Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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The permanent income hypothesis and long-run economic stability pp. 377-394: Truman F. Bewley
Expectations equilibrium with expectations conditioned on past data pp. 395-406: Kim C. Border and James Jordan
Liberal paradox and the voluntary exchange of rights-exercising pp. 407-422: Kotaro Suzumura
On the routewise application of choice pp. 423-438: Murat R. Sertel and Alexander Van der Bellen
Economies as distributions: Implications for aggregation and stability pp. 439-450: Elsie M. Knoer
Innovation, rates of profit, and uniqueness of von Neumann prices pp. 451-464: John Roemer
Efficient allocations under a general transaction technology pp. 465-476: Avia Spivak
On the aggregation of information in competitive markets pp. 477-498: Martin F. Hellwig
How the law circumvents Starrett's nonconvexity pp. 499-504: Robert D. Cooter

Noncooperative approaches to the theory of perfect competition: Presentation pp. 121-135: Andreu Mas-Colell
Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives pp. 136-154: Roy Radner
Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets pp. 155-182: Edward Green
The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium pp. 183-207: Joseph Ostroy
A characterization of perfectly competitive economies with production pp. 208-221: Louis Makowski
Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity pp. 222-242: Louis Makowski
Small efficient scale as a foundation for Walrasian equilibrium pp. 243-255: William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein
The limit points of monopolistic competition pp. 256-278: Kevin Roberts
Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation pp. 279-312: Oliver D. Hart
Equilibrium in simple spatial (or differentiated product) models pp. 313-326: William Novshek
Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry pp. 327-338: Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques Thisse
Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach pp. 339-362: Pradeep Dubey, Andreu Mas-Colell and Martin Shubik
Nash equilibria of market games: Finiteness and inefficiency pp. 363-376: Pradeep Dubey

Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness pp. 1-11: Andrew McLennan
Beneficial altruism pp. 12-22: Joseph Greenberg
Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting arrow social welfare functions pp. 23-36: Ehud Kalai and Zvi Ritz
Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control pp. 37-55: Susan I. Cohen
Intergenerational preference differences and optimal national saving pp. 56-66: John Laitner
A single-parameter generalization of the Gini indices of inequality pp. 67-86: David Donaldson and John Weymark
Index numbers and consistency in aggregation pp. 87-98: Charles Blackorby and Daniel Primont
Income distribution and distortion of preferences: The [lambda] commodity case pp. 99-106: Mordecai Kurz
Keynesian multipliers in temporary equilibrium with consumer credit rationing pp. 107-112: Anup Shah
Utility theory in unfair lotteries pp. 113-114: William MacDougall
The ALEP definition of complementarity and least concave utility functions pp. 115-117: Yakar Kannai

Budget-constrained Pareto-efficient allocations pp. 359-379: Yves Balasko
Is there an income effect? pp. 380-388: H. M. Polemarchakis
Nonlinear input-output model with piecewise affine coefficients pp. 389-410: M. J. Chien and Luke Chan
A theoretical analysis of resale price maintenance pp. 411-420: William L. Holahan
The hopf bifurcation and the existence and stability of closed orbits in multisector models of optimal economic growth pp. 421-444: Jess Benhabib and Kazuo Nishimura
Optimum towns and environmental externalities pp. 445-464: Anil Markandya
Two theorems concerning optimal educational policy in balanced growth pp. 465-472: Richard Manning
Manipulation and the Pareto rule pp. 473-482: Allan Feldman
On some results in comparative statics analysis pp. 483-490: Wilfried Pauwels
Comparative statics with discrete jumps in shift parameters, or, how to do economics on the saddle(-point) pp. 491-509: Richard K. Anderson and Akira Takayama
A comparative statics theorem for choice under risk pp. 510-517: Marvin Kraus

Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure pp. 213-221: Joseph Greenberg
Money, prices, and inflation in macroeconomic models with rational inflationary expectations pp. 222-234: Mark Gertler
Fair allocations of a renewable resource pp. 235-248: Joel Sobel
On equal plans with an infinite horizon pp. 249-264: C. R. Birchenhall and Paul Grout
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification pp. 265-293: Robert Townsend
Unpriced transport congestion pp. 294-316: Richard Arnott
On the theory of risk aversion and the theory of risk pp. 317-335: David C. Nachman
Pareto-optimality in the pure distribution economy with an infinite number of consumers and commodities pp. 336-347: Stephen A. Clark
On the uniqueness theorems by Arrow and Hahn pp. 348-352: Kazuo Nishimura
Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules pp. 353-356: James M. Enelow

Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion pp. 1-9: Ariel Rubinstein
Fair division with indivisible commodities pp. 10-27: Vincent Crawford and W. P. Heller
Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures pp. 28-45: John A. Ferejohn and Peter C. Fishburn
Competitive equilibrium with local public goods pp. 46-61: Bryan Ellickson
The effect of unlagging on stability and speed of adjustment pp. 62-72: Donald V. T. Bear and John Conlisk
Liquidity, speculation, and the demand for money pp. 73-87: Bryce Hool
Sequential exploitation of uncertain deposits of a depletable natural resource pp. 88-110: Arthur Robson
On social welfare functions and the aggregation of preferences pp. 111-139: John Chipman and James C. Moore
On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria pp. 140-165: Leonid Hurwicz
The long run limits to growth: Renewable resources, endogenous population, and technological change pp. 166-185: Richard E. Schuler
Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the arrow theorem pp. 186-194: Douglas H. Blair and Robert A. Pollak
Semiorders and collective choice pp. 195-206: Julian H. Blau
Self-fulfilling expectations in stochastic processes of temporary equilibria pp. 207-212: Gunter Knieps