Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Unfolding Social Hierarchies pp. 177-203: Fernando Vega-Redondo
When Is Efficiency Separable from Distribution in the Provision of Club Goods? pp. 204-221: Clive Fraser
Incomplete Markets, Allocative Efficiency, and the Information Revealed by Prices pp. 222-253: Alessandro Citanna and Antonio Villanacci
Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes pp. 254-276: Eran Hanany and Zvi Safra
Choquet Rationality pp. 277-285: Paolo Ghirardato and Michel Le Breton
A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order pp. 286-292: Hector M. Ramos, Jorge Ollero and Miguel A. Sordo
Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information pp. 293-304: Tetsuya Shinkai

Aggregation in a Model of Price Competition pp. 1-38: Martin Peitz
Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good pp. 39-61: Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa
Optimal Policy in OG Models pp. 62-83: Christian Ghiglino and Mich Tvede
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria pp. 84-115: Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg
Consistent Income Tax Structures When Households Are Heterogeneous pp. 116-150: Udo Ebert and Patrick Moyes
Decision Rules with Bounded Memory pp. 151-160: Rajiv Sarin
An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games pp. 161-172: Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium pp. 165-185: Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
The Asymptotic Nucleolus of Large Monopolistic Market Games pp. 186-206: Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz
Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games pp. 207-233: Murali Agastya
A Note on the Optimal Structure of Production pp. 234-246: Jose Da Rocha and Maria-Angeles de Frutos
Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model pp. 247-260: Henrik Thiele and Achim Wambach
On Optimal Replacement Thresholds with Technological Expectations pp. 261-266: Laura J. Kornish

Chaotic Learning Equilibria pp. 1-20: Martin Schonhofer
Stochastic OLG Models, Market Structure, and Optimality pp. 21-67: Subir Chattopadhyay and Piero Gottardi
Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Selection with Stochastic Differential Utility pp. 68-126: Mark Schroder and Costis Skiadas
On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion pp. 127-139: Giancarlo Spagnolo
Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments pp. 140-147: Mark A. Chen and Eric Maskin
Partially Informative Signaling pp. 148-161: Tommy Stamland

House Allocation with Existing Tenants pp. 233-260: Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sonmez
Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators pp. 261-293: David Martimort
Liberalism, Efficiency, and Stability: Some Possibility Results pp. 294-309: Martin van Hees
Markets for Composite Goods pp. 310-339: Yves Balasko
Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods pp. 340-368: Rajat Deb and Laura Razzolini

The Optimal Design of a Market pp. 1-39: Sandro Brusco and Matthew Jackson
Reputation versus Social Learning pp. 40-59: Matthew Jackson and Ehud Kalai
Perfect Competition in the Continuous Assignment Model pp. 60-118: Neil E. Gretsky, Joseph Ostroy and William Zame
A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms pp. 119-160: Larry Epstein and Michael Peters
Endogenous vs Exogenously Driven Fluctuations in Vintage Capital Models pp. 161-187: Raouf Boucekkine, Fernando del Río and Omar Licandro
Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games pp. 188-230: Pierpaolo Battigalli and Marciano Siniscalchi

Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus pp. 275-312: Eric Friedman and Herve Moulin
Explaining All Three-Alternative Voting Outcomes pp. 313-355: Donald G. Saari
Implementation with Extensive Form Games: One Round of Signaling Is Not Enough pp. 356-378: Sandro Brusco
Conflict and Distribution pp. 379-415: Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray
Rationality and the LeChatelier Principle pp. 416-428: Kevin Roberts
A Note on Matsushima's Regularity Condition pp. 429-433: Kim-Sau Chung
Boundary Behavior of Excess Demand and Existence of Equilibrium pp. 434-449: Farhad Husseinov

Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information pp. 1-48: Alberto Bisin and Piero Gottardi
The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs pp. 49-71: Michael Suk-Young Chwe
Simple Subscription Mechanisms for Excludable Public Goods pp. 72-94: Parimal Bag and Eyal Winter
Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes pp. 95-124: Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti
On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games pp. 125-143: Eddie Dekel and Suzanne Scotchmer
Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information pp. 144-168: Stefan Krasa
On the Different Notions of Arbitrage and Existence of Equilibrium pp. 169-193: Rose-Anne Dana, Cuong Le van and Francois Magnien
Optimal Saving under Poisson Uncertainty pp. 194-217: Klaus Wälde
Optimal Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market pp. 218-242: Abel Cadenillas and Fernando Zapatero
Endogenous Fluctuations in a Bounded Rationality Economy: Learning Non-perfect Foresight Equilibria pp. 243-253: Emilio Barucci, Gian Italo Bischi and Laura Gardini
The Congruence Axiom and Path Independence pp. 254-266: Taradas Bandyopadhyay and Kunal Sengupta
A Note on the Seller's Optimal Mechanism in Bilateral Trade with Two-Sided Incomplete Information pp. 267-271: Okan Yilankaya