Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Ambiguity Made Precise: A Comparative Foundation pp. 251-289: Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci
Efficient Investment in Children pp. 290-321: S. Aiyagari, Jeremy Greenwood and Ananth Seshadri
Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation pp. 322-353: Peter Norman
Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria pp. 354-374: Stephane Gauthier
Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach pp. 375-402: Thomas Troger
The Identification of Preferences from Equilibrium Prices under Uncertainty pp. 403-420: Felix Kubler, Pierre Chiappori, I. Ekeland and H. M. Polemarchakis
Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted pp. 421-436: Jean-Pierre Benoit
A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results pp. 437-470: Erik Balder
Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect pp. 471-479: Luis Cabral
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games pp. 480-484: Alejandro Manelli

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring pp. 1-15: Michihiro Kandori
Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring pp. 16-39: V Bhaskar and Eric van Damme
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring pp. 40-69: V Bhaskar and Ichiro Obara
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring pp. 70-83: Michele Piccione
A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma pp. 84-105: Jeffrey Ely and Juuso Välimäki
On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations pp. 106-150: Olivier Compte
On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private pp. 151-188: Olivier Compte
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring pp. 189-228: George Mailath and Stephen Morris
Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication pp. 229-248: Masaki Aoyagi

Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies pp. 333-373: Harold Cole, George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences pp. 374-394: Salvador Barberà, Bhaskar Dutta and Arunava Sen
Structural Stability Implies Robustness to Bounded Rationality pp. 395-422: Luca Anderlini and David Canning
Characterizations of Consequentialism and Nonconsequentialism pp. 423-436: Kotaro Suzumura and Yongsheng Xu
Paretian Quasi-orders: The Regular Two-Agent Case pp. 437-456: Yves Sprumont
Price Competition for an Informed Buyer pp. 457-493: Giuseppe Moscarini and Marco Ottaviani
Informational Robustness of Competitive Equilibria pp. 494-518: Stefan Krasa and Wayne Shafer
A Geometric Approach to Sunspot Equilibria pp. 519-539: Gaetano Bloise
A Proposal to Unify Some Concepts in the Theory of Fairness pp. 540-571: Luis Corchon and Inigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe
The Modified Vickrey Double Auction pp. 572-584: Kiho Yoon
Microeconomic Foundations for the Theory of International Comparisons pp. 585-605: Keir Armstrong

Endogenous Technical Change in a Competitive Economy pp. 1-39: Martin Hellwig and Andreas Irmen
Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies pp. 40-77: Bryan Ellickson, Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer and William Zame
Convergence of Least Squares Learning in Self-Referential Discontinuous Stochastic Models pp. 78-114: Inkoo Cho
Axiomatic Characterization of the Gini Coefficient and Lorenz Curve Orderings pp. 115-132: Rolf Aaberge
Indeterminacy and Endogenous Fluctuations with Arbitrarily Small Externalities pp. 133-157: Guido Cazzavillan
On Fragility of Bubbles in Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models of Lucas-Type pp. 158-188: Luigi Montrucchio and Fabio Privileggi
Markets with Many More Agents than Commodities: Aumann's "Hidden" Assumption pp. 189-221: Rabee Tourky and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Asymptotic Arbitrage and the APT with or without Measure-Theoretic Structures pp. 222-251: M. Khan and Yeneng Sun
Learning While Searching for the Best Alternative pp. 252-280: Klaus Adam
Optimal Inventory Policies when the Demand Distribution Is Not Known pp. 281-300: C. Erik Larson, Lars Olson and Sunil Sharma
Trade Fragmentation and Coordination in Strategic Market Games pp. 301-316: Francis Bloch and Hélène Ferrer
Aggregate Substitution Effects Implying Global Stability pp. 317-329: Donald Keenan

Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions pp. 191-219: Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole
Growing through Cycles in an Infinitely Lived Agent Economy pp. 220-234: Kiminori Matsuyama
The Core of Large Differentiable TU Games pp. 235-273: Larry Epstein and Massimo Marinacci
Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value pp. 274-294: David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem pp. 295-328: Anna Bogomolnaia and Herve Moulin
House Allocation with Transfers pp. 329-355: Eiichi Miyagawa
Time and Uncertainty in Overlapping Generations Economies pp. 356-386: Julio Dávila

Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game pp. 1-21: Philip Johnson, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
A Theory of Value with Non-linear Prices: Equilibrium Analysis beyond Vector Lattices pp. 22-72: Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Rabee Tourky and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Learning-by-Doing and the Choice of Technology: The Role of Patience pp. 73-92: Larry Karp and In Ho Lee
Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency pp. 93-128: Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton
High Bids and Broke Winners pp. 129-171: Charles Zheng
The Value of Information in Production Economies pp. 172-186: Bernhard Eckwert and Itzhak Zilcha