Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).

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Volume 193, issue C, 2021

Compromise is key in infinitely repeated bargaining with an Evergreen Clause

Prajit K. Dutta

A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints

Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba

Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences

Vikram Manjunath and Alexander Westkamp

On the existence of Pareto Efficient and envy-free allocations

Richard Cole and Yixin Tao

Efficiency in search and matching models: A generalized Hosios condition

Sephorah Mangin and Benoit Julien

Relationship finance, informed liquidity, and monetary policy

Luis Araujo, Raoul Minetti and Pierluigi Murro

Story builders

Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein

Bayesian persuasion with costly messages

Anh Nguyen and Teck Yong Tan

Pairwise normalization: A neuroeconomic theory of multi-attribute choice

Peter Landry and Ryan Webb

Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games

Yingkai Li and Harry Pei

Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections

Peter Bils, John Duggan and Gleason Judd

A comparison of regret theory and salience theory for decisions under risk

Fabian Herweg and Daniel Müller

Stability of equilibrium asset pricing models: A necessary and sufficient condition

Jaroslav Borovička and John Stachurski

Full surplus extraction from samples

Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline and Robert Kleinberg

Childbearing postponement, its option value, and the biological clock

David de la Croix and Aude Pommeret

Strategic observation with exponential bandits

Chantal Marlats and Lucie Ménager

Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry

Tatsuhiro Shichijo and Emiko Fukuda

Truthful aggregation of budget proposals

Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Unforeseen evidence

Evan Piermont

Optimal test allocation

Jeffrey Ely, Andrea Galeotti, Ole Jann and Jakub Steiner

Volume 192, issue C, 2021

Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Rational destabilization in a frictionless market

Tomasz Sadzik and Chris Woolnough

Stochastic semi-orders

Sean Horan

Matching with peer monitoring

Pak Hung Au and Bin R. Chen

Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules

Martin Lackner and Piotr Skowron

Divergent risk-attitudes and endogenous collateral constraints

Giuliano Curatola and Ester Faia

Selling to consumers who cannot detect small differences

Kim-Sau Chung, Erica Meixiazi Liu and Melody Lo

Lock-in through passive connections

Zhiwei Cui and Simon Weidenholzer

A general theory of risk apportionment

Christian Gollier

Dynamic programming with state-dependent discounting

John Stachurski and Junnan Zhang

The value of mediated communication

Andrés Salamanca

Strategic interpretations

Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler and Heidi Thysen

A theory of the saving rate of the rich

Qingyin Ma and Alexis Akira Toda

Cross-ownership and portfolio choice

Andrea Galeotti and Christian Ghiglino

Deterministic debt cycles in open economies with flow collateral constraints

Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Martín Uribe

Competitive insurance markets with unbounded cost

Yehuda Levy and André Veiga

Simple preference intensity comparisons

Georgios Gerasimou

Volume 191, issue C, 2021

Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection

Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs and Brett Green

Would you prefer your retirement income to depend on your life expectancy?

Antoine Bommier and Hélène Schernberg

Rational quantitative trading in efficient markets

Stefano Rossi and Katrin Tinn

Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: Dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity

Komal Malik and Debasis Mishra

Information aggregation with runoff voting

Nikolas Tsakas and Dimitrios Xefteris

Multiple priors and comparative ignorance

Igor Kopylov

Designing referenda: An economist's pessimistic perspective

Siyang Xiong

Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem

Timo Mennle and Sven Seuken

Creating confusion

Chris Edmond and Yang K. Lu

Information acquisition with heterogeneous valuations

Rohit Rahi

Efficiency in trading markets with multi-dimensional signals

Tibor Heumann

Systemic risk shifting in financial networks

Matthew Elliott, Co-Pierre Georg and Jonathon Hazell

Reputation and earnings dynamics

Boyan Jovanovic and Julien Prat

Organ donation with vouchers

Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li and Menghan Xu

Information design in competitive insurance markets

Daniel Garcia and Matan Tsur

The strategy of conquest

Marcin Dziubiński, Sanjeev Goyal and David E.N. Minarsch

Dead ends

Evan Sadler

Hyperadditive games and applications to networks or matching problems

Eric Bahel