Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 156, issue C, 2015

Introduction to computer science and economic theory pp. 1-13

Lawrence Blume, David Easley, Jon Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg and Éva Tardos

Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts pp. 14-44

Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan

Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items pp. 45-76

Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs pp. 77-102

Jing Chen and Silvio Micali

Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design pp. 103-143

Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline and Qiqi Yan

Pricing lotteries pp. 144-174

Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg

Multilateral matching pp. 175-206

John William Hatfield and Scott Kominers

Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games pp. 207-245

Constantinos Daskalakis and Christos H. Papadimitriou

Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation pp. 246-268

Joseph Y. Halpern and Rafael Pass

Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure pp. 269-316

Sachin Adlakha, Ramesh Johari and Gabriel Y. Weintraub

Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games pp. 317-342

Tim Roughgarden and Florian Schoppmann

Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions pp. 343-388

Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme and Éva Tardos

An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms pp. 389-416

Nicolas Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, Yoav Shoham and David M. Pennock

Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks pp. 417-454

Mohsen Bayati, Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Yash Kanoria and Andrea Montanari

Volume 155, issue C, 2015

Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets pp. 1-15

Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers and Ronald Wolthoff

Recognition for sale pp. 16-29

S. Nageeb Ali

On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good pp. 30-49

Jordi Masso, Antonio Nicolo', Arunava Sen, Tridib Sharma and Levent Ülkü

Survival with ambiguity pp. 50-94

Ani Guerdjikova and Emanuela Sciubba

Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions pp. 95-130

Paulo Barelli and John Duggan

Choice theory when agents can randomize pp. 131-151

Jörg Stoye

Payoffs in exact TU economies pp. 152-184

Omer Edhan

From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment pp. 185-205

Daniel Friedman, Steffen Huck, Ryan Oprea and Simon Weidenholzer

Rational agents are the quickest pp. 206-233

Michael Mandler

The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints pp. 234-261

Pablo Beker and Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Dynamic pricing in the presence of individual learning pp. 262-299

Xi Weng

Preferences with grades of indecisiveness pp. 300-331

Stefania Minardi and Andrei Savochkin

On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria pp. 332-358

Luca Colombo and Paola Labrecciosa

Volume 154, issue C, 2014

Collective rationality and monotone path division rules pp. 1-24

John E. Stovall

Symmetric play in repeated allocation games pp. 25-67

Christoph Kuzmics, Thomas Palfrey and Brian W. Rogers

Endogenous growth and wave-like business fluctuations pp. 68-111

Mauro Bambi, Fausto Gozzi and Omar Licandro

Free entry versus socially optimal entry pp. 112-125

Rabah Amir, Luciano De Castro and Leonidas Koutsougeras

Markup cycles, dynamic misallocation, and amplification pp. 126-161

Marcus Opp, Christine A. Parlour and Johan Walden

Weakly monotonic solutions for cooperative games pp. 162-172

André Casajus and Frank Huettner

Community enforcement with observation costs pp. 173-186

Yu Awaya

On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria pp. 187-215

Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents pp. 216-228

Alejandro Saporiti

Convergence in models with bounded expected relative hazard rates pp. 229-244

Carlos Oyarzun and Johannes Ruf

Optimal city hierarchy: A dynamic programming approach to central place theory pp. 245-273

Wen-Tai Hsu, Thomas J. Holmes and Frank Morgan

The dynamics of continuous cultural traits in social networks pp. 274-309

Berno Buechel, Tim Hellmann and Michael M. Pichler

Incomplete market dynamics and cross-sectional distributions pp. 310-348

Alexis Akira Toda

A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content pp. 349-374

Arpita Ghosh and Patrick Hummel

Observational learning with position uncertainty pp. 375-402

Ignacio Monzon and Michael Rapp

When can expected utility handle first-order risk aversion? pp. 403-422

Georges Dionne and Jingyuan Li

Does one Bayesian make a difference? pp. 423-452

Manuel Mueller-Frank

Aggregation of preferences for skewed asset returns pp. 453-489

Fousseni Chabi-Yo, Dietmar P.J. Leisen and Eric Renault

A dynamic equilibrium model of imperfectly integrated financial markets pp. 490-542

Harjoat Bhamra, Nicolas Coeurdacier and Stéphane Guibaud

A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea pp. 543-561

Qianfeng Tang and Jingsheng Yu

Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels pp. 562-577

Ryoji Sawa and Dai Zusai

The role of commitment in bilateral trade pp. 578-603

Dino Gerardi, Johannes Hörner and Lucas Maestri

Information and the dispersion of posterior expectations pp. 604-611

Nikolai Brandt, Burkhard Drees, Bernhard Eckwert and Felix Vardy

Ordients: Optimization and comparative statics without utility functions pp. 612-632

Ludovic Renou and Karl H. Schlag

Costly information, entry, and credit access pp. 633-667

Todd A. Gormley