Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 172, issue C, 2017

Optimality of Ramsey–Euler policy in the stochastic growth model pp. 1-25

Tapan Mitra and Santanu Roy

Counterfeiting, screening and government policy pp. 26-54

Kee-Youn Kang

Rational inattention and the dynamics of consumption and wealth in general equilibrium pp. 55-87

Yulei Luo, Jun Nie, Gaowang Wang and Eric Young

Regret theory: A new foundation pp. 88-119

Enrico Diecidue and Jeeva Somasundaram

Non-reservation price equilibria and consumer search pp. 120-162

Maarten Janssen, Alexei Parakhonyak and Anastasia Parakhonyak

Slutsky matrix norms: The size, classification, and comparative statics of bounded rationality pp. 163-201

Victor Aguiar and Roberto Serrano

Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments pp. 202-219

Belén Jerez

Nash equilibrium in games with quasi-monotonic best-responses pp. 220-246

Rabah Amir and Luciano De Castro

The direction of innovation pp. 247-272

Kevin Bryan and Jorge Lemus

Short-sale constraints, information acquisition, and asset prices pp. 273-312

Mahdi Nezafat, Mark Schroder and Qinghai Wang

Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items pp. 313-347

Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan

Repeated games with general discounting pp. 348-375

Ichiro Obara and Jaeok Park

A theory of production, matching, and distribution pp. 376-409

Sephorah Mangin

On the biological foundation of risk preferences pp. 410-422

Roberto Robatto and Balázs Szentes

A new suggestion for simplifying the theory of money pp. 423-450

Kenneth Burdett, Alberto Trejos and Randall Wright

Shilnikov chaos in the Lucas model of endogenous growth pp. 451-477

Giovanni Bella, Paolo Mattana and Beatrice Venturi

Performance pay, trade and inequality pp. 478-504

Germán Pupato

On the maximal domain theorem: A corrigendum to “Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes” pp. 505-511

Yi-You Yang

The pricing effects of ambiguous private information pp. 512-557

Scott Condie and Jayant Ganguli

Volume 171, issue C, 2017

Defending against speculative attacks: The policy maker's reputation pp. 1-34

Chong Huang

Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement pp. 35-63

Felix Jarman and Vincent Meisner

Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models pp. 64-100

Raphaël Giraud and Lionel Thomas

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives pp. 101-135

Attila Ambrus and Georgy Egorov

Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation pp. 136-173

Lucas Maestri

Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning pp. 174-212

Arina Nikandrova and Romans Pancs

Ordering ambiguous acts pp. 213-267

Ian Jewitt and Sujoy Mukerji

Two-sided matching with indifferences pp. 268-292

Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin

Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic? pp. 293-315

Hülya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo

Volume 170, issue C, 2017

All-units discounts and double moral hazard pp. 1-28

Daniel P. O'Brien

Incentives in landing slot problems pp. 29-55

James Schummer and Azar Abizada

On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget pp. 56-69

Christoph Kuzmics and Jan-Henrik Steg

When more is less: Limited consideration pp. 70-85

Juan Sebastián Lleras, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Daisuke Nakajima and Erkut Ozbay

Revenues and welfare in auctions with information release pp. 86-111

Nikolaus Schweizer and Nora Szech

Efficient ex-ante stabilization of firms pp. 112-144

David Frankel

Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms pp. 145-168

Alexander Nesterov

Implementation via approval mechanisms pp. 169-181

Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris

Individual security, contagion, and network design pp. 182-226

Diego Cerdeiro, Marcin Dziubiński and Sanjeev Goyal

Foundation of competitive equilibrium with non-transferable utility pp. 227-265

Inkoo Cho and Akihiko Matsui

A normalized value for information purchases pp. 266-288

Antonio Cabrales, Olivier Gossner and Roberto Serrano

Trust in cohesive communities pp. 289-318

Felipe Balmaceda and Juan Escobar

Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values pp. 319-345

Peter Troyan

Endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change in the neoclassical growth model pp. 346-384

Andreas Irmen and Amer Tabakovic

The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces pp. 385-416

Alia Gizatulina and Martin Hellwig

Choice deferral, indecisiveness and preference for flexibility pp. 417-425

Leonardo Pejsachowicz and Séverine Toussaert

Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections pp. 426-463

John Duggan

Volume 169, issue C, 2017

Temporary boycotts as self-fulfilling disruptions of markets pp. 1-12

James Peck

Implementation in partial equilibrium pp. 13-34

Takashi Hayashi and Michele Lombardi

Stationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games pp. 35-61

Wei He and Yeneng Sun

On blame and reciprocity: Theory and experiments pp. 62-92

Boğaçhan Çelen, Andrew Schotter and Mariana Blanco

Limited attention and status quo bias pp. 93-127

Mark Dean, Özgür Kıbrıs and Yusufcan Masatlioglu

The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games pp. 128-144

Claudia Meroni and Carlos Pimienta

Dynamic benchmark targeting pp. 145-169

Karl Schlag and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Even up: Maintaining relationships pp. 170-217

Larry Samuelson and Ennio Stacchetti

Incentive compatible and stable trade mechanisms on networks pp. 218-233

Olivier Bochet and Rahmi İlkılıç

Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation pp. 234-269

Alessandro Bonatti and Johannes Hörner

Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics pp. 270-293

Yuk-fai Fong and Jin Li

Selloffs, bailouts, and feedback: Can asset markets inform policy? pp. 294-343

Raphael Boleslavsky, David Kelly and Curtis R. Taylor

Skewed noise pp. 344-364

David Dillenberger and Uzi Segal

Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons pp. 365-399

Kyungmin Kim

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring pp. 400-424

Marie Laclau and Tristan Tomala

On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems pp. 425-452

Christian Trudeau and Juan Vidal-Puga

Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation pp. 453-473

Xiaoming Cai, Pieter Gautier and Ronald Wolthoff

Equilibria and incentives in private information economies pp. 474-488

Xiang Sun, Yeneng Sun, Lei Wu and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs pp. 489-516

Andrés Perea

Insider trading and the short-swing profit rule pp. 517-545

Stephen L. Lenkey

Afriat in the lab pp. 546-550

Paul van Bruggen and Jan Heufer

Productivity spillovers through labor mobility in search equilibrium pp. 551-602

Tom-Reiel Heggedal, Espen Moen and Edgar Preugschat

Quasi-linear integrability pp. 603-628

Volker Nocke and Nicolas Schutz

Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders pp. 629-640

Pauli Murto and Juuso Välimäki

On the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products pp. 641-665

Rabah Amir, Philip Erickson and Jim Jin

Fair management of social risk pp. 666-706

Marc Fleurbaey and Stéphane Zuber

Redistribution by means of lotteries pp. 707-716

Stephane Gauthier and Guy Laroque