Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 150, issue C, 2014

Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers pp. 383-425

Mallesh M. Pai and Rakesh Vohra

Social networks and interactions in cities pp. 426-466

Robert Helsley and Yves Zenou

Coarse decision making and overfitting pp. 467-486

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Mallesh M. Pai

Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags pp. 487-514

Drew Fudenberg, Yuhta Ishii and Scott Kominers

Household behavior and the marriage market pp. 515-550

Daniela Del Boca and Christopher Flinn

Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility pp. 551-582

Alice Schoonbroodt and Michele Tertilt

Socialization networks and the transmission of interethnic attitudes pp. 583-610

Fabrizio Panebianco

A two-parameter model of dispersion aversion pp. 611-641

Robert G. Chambers, Simon Grant, Ben Polak and John Quiggin

Parametric representation of preferences pp. 642-667

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Luciano De Castro

Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem pp. 668-682

Sofia Moroni and Jeroen Swinkels

Investments as signals of outside options pp. 683-708

Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick Schmitz

Experience vs. obsolescence: A vintage-human-capital model pp. 709-739

Matthias Kredler

Money and price posting under private information pp. 740-777

Mei Dong and Janet Hua Jiang

Behavioral learning equilibria pp. 778-814

Cars Hommes and Mei Zhu

A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities pp. 815-840

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem pp. 841-851

David S. Ahn and Santiago Oliveros

Improving Nash by coarse correlation pp. 852-865

Herve Moulin, Indrajit Ray and Sonali Sen Gupta

Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria pp. 866-877

Vladyslav Nora and Hiroshi Uno

A correspondence principle for cooperative differential equations pp. 878-887

Kai-Sun Kwong

Volume 149, issue C, 2014

Introduction to financial economics pp. 1-14

Franklin Allen, Dimitri Vayanos and Xavier Vives

The fragility of short-term secured funding markets pp. 15-42

Antoine Martin, David Skeie and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Looting and risk shifting in banking crises pp. 43-64

John H. Boyd and Hendrik Hakenes

Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking pp. 65-99

Giovanni DellʼAriccia, Luc Laeven and Robert Marquez

Money, financial stability and efficiency pp. 100-127

Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Douglas Gale

Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence pp. 128-152

David Andolfatto, Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher Waller

Counterparty risk externality: Centralized versus over-the-counter markets pp. 153-182

Viral Acharya and Alberto Bisin

Liquidating illiquid collateral pp. 183-210

Martin Oehmke

Competitive rational expectations equilibria without apology pp. 211-235

Alexander Kovalenkov and Xavier Vives

Advance information and asset prices pp. 236-275

Rui Albuquerque and Jianjun Miao

Prospect Theory and market quality pp. 276-310

Paolo Pasquariello

Agency-based asset pricing pp. 311-349

Gary B. Gorton, Ping He and Lixin Huang

House price dynamics with dispersed information pp. 350-382

Giovanni Favara and Zheng Song

Volume 148, issue 6, 2013

Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining pp. 2195-2222

Hülya Eraslan and Andrew McLennan

Fiscal policy over the real business cycle: A positive theory pp. 2223-2265

Levon Barseghyan, Marco Battaglini and Stephen Coate

A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions pp. 2266-2312

Guido Menzio, Shouyong Shi and Hongfei Sun

On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach pp. 2313-2343

Ohad Kadan and Jeroen M. Swinkels

Optimal limited authority for principal pp. 2344-2382

Anton Kolotilin, Hao Li and Wei Li

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard pp. 2383-2403

Sandrine Ollier and Lionel Thomas

Delay and information aggregation in stopping games with private information pp. 2404-2435

Pauli Murto and Juuso Välimäki

Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions pp. 2436-2466

Aaron Bodoh-Creed

Preference for Flexibility and Dynamic Consistency pp. 2467-2482

Gil Riella

Incomplete markets, liquidation risk, and the term structure of interest rates pp. 2483-2519

Edouard Challe, François Le Grand and Xavier Ragot

On the coexistence of money and higher-return assets and its social role pp. 2520-2560

Tai-Wei Hu and Guillaume Rocheteau

On microfoundations of the city pp. 2561-2582

Pierre Picard and Takatoshi Tabuchi

Tractable dynamic global games and applications pp. 2583-2619

Laurent Mathevet and Jakub Steiner

Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities pp. 2620-2637

Christian Basteck, Tijmen Daniëls and Frank Heinemann

Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games pp. 2638-2665

Marion Oury

Higher order game dynamics pp. 2666-2695

Rida Laraki and Panayotis Mertikopoulos

Community standards pp. 2696-2705

Alan Miller

Substituting one risk increase for another: A method for measuring risk aversion pp. 2706-2718

Liqun Liu and Jack Meyer

Spatial dynamics and convergence: The spatial AK model pp. 2719-2736

Raouf Boucekkine, Carmen Camacho and Giorgio Fabbri

A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games pp. 2737-2748

Rene van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan and Nigel Moes

Surplus extraction with rich type spaces pp. 2749-2762

Vitor Farinha Luz

Volume 148, issue 5, 2013

Strategic information transmission networks pp. 1751-1769

Andrea Galeotti, Christian Ghiglino and Francesco Squintani

Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses pp. 1770-1805

Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann and Bruno Van der Linden

Optimal contracting with dynastic altruism: Family size and per capita consumption pp. 1806-1840

Roozbeh Hosseini, Larry Jones and Ali Shourideh

Incentive compatibility and differentiability: New results and classic applications pp. 1841-1861

George Mailath and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda pp. 1862-1890

Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring pp. 1891-1928

Takuo Sugaya and Satoru Takahashi

Finitely repeated games with monitoring options pp. 1929-1952

Yasuyuki Miyahara and Tadashi Sekiguchi

On Ramseyʼs conjecture pp. 1953-1976

Tapan Mitra and Gerhard Sorger

Aggregate instability under balanced-budget consumption taxes: A re-examination pp. 1977-2006

Carine Nourry, Thomas Seegmuller and Alain Venditti

Optimal policy with credibility concerns pp. 2007-2032

Yang K. Lu

Gambling in contests pp. 2033-2048

Christian Seel and Philipp Strack

Eliciting information from a committee pp. 2049-2067

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty pp. 2068-2095

Seungjin Han

Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining pp. 2096-2123

Jun Zhang and Ruqu Wang

Reshaping the schooling system: The role of immigration pp. 2124-2149

Davide Dottori, Fernanda Estevan and I-Ling Shen

Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining pp. 2150-2163

Avidit Acharya and Juan Ortner

Characterizing the sustainability problem in an exhaustible resource model pp. 2164-2182

Tapan Mitra, Geir Asheim, Wolfgang Buchholz and Cees Withagen

A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation pp. 2183-2193

Ville Korpela

Volume 148, issue 4, 2013

Pricing and signaling with frictions pp. 1301-1332

Alain Delacroix and Shouyong Shi

Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation pp. 1333-1360

Florian Scheuer

Mean-dispersion preferences and constant absolute uncertainty aversion pp. 1361-1398

Simon Grant and Ben Polak

Dynamics of inductive inference in a unified framework pp. 1399-1432

Itzhak Gilboa, Larry Samuelson and David Schmeidler

Ambiguity, data and preferences for information – A case-based approach pp. 1433-1462

Jürgen Eichberger and Ani Guerdjikova

Removed preferences pp. 1463-1486

Jawwad Noor

Dynamically stable preferences pp. 1487-1508

Anna Gumen and Andrei Savochkin

Supply function equilibria: Step functions and continuous representations pp. 1509-1551

Pär Holmberg, David M Newbery and Daniel Ralph

The empirical content of Cournot competition pp. 1552-1581

Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck and Bram De Rock

Intertemporal equilibria with Knightian uncertainty pp. 1582-1605

Rose-Anne Dana and Frank Riedel

Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known pp. 1606-1623

G. Carlier and R.-A. Dana

Risk-sharing and crises. Global games of regime change with endogenous wealth pp. 1624-1658

Rodolfo Campos

Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution pp. 1659-1688

Inkoo Cho and Akihiko Matsui

On the impossibility of complete Non-Interference in Paretian social judgements pp. 1689-1699

Marco Mariotti and Roberto Veneziani

Matching through position auctions pp. 1700-1713

T.R. Johnson

Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions pp. 1714-1725

Shiran Rachmilevitch

The number of active bidders in internet auctions pp. 1726-1736

Laurens de Haan, Casper de Vries and Chen Zhou

Optimal education and pensions in an endogenous growth model pp. 1737-1750

Elena Del Rey and Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia

Volume 148, issue 3, 2013

Abstention, ideology and information acquisition pp. 871-902

Santiago Oliveros

The price of flexibility: Towards a theory of Thinking Aversion pp. 903-934

Pietro Ortoleva

The value of switching costs pp. 935-952

Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer and Gergely Dobos

A folk theorem for competing mechanisms pp. 953-973

Michael Peters and Cristián Troncoso-Valverde

Ambiguity and robust statistics pp. 974-1049

Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio

On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions pp. 1050-1073

Shurojit Chatterji, Remzi Sanver and Arunava Sen

Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains pp. 1074-1101

Juan Carlos Carbajal, Andrew McLennan and Rabee Tourky

Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: Beyond the Groves mechanisms pp. 1102-1121

Yves Sprumont

Large games with a bio-social typology pp. 1122-1149

M. Khan, Kali P. Rath, Yeneng Sun and Haomiao Yu

TFP during a credit crunch pp. 1150-1178

Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau

Quality, upgrades and equilibrium in a dynamic monopoly market pp. 1179-1212

James J. Anton and Gary Biglaiser

Information acquisition during a Dutch auction pp. 1213-1225

Paavo Miettinen

Bridging the gap: Bargaining with interdependent values pp. 1226-1236

William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents pp. 1237-1254

Takeshi Momi

On multivariate prudence pp. 1255-1267

Elyès Jouini, Clotilde Napp and Diego Nocetti

Directed search and job rotation pp. 1268-1281

Fei Li and Can Tian

Von Neumann–Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market pp. 1282-1291

Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

Why do I like people like me? pp. 1292-1299

Manuel Bagues and Maria J. Perez-Villadoniga

Volume 148, issue 2, 2013

Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine pp. 424-447

Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano

A more general theory of commodity bundling pp. 448-472

Mark Armstrong

Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design pp. 473-501

Zvika Neeman and Gregory Pavlov

Dynamic sender–receiver games pp. 502-534

Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

Egalitarianism under earmark constraints pp. 535-562

Olivier Bochet, Rahmi İlkılıç and Herve Moulin

Consumption and bubbles pp. 563-600

Mark Loewenstein and Gregory A. Willard

Goal-setting and self-control pp. 601-626

Alice Hsiaw

Coalitional manipulation on networks pp. 627-662

Biung-Ghi Ju

Aggregating sets of von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities pp. 663-688

Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos and Jean-Marc Tallon

Finite-order type spaces and applications pp. 689-719

Cheng-Zhong Qin and Chun-Lei Yang

Linking consumption externalities with optimal accumulation of human and physical capital and intergenerational transfers pp. 720-742

Monisankar Bishnu

Evolutionary dynamics over continuous action spaces for population games that arise from symmetric two-player games pp. 743-777

Daniel Friedman and Daniel N. Ostrov

Unique equilibria and substitution effects in a stochastic model of the marriage market pp. 778-792

Colin Decker, Elliott H. Lieb, Robert J. McCann and Benjamin K. Stephens

Many-valued judgment aggregation: Characterizing the possibility/impossibility boundary pp. 793-805

Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins

Endogenous credit limits with small default costs pp. 806-824

Costas Azariadis and Leo Kaas

No-regret dynamics and fictitious play pp. 825-842

Yannick Viossat and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

A two-sector model of endogenous growth with leisure externalities pp. 843-857

Costas Azariadis, Been-Lon Chen, Chia-Hui Lu and Yin-Chi Wang

Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes pp. 858-870

Hitoshi Matsushima

Volume 148, issue 1, 2013

Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting pp. 2-30

Matthew Jackson and Xu Tan

Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts pp. 31-63

John B. Donaldson, Natalia Gershun and Marc Giannoni

Social networks and unraveling in labor markets pp. 64-103

Itay Fainmesser

Mechanism design without revenue equivalence pp. 104-133

Juan Carlos Carbajal and Jeffrey Ely

Extremal incentive compatible transfers pp. 134-164

Nenad Kos and Matthias Messner

When are signals complements or substitutes? pp. 165-195

Tilman Börgers, Angel Hernando-Veciana and Daniel Krähmer

Learning and risk aversion pp. 196-225

Carlos Oyarzun and Rajiv Sarin

Hidden symmetries and focal points pp. 226-258

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Christoph Kuzmics

A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one pp. 259-278

Shin Sato

Smallness of a commodity and partial equilibrium analysis pp. 279-305

Takashi Hayashi

Safety first consumption pp. 306-321

Michael Sattinger

Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality pp. 322-352

Kenichi Ueda

Inequality, mobility and redistributive politics pp. 353-375

Ryo Arawatari and Tetsuo Ono

A two-sided reputation result with long-run players pp. 376-392

Alp Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci

Efficient and optimal mechanisms with private information acquisition costs pp. 393-408

Jingfeng Lu and Lixin Ye

Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships pp. 409-417

Heiner Schumacher