Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 175, issue C, 2018

Quasi-linear integrability: Addendum pp. e1-e2

Volker Nocke and Nicolas Schutz

Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion pp. 1-37

Vivek Bhattacharya, Lucas Manuelli and Ludwig Straub

The simplest rational greater-fool bubble model pp. 38-57

Feng Liu and John Conlon

Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games pp. 58-87

Takuo Sugaya and Alexander Wolitzky

College assignment as a large contest pp. 88-126

Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed and Brent R. Hickman

Whether or not to open Pandora's box pp. 127-158

Laura Doval

Context-dependent choice as explained by foraging theory pp. 159-177

Shengwu Li and Ning Neil Yu

A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism pp. 178-200

Battal Dogan, Serhat Doğan and Kemal Yildiz

Incentives and the structure of communication pp. 201-247

Thomas J. Rivera

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating pp. 248-264

Martin Dufwenberg and Martin A. Dufwenberg

A behavioral definition of unforeseen contingencies pp. 265-290

Asen Kochov

Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes pp. 291-317

Bin Liu, Jingfeng Lu, Ruqu Wang and Jun Zhang

Price instability in multi-unit auctions pp. 318-341

Edward Anderson and Pär Holmberg

Searching for information pp. 342-373

Jungsuk Han and Francesco Sangiorgi

Cultural leader and the dynamics of assimilation pp. 374-414

Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou

Sharing market access in buyer–seller networks pp. 415-446

Sofia Priazhkina and Frank H. Page

Asset bundling and information acquisition of investors with different expertise pp. 447-490

Liang Dai

Dynamic market participation and endogenous information aggregation pp. 491-517

Edison Yu

No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining pp. 518-555

Jack Fanning

Indeterminacy in credit economies pp. 556-584

Zachary Bethune, Tai-Wei Hu and Guillaume Rocheteau

Firm-specific training pp. 585-623

Leonardo Felli and Christopher Harris

Dynamic relational contracts under complete information pp. 624-651

Jonathan Thomas and Timothy Worrall

Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions pp. 652-688

Vincent Glode, Christian Opp and Xingtan Zhang

Doubts and variability: A robust perspective on exotic consumption series pp. 689-712

Rhys Bidder and M.E. Smith

Herding with costly information pp. 713-729

S. Nageeb Ali

Risk sharing in the small and in the large pp. 730-765

Paolo Ghirardato and Marciano Siniscalchi

A Schumpeterian theory of multi-quality firms pp. 766-802

Hélène Latzer

Sovereign default: The role of expectations pp. 803-812

Joao Ayres, Gaston Navarro, Juan Pablo Nicolini and Pedro Teles

Volume 174, issue C, 2018

Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder pp. 1-15

Brian Baisa and Justin Burkett

Liquidity misallocation in an over-the-counter market pp. 16-56

Shengxing Zhang

The winner's curse: Conditional reasoning and belief formation pp. 57-102

Christian Koch and Stefan P. Penczynski

On the value of persuasion by experts pp. 103-123

Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara

Dynamic directed random matching pp. 124-183

Darrell Duffie, Lei Qiao and Yeneng Sun

Large firms and within firm occupational reallocation pp. 184-223

Theodore Papageorgiou

On investor preferences and mutual fund separation pp. 224-260

Philip Dybvig and Fang Liu

Uniqueness and stability of equilibrium in economies with two goods pp. 261-272

John Geanakoplos and Kieran James Walsh

Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling pp. 273-287

Takakazu Honryo

Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games pp. 288-299

Carmen Camacho, Takashi Kamihigashi and Çağrı Sağlam

On the probabilistic transmission of continuous cultural traits pp. 300-323

Man-Wah Cheung and Jiabin Wu

Volume 173, issue C, 2018

Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk pp. 1-17

Christian Kellner and Mark T. Le Quement

On the existence and uniqueness of stationary equilibrium in Bewley economies with production pp. 18-55

Ömer T. Açıkgöz

Foundations for optimal inattention pp. 56-94

Andrew Ellis

Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller pp. 95-117

Juan Beccuti and Marc Möller

Convex dynamic programming with (bounded) recursive utility pp. 118-141

Gaetano Bloise and Yiannis Vailakis

Asset pricing under optimal contracts pp. 142-180

Jaksa Cvitanic and Hao Xing

Stochastic optimal growth model with risk sensitive preferences pp. 181-200

Nicole Bäuerle and Anna Jaśkiewicz

Informal commitments in planner–doer games pp. 201-230

Madhav Chandrasekher

Dynamic inefficiency in decentralized capital markets pp. 231-256

André Kurmann and Stanislav Rabinovich

Financial market structures revealed by pricing rules: Efficient complete markets are prevalent pp. 257-288

Aloisio Araujo, Alain Chateauneuf and José Faro

Contracting to compete for flows pp. 289-319

Jason Roderick Donaldson and Giorgia Piacentino

WARP and combinatorial choice pp. 320-333

Samson Alva

Stochastic stability of monotone economies in regenerative environments pp. 334-360

Sergey Foss, Vsevolod Shneer, Jonathan Thomas and Timothy Worrall

Normality of demand in a two-goods setting pp. 361-382

Laurens Cherchye, Thomas Demuynck and Bram De Rock

The speed of sequential asymptotic learning pp. 383-409

Wade Hann-Caruthers, Vadim V. Martynov and Omer Tamuz