Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 137, issue 1, 2007

Introduction to development theory pp. 1-10

Debraj Ray

Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship pp. 11-26

Andrew Newman

Entrepreneurial talent, occupational choice, and trickle up policies pp. 27-48

Maitreesh Ghatak, Massimo Morelli and Tomas Sjostrom

Intergenerational mobility and macroeconomic history dependence pp. 49-78

Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Napel

Wage inequality, technology, and trade pp. 79-103

Joseph Zeira

Knowledge hierarchies in the labor market pp. 104-126

Gilles Saint-Paul

Effective property rights, conflict and growth pp. 127-139

Francisco Gonzalez

Why the marriage squeeze cannot cause dowry inflation pp. 140-152

Siwan Anderson

Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly pp. 153-185

Alejandro Manelli and Daniel Vincent

The pre-marital investment game pp. 186-213

Michael Peters

A theory of (relative) discounting pp. 214-245

Efe Ok and Yusufcan Masatlioglu

Core equivalence theorem with production pp. 246-270

Siyang Xiong and Charles Zheng

Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise pp. 271-299

Denis Gromb and David Martimort

Firm dynamics and markup variations: Implications for sunspot equilibria and endogenous economic fluctuations pp. 300-325

Nir Jaimovich

A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 326-352

Gustavo Bergantinos and Juan Vidal-Puga

Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy pp. 353-382

Pietro Peretto

The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information pp. 383-403

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky

Conditions for a CAPM equilibrium with positive prices pp. 404-415

Moshe Levy

Ordinal aggregation and quantiles pp. 416-431

Christopher Chambers

Arbitrage-free valuation of interest rate securities under forward curves with stochastic speed and acceleration pp. 432-459

Gurupdesh Pandher

Structural holes in social networks pp. 460-492

Sanjeev Goyal and Fernando Vega-Redondo

Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems pp. 493-511

Marco Slikker

How equilibrium prices reveal information in a time series model with disparately informed, competitive traders pp. 512-537

Todd Walker

Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities pp. 538-567

Alain Chateauneuf, Jürgen Eichberger and Simon Grant

On the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic OLG model with production pp. 568-579

Martin Barbie, Marcus Hagedorn and Ashok Kaul

Information structures in optimal auctions pp. 580-609

Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer

Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games pp. 610-626

Seungjin Han

Bargaining one-dimensional social choices pp. 627-651

Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsati

Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules pp. 652-672

Chiaki Hara, James Huang and Christoph Kuzmics

Equilibrium portfolios in the neoclassical growth model pp. 673-687

Emilio Espino

A procedural condition necessary and sufficient for cyclic social preference pp. 688-695

Thomas Schwartz

A tight sufficient condition for Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information pp. 696-708

Michel De Lara and Laurent Gilotte

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model pp. 709-715

David Andolfatto, Ed Nosal and Neil Wallace

Mutual absolute continuity of multiple priors pp. 716-720

Larry Epstein and Massimo Marinacci

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, discounting, and Nash bargaining pp. 721-728

Klaus Kultti and Hannu Vartiainen

On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions pp. 729-732

David McAdams

Sequential communication with ex post participation constraints pp. 733-744

Stefan Ambec

A note on optimal procurement contracts with limited direct cost inflation pp. 745-753

Leon Yang Chu and David Sappington

Dynamic inefficiency in an overlapping generations economy with production pp. 754-759

Guido Cazzavillan and Patrick Pintus

Volume 136, issue 1, 2007

Recursive robust estimation and control without commitment pp. 1-27

Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas Sargent

Bargaining and network structure: An experiment pp. 28-65

Gary Charness, Margarida Corominas-Bosch and Guillaume Frechette

Search and endogenous concentration of liquidity in asset markets pp. 66-104

Dimitri Vayanos and Tan Wang

Coalitions, agreements and efficiency pp. 105-125

Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Licun Xue

Asset price fluctuations without aggregate shocks pp. 126-143

Costas Azariadis and Leo Kaas

Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation pp. 144-166

David McAdams

Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition pp. 167-196

Huseyin Yildirim

Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings pp. 197-216

Uzi Segal and Joel Sobel

Imitation--theory and experimental evidence pp. 217-235

Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck and Jörg Oechssler

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication pp. 236-259

Helmut Bester and Roland Strausz

Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information pp. 260-285

Roger Myerson

Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs pp. 286-301

David S. Ahn

Efficient collusion in optimal auctions pp. 302-323

Vianney Dequiedt

Selling options pp. 324-340

Simon Board

The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets pp. 341-378

Ilya Segal

On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality pp. 379-391

Tai-Wei Hu

Stability, global dynamics and Markov equilibrium in models of endogenous economic growth pp. 392-416

Fernando Garcia-Belenguer Campos

Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation pp. 417-445

Gary Charness and Matthew Jackson

The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmstrom-Milgrom type pp. 446-475

Martin F. Hellwig

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations pp. 476-496

Nolan H. Miller, John W. Pratt, Richard Zeckhauser and Scott Johnson

A decentralized model of information pricing in networks pp. 497-512

Arnold Polanski

Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: Theory and experiments pp. 513-535

Yan Chen, Peter Katuscak and Emre Ozdenoren

Subjective probability over a subjective decision tree pp. 536-571

Norio Takeoka

Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games pp. 572-586

Andrés Perea

Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets pp. 587-600

Lars Ehlers and Jordi Masso

Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard pp. 601-640

Rui Zhao

Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria pp. 641-667

William H. Sandholm

Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty pp. 668-694

Kiyohiko G. Nishimura and Hiroyuki Ozaki

Bargaining with history-dependent preferences pp. 695-708

Duozhe Li

Competitive-search equilibrium in monetary economies pp. 709-718

Miquel Faig and Xiuhua Huangfu

Higher-order generalizations of Arrow-Pratt and Ross risk aversion: A comparative statics approach pp. 719-728

Paan Jindapon and William Neilson

Firm-specific capital, nominal rigidities, and the Taylor principle pp. 729-737

Tommy Sveen and Lutz Weinke

Contests with limited resources pp. 738-748

Dmitriy Kvasov

A note on cheap talk and burned money pp. 749-758

Navin Kartik

Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: A unidimensional illustration pp. 759-766

Jacques Dreze, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber

Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions pp. 767-775

Rene van den Brink

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach pp. 776-787

Kristian Behrens and Yasusada Murata

The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models pp. 788-797

Guido Cozzi, Paolo Giordani and Luca Zamparelli