Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 144, issue 6, 2009

Introduction to dynamic general equilibrium pp. 2235-2246

Lee Ohanian, Edward Prescott and Nancy L. Stokey

Investment options and the business cycle pp. 2247-2265

Boyan Jovanovic

Heterogeneous producers facing common shocks: An overlapping-generations example pp. 2266-2276

Edward Green

Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes pp. 2277-2292

Richard Rogerson and Johanna Wallenius

Business cycle fluctuations and the life cycle: How important is on-the-job skill accumulation? pp. 2293-2309

Gary Hansen and Selahattin Imrohoroglu

What - or who - started the great depression? pp. 2310-2335

Lee Ohanian

Island matching pp. 2336-2353

Dale Mortensen

Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique pp. 2354-2371

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

On the robustness of laissez-faire pp. 2372-2387

Narayana Kocherlakota and Christopher Phelan

Doubts or variability? pp. 2388-2418

Francisco Barillas, Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent

Moving costs, nondurable consumption and portfolio choice pp. 2419-2439

Nancy L. Stokey

Anonymity and individual risk pp. 2440-2453

Pamela Labadie

Openness, technology capital, and development pp. 2454-2476

Ellen McGrattan and Edward Prescott

Spatial growth and industry age pp. 2477-2502

Klaus Desmet and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg

Volume 144, issue 5, 2009

Understanding Markov-switching rational expectations models pp. 1849-1867

Roger Farmer, Daniel Waggoner and Tao Zha

Do voters vote ideologically? pp. 1868-1894

Arianna Degan and Antonio Merlo

The communication cost of selfishness pp. 1895-1920

Ronald Fadel and Ilya Segal

Constrained school choice pp. 1921-1947

Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn

Differentiability of the value function without interiority assumptions pp. 1948-1964

Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero and Manuel S. Santos

Information acquisition and mutual funds pp. 1965-1995

Diego García and Joel M. Vanden

Run equilibria in the Green-Lin model of financial intermediation pp. 1996-2020

Huberto Ennis and Todd Keister

Private polling in elections and voter welfare pp. 2021-2056

Dan Bernhardt, John Duggan and Francesco Squintani

Efficient compromising pp. 2057-2076

Tilman Börgers and Peter Postl

Hyperbolic discounting and the standard model: Eliciting discount functions pp. 2077-2083

Jawwad Noor

A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity pp. 2084-2114

Subir Bose and Arup Daripa

On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information pp. 2115-2145

Qingmin Liu

Foundations of neo-Bayesian statistics pp. 2146-2173

Massimiliano Amarante

Interpreted and generated signals pp. 2174-2196

Lu Hong and Scott Page

The value of information for auctioneers pp. 2197-2208

Marcus Hagedorn

Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? pp. 2209-2226

Onur Kesten

Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] pp. 2227-2233

Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn and Toshifumi Nakamura

Volume 144, issue 4, 2009

Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case pp. 1373-1395

Eugen Kovac and Tymofiy Mylovanov

Mediation, arbitration and negotiation pp. 1397-1420

Maria Goltsman, Johannes Hörner, Gregory Pavlov and Francesco Squintani

The wisdom of the minority pp. 1421-1439.e2

Steven Callander and Johannes Hörner

Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies pp. 1440-1467

Brian Rogers, Thomas Palfrey and Colin F. Camerer

On the relevance of exchange rate regimes for stabilization policy pp. 1468-1488

Bernardino Adao, Isabel Correia and Pedro Teles

Trade, inequality, and the political economy of institutions pp. 1489-1520

Quy-Toan Do and Andrei Levchenko

Bubble-free policy feedback rules pp. 1521-1559

Olivier Loisel

Endogenous inequality and fluctuations in a two-country model pp. 1560-1571

Tomoo Kikuchi and John Stachurski

A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection pp. 1572-1588

Alberto Martin

Pricing the ecosystem and taxing ecosystem services: A general equilibrium approach pp. 1589-1616

Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig

Asymmetric first price auctions pp. 1617-1635

Rene Kirkegaard

Merger negotiations and ex-post regret pp. 1636-1664

Dennis Gärtner and Armin Schmutzler

Stable games and their dynamics pp. 1665-1693.e4

Josef Hofbauer and William Sandholm

Learning in games with unstable equilibria pp. 1694-1709

Michel Benaïm, Josef Hofbauer and Ed Hopkins

Large population potential games pp. 1710-1725

William Sandholm

Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria pp. 1726-1769

Daisuke Oyama and Olivier Tercieux

Lexicographic compositions of multiple criteria for decision making pp. 1770-1782

Nicolas Houy and Koichi Tadenuma

The measurement of rank mobility pp. 1783-1803

Marcello D'Agostino and Valentino Dardanoni

A testable model of consumption with externalities pp. 1804-1816

Rahul Deb

Bilateral commitment pp. 1817-1831

Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer and Ludovic Renou

Excess demand functions when new assets are introduced pp. 1832-1843

Takeshi Momi

Volume 144, issue 3, 2009

A theory of subjective compound lotteries pp. 899-929

Haluk Ergin and Faruk Gul

Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences pp. 930-976

Peter Klibanoff, Massimo Marinacci and Sujoy Mukerji

Information structures with unawareness pp. 977-993

Li Jing

Apportioning of risks via stochastic dominance pp. 994-1003

Louis Eeckhoudt, Harris Schlesinger and Ilia Tsetlin

Supermodularity and preferences pp. 1004-1014

Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique

Subjective random discounting and intertemporal choice pp. 1015-1053

Youichiro Higashi, Kazuya Hyogo and Norio Takeoka

Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity pp. 1054-1091

Klaus Nehring

Greater downside risk aversion in the large pp. 1092-1101

Donald Keenan and Arthur Snow

Parametric weighting functions pp. 1102-1118

Enrico Diecidue, Ulrich Schmidt and Horst Zank

When is there state independence? pp. 1119-1134

Brian Hill

Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence pp. 1135-1165

Masaki Aoyagi and Guillaume Frechette

A theory of political cycles pp. 1166-1186

Leonardo Martinez

Size approval voting pp. 1187-1210

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Marc Vorsatz

Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors pp. 1211-1226

Pablo Amoros

Manipulation through political endorsements pp. 1227-1248

Mehmet Ekmekci

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective pp. 1249-1277

Ryo Arawatari and Tetsuo Ono

Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency pp. 1278-1299

Parimal Bag, Hamid Sabourian and Eyal Winter

On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games pp. 1300-1319

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design pp. 1320-1332

Paulo Barelli

An existence result for discontinuous games pp. 1333-1340

Guilherme Carmona

Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders pp. 1341-1351

Bernard Lebrun

Reputation and exogenous private learning pp. 1352-1357

Thomas Wiseman

A consistent multidimensional Pigou-Dalton transfer principle pp. 1358-1371

Kristof Bosmans, Luc Lauwers and Erwin Ooghe

Volume 144, issue 2, 2009

Directed search with multiple job applications pp. 445-471

Manolis Galenianos and Philipp Kircher

Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets pp. 473-501

Albert Marcet and Andrew Scott

Sequential contracting with multiple principals pp. 503-531

Alessandro Pavan and Giacomo Calzolari

Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets pp. 532-564

Nicolae Gârleanu

Optimal collusion-proof auctions pp. 565-603

Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim

Selecting equilibria in common agency games pp. 604-634

David Martimort and Lars Stole

Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks pp. 635-675

Yuzhe Zhang

Theories of coalitional rationality pp. 676-695

Attila Ambrus

The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure pp. 696-721

Ben McQuillin

Correlated Nash equilibrium pp. 722-743

Kin Chung Lo

Pivots versus signals in elections pp. 744-771

Adam Meirowitz and Kenneth W. Shotts

Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? pp. 772-801

Arnaud Dellis

A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games pp. 802-824

Yuichi Yamamoto

English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem pp. 825-849

Juan Dubra, Federico Echenique and Alejandro Manelli

Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem pp. 851-868

Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan

Decreasing impatience and the magnitude effect jointly contradict exponential discounting pp. 869-875

Jawwad Noor

From posteriors to priors via cycles pp. 876-883

José Rodrigues-Neto

The role of optimal threats in auction design pp. 884-897

Nicolas Figueroa and Vasiliki Skreta

Volume 144, issue 1, 2009

Dynamic psychological games pp. 1-35

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Martin Dufwenberg

Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition pp. 36-68

Alex Gershkov and Balázs Szentes

Mechanism design with collusive supervision pp. 69-95

Gorkem Celik

Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects pp. 96-119

Herve Moulin

Folk theorem with communication pp. 120-134

Ichiro Obara

Afriat's theorem for general budget sets pp. 135-145

Francoise Forges and Enrico Minelli

Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters pp. 146-174

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation pp. 175-211

Philip Bond and Armando Gomes

Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium pp. 212-247

Paul Milgrom and Bruno Strulovici

Bayesian coalitional rationalizability pp. 248-263

Xiao Luo and Chih-Chun Yang

Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation pp. 264-279

Benoit Crutzen and Nicolas Sahuguet

Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning pp. 280-295

Christos Koulovatianos, Leonard Mirman and Marc Santugini

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria pp. 296-311

Gabriella Chiesa and Vincenzo Denicolo'

Repeated games with one-memory pp. 312-336

Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona and Hamid Sabourian

Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty pp. 337-353

Atsushi Kajii and Takashi Ui

Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus pp. 354-374

Igor Kopylov

An axiomatic theory of political representation pp. 375-389

Christopher Chambers

The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle pp. 390-413

Laurent Lamy

Global Newton Method for stochastic games pp. 414-421

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson

Structural holes in social networks: A remark pp. 422-431

Nicolas Houy

Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty pp. 432-443

Yeneng Sun and Yongchao Zhang