Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 66, issue 2, 1995

Consistent Bayesian Aggregation pp. 313-351

Philippe Mongin

Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market pp. 352-369

Jinpeng Ma

Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability pp. 370-405

Barton Lipman and Seppi Duane J.

Sequential Indeterminacy in Production Economies pp. 406-436

Michael Mandler

Industrialization under Perfect Foresight: A World Economy with a Continuum of Countries pp. 437-462

Kaneda Mitsuhiro

Resilient Allocation Rules for Bilateral Trade pp. 463-487

Roger Lagunoff

Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment pp. 488-506

Christopher Phelan

A Simple Forecasting Mechanism for Moral Hazard Settings pp. 507-521

Anil Arya and Glover Jonathan

The Comparative Statics of Changes in Risk Revisited pp. 522-535

Christian Gollier

Stability and the Chain Store Paradox pp. 536-547

Srihari Govindan

Optimal Public Utility Pricing: A General Equilibrium Analysis pp. 548-572

Kazuya Kamiya

An Alternative Proof of Ben Porath and Gilboa's Generalized Gini Characterization Theorem pp. 573-580

John Weymark

A Note on Randomized Social Choice and Random Dictatorships pp. 581-589

Nandeibam Shasikanta

Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination pp. 590-598

Abhinay Muthoo

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Implementation Costs pp. 599-608

Alejandro Neme and Luis Quintas

Output Shares in Bilateral Agency Contracts pp. 609-614

Neary Hugh M. and Ralph Winter

Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals pp. 615-625

Boylan Richard T.

Structure of Pareto Optima When Agents Have Stochastic Recursive Preferences pp. 626-631

Kan Rui

The Substitution Theorem pp. 632-636

Raa Thijs Ten

Volume 66, issue 1, 1995

A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games pp. 1-32

Dutta Prajit K.

Rivalrous Benefit Taxation: The Independent Viability of Separate Agencies or Firms pp. 33-63

Aaron Edlin and Epelbaum Mario

Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance pp. 64-88

Andrew Atkeson and Robert Lucas

Bargaining a Monetary Union pp. 89-112

Roberto Chang

Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy pp. 113-138

Charles Kahn and Dilip Mookherjee

Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? pp. 139-157

Fahad Khalil and Jacques Lawarree

Nonconvex Production Economies pp. 158-177

Suzuki Takashi

Martingales and Arbitrage in Securities Markets with Transaction Costs pp. 178-197

Elyès Jouini and Kallal Hedi

Intransitivity of Indifference, Strong Monotonicity, and the Endowment Effect pp. 198-223

Sileo Patrick W.

Continuous Strategy Games as Location Games pp. 224-237

Vicki Knoblauch

On Countervailing Incentives pp. 238-263

Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare

On the Invariance of a Mean Voter Theorem pp. 264-274

Ma Barry K. and Weiss Jeffrey H.

Experimentation and Learning in a Differentiated-Products Duopoly pp. 275-288

Joseph E. Harrington

Collusion, Discounting and Dynamic Games pp. 289-306

Dutta Prajit K.

Volume 65, issue 2, 1995

Acyclicity and Dynamic Stability: Generalizations and Applications pp. 303-326

Michele Boldrin and Luigi Montrucchio

Insurance, Adverse Selection, and Cream-Skimming pp. 327-358

Tracy Lewis and David Sappington

Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games pp. 359-382

Andreas Blume and Sobel Joel

Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications pp. 383-414

Michihiro Kandori and Rob Rafael

An Approach to Equilibrium Selection pp. 415-434

Akihiko Matsui and Kiminori Matsuyama

Renegotiation-Proof Lotteries Equilibrium in an Economy with Private Information pp. 435-467

Hiroshi Osano

Ideal Structures of Path Independent Choice Functions pp. 468-504

Johnson Mark R.

Three Solutions for the Compensation Problem pp. 505-521

Marc Fleurbaey

On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information pp. 522-556

Sabitha Nagarajan

The Arbitrage Pricing Theorem with Non-expected Utility Preferences pp. 557-574

David Kelsey and Frank Milne

Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret pp. 575-584

Daniel Vincent

Jamming a Rival's Learning pp. 585-599

Anthony Creane

On Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium under Imperfect Monitoring pp. 600-610

Kong-Pin Chen

On the Existence of Nonoptimal Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Economies pp. 611-623

Jeremy Greenwood and Huffman Gregory W.

A Theorem on Portfolio Separation with General Preferences pp. 624-626

Lwebel Arthur and William Perraudin

Risk Avoidance under Limited Liability pp. 627-634

Suen Wing

A Simple Proof of a Basic Result in Nonexpected Utility Theory pp. 635-639

John Conlon

Volume 65, issue 1, 1995

Financial Market Innovation and Security Design: An Introduction pp. 1-42

Darrell Duffie and Rohit Rahi

Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets Economies with Several Consumption Goods pp. 43-78

Elul Ronel

Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model pp. 79-116

Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Financial Innovation and Arbitrage Pricing in Frictional Economies pp. 117-135

Zhiwu Chen

Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market pp. 136-170

Utpal Bhattacharya, Philip Reny and Spiegel Matthew

Optimal Incomplete Markets with Asymmetric Information pp. 171-197

Rohit Rahi

Endogenous Determination of the Degree of Market-Incompleteness in Futures Innovation pp. 198-217

Ohashi Kazuhiko

Optimality of Incomplete Markets pp. 218-232

Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque

Private Information and the Design of Securities pp. 233-257

Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque

Commission-Revenue Maximization in a General Equilibrium Model of Asset Creation pp. 258-298

Hara Chiaki