412-2423

- Arantxa Jarque
- Cores of combined games pp. 2424-2434

- Francis Bloch and Geoffroy de Clippel
- With exhaustible resources, can a developing country escape from the poverty trap? pp. 2435-2447

- Cuong Le van, Katheline Schubert and Tu Nguyen
- Preemption in a real option game with a first mover advantage and player-specific uncertainty pp. 2448-2462

- Jacco Thijssen
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences pp. 2463-2470

- Gabriel Carroll
- Selectivity in hierarchical social systems pp. 2471-2482

- Jose A. Garcia-Martinez
- Kernel-based type spaces pp. 2483-2495

- Konrad Grabiszewski
- Corrigendum to "Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly" [J. Econ. Theory 131 (1) (2006) 212-230] pp. 2496-2497

- Ludwig Ressner, Matti Liski and Juan-Pablo Montero
- Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] pp. 2498-2504

- Laurent Lamy
Volume 145, issue 5, 2010
- Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: Theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust pp. 1603-1617

- Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler and Simon Weidenholzer
- Optimal fiscal and monetary policy when money is essential pp. 1618-1647

- S. Boragan Aruoba and Sanjay Chugh
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide? pp. 1648-1674

- Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno
- Information-based trade pp. 1675-1703

- Philip Bond and Hülya Eraslan
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts pp. 1704-1723

- John William Hatfield and Fuhito Kojima
- Market structure and matching with contracts pp. 1724-1738

- Alexander Westkamp
- The roommates problem revisited pp. 1739-1756

- Thayer Morrill
- Simplicity and likelihood: An axiomatic approach pp. 1757-1775

- Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler
- Unique solutions for stochastic recursive utilities pp. 1776-1804

- Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio
- Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment pp. 1805-1836

- Nina Baranchuk, Philip Dybvig and Jun Yang
- Portfolio choice, attention allocation, and price comovement pp. 1837-1864

- Jordi Mondria
- A model of merchants pp. 1865-1889

- Makoto Watanabe
- Research cycles pp. 1890-1920

- Yann Bramoullé and Gilles Saint-Paul
- A dynamic theory of war and peace pp. 1921-1950

- Pierre Yared
- Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution pp. 1951-1967

- Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski
- Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: A synthesis pp. 1968-1986

- Rabah Amir, Filomena Garcia and Malgorzata Knauff
- Interim efficiency with MEU-preferences pp. 1987-2017

- V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha
- Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion pp. 2018-2026

- Donald Keenan and Arthur Snow
- Stronger measures of higher-order risk attitudes pp. 2027-2036

- Michel M. Denuit and Louis Eeckhoudt
- Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale pp. 2037-2043

- Bernard Lebrun
- An additively separable representation in the Savage framework pp. 2044-2054

- Brian Hill
Volume 145, issue 4, 2010
- Introduction to Search Theory and Applications pp. 1319-1324

- Giuseppe Moscarini and Randall Wright
- Stock-flow matching pp. 1325-1353

- Ehsan Ebrahimy and Robert Shimer
- Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms pp. 1354-1385

- Jan Eeckhout and Philipp Kircher
- Search by committee pp. 1386-1407

- James Albrecht, Axel Anderson and Susan Vroman
- Wage/tenure contracts with heterogeneous firms pp. 1408-1435

- Kenneth Burdett and Melvyn Coles
- Sorting by search intensity pp. 1436-1452

- Rasmus Lentz
- Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job pp. 1453-1494

- Guido Menzio and Shouyong Shi
- Essential interest-bearing money pp. 1495-1507

- David Andolfatto
- Some results on the optimality and implementation of the Friedman rule in the Search Theory of Money pp. 1508-1524

- Ricardo Lagos
- Money and credit with limited commitment and theft pp. 1525-1549

- Daniel Sanches and Stephen Williamson
- Search and the market for ideas pp. 1550-1573

- Rafael Silveira and Randall Wright
- The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation pp. 1574-1601

- Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud and Gustavo Manso
Volume 145, issue 3, 2010
- Lifetime consumption and investment: Retirement and constrained borrowing pp. 885-907

- Philip Dybvig and Hong Liu
- Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation pp. 908-943

- Borys Grochulski and Tomasz Piskorski
- Dollarization and financial integration pp. 944-973

- Cristina Arellano and Jonathan Heathcote
- Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets pp. 974-1004

- Arpad Abraham and Eva Carceles-Poveda
- Fiscal policy under loose commitment pp. 1005-1032

- Davide Debortoli and Ricardo Nunes
- Trade elasticity of substitution and equilibrium dynamics pp. 1033-1059

- Martin Bodenstein
- Balanced-budget rules: Chaos and deterministic sunspots pp. 1060-1085

- David R. Stockman
- On equilibrium prices in continuous time pp. 1086-1112

- V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha and Frank Riedel
- Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition pp. 1113-1141

- Aloisio Araujo and Humberto Moreira
- An Afriat Theorem for the collective model of household consumption pp. 1142-1163

- Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock and Frederic Vermeulen
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms pp. 1164-1187

- Artyom Shneyerov and Chi Leung Wong
- Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions pp. 1188-1202

- Audrey Hu, Steven Matthews and Liang Zou
- Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions pp. 1203-1223

- Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan
- Context effects: A representation of choices from categories pp. 1224-1243

- Andrei Barbos
- Variational convergence: Approximation and existence of equilibria in discontinuous games pp. 1244-1268

- Adib Bagh
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities pp. 1269-1282

- Lars Ehlers and Aytek Erdil
- On the observational equivalence of random matching pp. 1283-1301

- Robert Molzon and Daniela Puzzello
- Testable implications of transferable utility pp. 1302-1317

- Pierre Chiappori
Volume 145, issue 2, 2010
- Introduction to judgment aggregation pp. 441-466

- Christian List and Ben Polak
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation pp. 467-494

- Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe
- Aggregation of binary evaluations pp. 495-511

- Elad Dokow and Ron Holzman
- Majority voting on restricted domains pp. 512-543

- Franz Dietrich and Christian List
- Aggregation of binary evaluations with abstentions pp. 544-561

- Elad Dokow and Ron Holzman
- The premiss-based approach to judgment aggregation pp. 562-582

- Franz Dietrich and Philippe Mongin
- Justifiable group choice pp. 583-602

- Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe
- The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications pp. 603-638

- Franz Dietrich
- Competitive experimentation with private information: The survivor's curse pp. 639-660

- Giuseppe Moscarini and Francesco Squintani
- The binary policy model pp. 661-688

- Stefan Krasa and Mattias K Polborn
- Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks pp. 689-720

- Jack Ochs and In-Uck Park
- Informational control and organizational design pp. 721-751

- Maxim Ivanov
- Robust equilibria under non-common priors pp. 752-784

- Daisuke Oyama and Olivier Tercieux
- Self-admissible sets pp. 785-811

- Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg
- Ecological discounting pp. 812-829

- Christian Gollier
- Discounting and divergence of opinion pp. 830-859

- Elyès Jouini, Jean-Michel Marin and Clotilde Napp
- Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default pp. 860-868

- Andreas Schabert
- Communication via a strategic mediator pp. 869-884

- Maxim Ivanov
Volume 145, issue 1, 2010
- When is market incompleteness irrelevant for the price of aggregate risk (and when is it not)? pp. 1-41

- Dirk Krueger and Hanno Lustig
- Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play pp. 42-62

- Satoru Takahashi
- When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff? pp. 63-84

- Olivier Gossner and Johannes Hörner
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values pp. 85-105

- Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna and Michael Ostrovsky
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism pp. 106-123

- Fuhito Kojima and Mihai Manea
- The tradeoff between risk sharing and information production in financial markets pp. 124-155

- Joel Peress
- Optimal debt contracts and product market competition with exit and entry pp. 156-188

- Naveen Khanna and Mark Schroder
- One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities pp. 189-215

- P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski
- Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics pp. 216-248

- Marcin Peski
- Interim Bayesian Nash equilibrium on universal type spaces for supermodular games pp. 249-263

- Timothy Van Zandt
- Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty pp. 264-286

- Ludovic Renou and Karl H. Schlag
- Indeterminacy with no-income-effect preferences and sector-specific externalities pp. 287-300

- Jang-Ting Guo and Sharon G. Harrison
- Competitive equilibria in semi-algebraic economies pp. 301-330

- Felix Kubler and Karl Schmedders
- Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization pp. 331-353

- Sushama Murty
- A consistent route to randomness pp. 354-381

- Maciej Dudek
- A uniqueness proof for monetary steady state pp. 382-391

- Randall Wright
- On the multiplicity of monetary equilibria: Green-Zhou meets Lagos-Wright pp. 392-401

- Kasie Jean, Stanislav Rabinovich and Randall Wright
- A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring pp. 402-420

- Bo Chen
- Essential equilibria in normal-form games pp. 421-431

- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
- Bayesian consistent belief selection pp. 432-439

- Christopher Chambers and Takashi Hayashi