Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Optimal Retention in Agency Problems pp. 293-323: Jeffrey Banks and Rangarajan K. Sundaram
Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs pp. 324-341: Aviad Heifetz and Dov Samet
Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard pp. 342-378: Son Ku Kim and Susheng Wang
The Distribution of Wealth with Imperfect Altruism pp. 379-404: Jayasri Dutta and Philippe Michel
Mutual Observability and the Convergence of Actions in a Multi-Person Two-Armed Bandit Model pp. 405-424: Masaki Aoyagi
Coordination in Auctions with Entry pp. 425-450: Colin Campbell
Forward Induction, Public Randomization, and Admissibility pp. 451-457: Srihari Govindan and Arthur Robson
Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities pp. 458-468: Jinpeng Ma
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations pp. 469-480: Jose Alcalde, David Perez-Castrillo and Antonio Romero-Medina
Indeterminacy and Stabilization Policy pp. 481-490: Jang-Ting Guo and Kevin Lansing

Learning, Rare Events, and Recurrent Market Crashes in Frictionless Economies without Intrinsic Uncertainty pp. 1-18: Alvaro Sandroni
General Equilibrium with Endogenously Incomplete Financial Markets pp. 19-45: Alberto Bisin
Prices, Asset Markets and Indeterminacy pp. 46-64: H. M. Polemarchakis and P. Siconolfi
A Learning Approach to Auctions pp. 65-88: Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer and Aner Sela
Who Buys and Who Sells Options: The Role of Options in an Economy with Background Risk pp. 89-109: Günter Franke, Richard C. Stapleton and Marti G. Subrahmanyam
Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation pp. 110-131: V Bhaskar
Coalition-Proof Implementation pp. 132-143: Richard T. Boylan
The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions pp. 144-166: Giuseppe (Pino) Lopomo
Dynamic Programming with Homogeneous Functions pp. 167-189: Fernando Alvarez and Nancy L. Stokey
Nonparametric Adaptive Learning with Feedback pp. 190-222: Xiaohong Chen and Halbert White
Stock-Returns and Inflation in a Principal-Agent Economy pp. 223-247: Boyan Jovanovic and Masako Ueda
Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games pp. 248-266: Uday Rajan
Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games pp. 267-276: Atsushi Kajii and Stephen Morris
Efficient Horizontal Mergers pp. 277-289: Satya Chakravarty

Introduction to Modeling Money and Studying Monetary Policy pp. 223-231: Neil Wallace
Money Is Memory pp. 232-251: Narayana Kocherlakota
A Rudimentary Random-Matching Model with Divisible Money and Prices pp. 252-271: Edward Green and Ruilin Zhou
Incomplete Record-Keeping and Optimal Payment Arrangements pp. 272-289: Narayana Kocherlakota and Neil Wallace
Government Transaction Policy, Media of Exchange, and Prices pp. 290-313: Yiting Li and Randall Wright
Search for a Monetary Propagation Mechanism pp. 314-352: Shouyong Shi
Financial Market Frictions, Monetary Policy, and Capital Accumulation in a Small Open Economy pp. 353-400: Elisabeth Huybens and Bruce D. Smith
Price Level Volatility: A Simple Model of Money Taxes and Sunspots pp. 401-430: Joydeep Bhattacharya, Mark Guzman and Karl Shell
Credible Monetary Policy in an Infinite Horizon Model: Recursive Approaches pp. 431-461: Roberto Chang
Expectation Traps and Discretion pp. 462-492: Varadarajan Chari, Lawrence Christiano and Martin Eichenbaum

Introduction to Sunspots in Macroeconomics pp. 1-6: Jess Benhabib
Capacity Utilization under Increasing Returns to Scale pp. 7-36: Yi Wen
Fickle Consumers, Durable Goods, and Business Cycles pp. 37-57: Mark Weder
Indeterminacy and Sunspots with Constant Returns pp. 58-96: Jess Benhabib and Kazuo Nishimura
Endogenous Strategic Business Cycles pp. 97-125: Aditya Goenka, David Kelly and Stephen E. Spear
Ordinal Cost Sharing pp. 126-162: Yves Sprumont
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered pp. 163-200: Jacques Crémer, Fahad Khalil and Jean Rochet
Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics pp. 201-219: Aaron Edlin and Chris Shannon

Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated Types pp. 185-200: Sandro Brusco
Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets pp. 201-221: Lu Hong
Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments pp. 222-256: James Bergin and Arunava Sen
Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games pp. 257-291: Ken Binmore, Michele Piccione and Larry Samuelson
Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation pp. 292-331: Rajeeva Karandikar, Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray and Fernando Vega-Redondo
Multiplicity of Cournot Equilibria and Involuntary Unemployment pp. 332-349: Leo Kaas
Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization pp. 350-369: Mark An

Introduction to Market Psychology and Nonlinear Endogenous Business Cycles pp. 1-13: Jean-Michel Grandmont
Capital-Labor Substitution and Competitive Nonlinear Endogenous Business Cycles pp. 14-59: Jean-Michel Grandmont, Patrick Pintus and Robin de Vilder
Multiple Steady States and Endogenous Fluctuations with Increasing Returns to Scale in Production pp. 60-107: Guido Cazzavillan, Teresa Lloyd-Braga and Patrick Pintus
Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures pp. 108-122: Elchanan Ben-Porath
Aggregation, Determinacy, and Informational Efficiency for a Class of Economies with Asymmetric Information pp. 123-152: Peter DeMarzo and Costis Skiadas
On the Optimal Order of Natural Resource Use When the Capacity of the Inexhaustible Substitute Is Limited pp. 153-170: Jean-Pierre Amigues, Pascal Favard, Gérard Gaudet and Michel Moreaux
Partial Revelation with Rational Expectations pp. 171-181: Aviad Heifetz and Heracles M. Polemarchakis