Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude pp. 133-173: Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni and Massimo Marinacci
Optimal monetary policy in a Phillips-curve world pp. 174-208: Thomas Cooley and Vincenzo Quadrini
Fair imposition pp. 209-228: Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz
Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders pp. 229-251: Dan Levin and Emre Ozdenoren
Modelling cost complementarities in terms of joint production pp. 252-264: Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe

Evidence disclosure and verifiability pp. 1-31: Jesse Bull and Joel Watson
Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation pp. 32-60: P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Ronald Peeters
Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements pp. 61-79: Federico Echenique and Aaron Edlin
Investment timing and learning externalities pp. 80-102: Jean-Paul Décamps and Thomas Mariotti
Core is manipulable via segmentation pp. 103-117: Murat Sertel and Muhamet Yildiz
Consistent planning under quasi-geometric discounting pp. 118-129: Gerhard Sorger

The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication pp. 147-179: Vijay Krishna and John Morgan
Informal communication pp. 180-200: Wojciech Olszewski
Product differentiation and location decisions under demand uncertainty pp. 201-216: Kieron Meagher and Klaus Zauner
Haggling over substitutes pp. 217-245: John Thanassoulis
A commodity-money refinement in matching models pp. 246-258: Neil Wallace and Tao Zhu

Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games pp. 1-28: Nathan Larson
Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures pp. 29-54: Hülya Eraslan and Andrew McLennan
The relevance of private information in mechanism design pp. 55-77: Zvika Neeman
Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions pp. 78-95: Bernard Caillaud and Claudio Mezzetti
Invariant risk attitudes pp. 96-118: John Quiggin and Robert Chambers
The curse of wealth and power pp. 119-123: Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein
Koopmans recursive preferences and income convergence pp. 124-139: Christopher Bliss
Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment pp. 140-143: Guillaume Haeringer

Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome pp. 189-228: Hamid Sabourian
A characterization of the core of convex games through Gateaux derivatives pp. 229-248: Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio
Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly pp. 249-281: Byoung Jun and Xavier Vives
Softening competition through forward trading pp. 282-293: Philippe Mahenc and F. Salanie
A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game pp. 294-322: Tasos Kalandrakis
Search frictions, market power, and long-run growth pp. 323-346: Chung-Yi Tse
Price discrimination of buyers with identical preferences and collusion in a model of advertising pp. 347-356: Agostino Manduchi
Collusion and discrimination in organizations pp. 357-369: Shingo Ishiguro

Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions pp. 1-40: Han Hong and Matthew Shum
On trees and logs pp. 41-83: David Cass and Anna Pavlova
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game pp. 84-92: Arkadi Predtetchinski and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Unequal uncertainties and uncertain inequalities: an axiomatic approach pp. 93-118: Thibault Gajdos and Eric Maurin
Endogenous lifetime and economic growth pp. 119-137: Shankha Chakraborty
Sorting equilibrium in a multi-jurisdiction model pp. 138-154: Andrei Gomberg
Contractual distortions in a market with frictions pp. 155-176: Roman Inderst
A comment on: "Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs" pp. 177-186: Eric T. Anderson, Nanda Kumar and Surendra Rajiv

Global instability in experimental general equilibrium: the Scarf example pp. 209-249: Christopher M. Anderson, Charles Plott, K.-I.Ken-Ichi Shimomura and Sander Granat
A model of political parties pp. 250-277: Gilat Levy
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences pp. 278-308: Matthew Jackson and Antonio Nicolo'
Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions pp. 309-321: Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela
Macroeconomic fluctuations and bargaining pp. 322-340: Huberto Ennis
Concave utility on finite sets pp. 341-357: Marcel Richter and K.-C.Kam-Chau Wong
Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods pp. 358-376: Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo
On the topological social choice model pp. 377-384: Shmuel Weinberger
Balanced Bayesian mechanisms pp. 385-396: Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer and Louis-André Gérard-Varet

Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects pp. 1-34: Ori Haimanko, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber
Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers pp. 35-77: Margarida Corominas-Bosch
Bargaining and competition revisited pp. 78-88: Takashi Kunimoto and Roberto Serrano
Fiscal shocks and their consequences pp. 89-117: Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum and Jonas Fisher
Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom pp. 118-133: Juan Dubra, Fabio Maccheroni and Efe Ok
Non-existence of recursive equilibria on compact state spaces when markets are incomplete pp. 134-150: Tom Krebs
Retrading in market games pp. 151-181: Sayantan Ghosal and Massimo Morelli
Sunspots and predictable asset returns pp. 182-190: Edouard Challe
Job contact networks pp. 191-206: Antoni Calvó-Armengol