Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 68, issue 2, 1996

Perfect Correlated Equilibria pp. 279-302

Amrita Dhillon and Jean-François Mertens

Arrow's Theorem in Public Good Environments with Convex Technologies pp. 303-318

John Duggan

Stability of Competitive Equilibrium with Respect to Recursive and Learning Processes pp. 319-348

Yves Balasko and Daniel Royer

Information, Liquidity, and Asset Trading in a Random Matching Game pp. 349-379

Hugo A. Hopenhayn and Ingrid M. Werner

Rationalizable Predatory Pricing pp. 380-396

David Roth

A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-expected Utility pp. 397-424

Arthur Robson

Nash Implementation of Matching Rules pp. 425-439

Tarik Kara and Tayfun Sonmez

Optimal Repeated Purchases When Sellers Are Learning about Costs pp. 440-455

Roberto Burguet

Continuous Extensions of an Order on a Set to the Power Set pp. 456-479

Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe

Voting with Ballots and Feet: Existence of Equilibrium in a Local Public Good Economy pp. 480-509

Hideo Konishi

On the Role of Commitment in a Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal pp. 510-530

Peter-Jurgen Jost

Cores and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities and Lotteries pp. 531-543

Rodney Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin

Correlated Equilibrium of Cournot Oligopoly Competition pp. 544-548

Luchuan Liu

Ranking Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders pp. 549-561

James Smith and Dan Levin

Volume 68, issue 1, 1996

Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements pp. 1-25

Matthew Rabin and Joel Sobel

Incentive-Efficient Equilibria of Two-Party Sealed-Bid Bargaining Games pp. 26-48

Thomas Gresik

Excess Demand Functions and Incomplete Markets pp. 49-63

Jean-Marc Bottazzi and Thorsten Hens

The Positive Economics of Methodology pp. 64-76

James Kahn, Steven E. Landsburg and Alan C. Stockman

Axiomatizing Ordinal Welfare Egalitarianism When Preferences May Vary pp. 77-110

Yves Sprumont

A Model of Fiat Money and Barter pp. 111-132

Fumio Hayashi and Akihiko Matsui

On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models pp. 133-148

Erik Balder

A General Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth with Human and Physical Capital: Balanced Growth and Transitional Dynamics pp. 149-173

Eric Bond, Ping Wang and Chong Yip

An Axiomatic Approach to "Preference for Freedom of Choice" pp. 174-199

Clemens Puppe

Core and Stable Sets of Large Games Arising in Economics pp. 200-211

Ezra Einy, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer and Benyamin Shitovitz

Coalitional Power Structure in Stochastic Social Choice Functions with an Unrestricted Preference Domain pp. 212-233

Shasikanta Nandeibam

Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game pp. 234-248

R. Cressman

A Communication-Proof Equilibrium Concept pp. 249-257

José Luis Ferreira

Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests pp. 258-265

Dov Monderer and Lloyd S. Shapley

Supergames Played by Finite Automata with Finite Costs of Complexity in an Evolutionary Setting pp. 266-275

David Cooper

Volume 67, issue 2, 1995

The Assessment of Large Compounds of Independent Gambles pp. 299-326

Hellwig Martin F.

Profitable Informed Trading in a Simple General Equilibrium Model of Asset Pricing pp. 327-369

James Dow and Gary Gorton

Comparative Statics of the Firm pp. 370-401

Topkis Donald M.

A Schur Concave Characterization of Risk Aversion for Non-expected Utility Preferences pp. 402-435

Hong Chew Soo and Hui Mao Mei

Bertrand and Walras Equilibria in Large Economies pp. 436-466

Peter Funk

Money and Prices: A Model of Search and Bargaining pp. 467-496

Shi Shougong

Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games pp. 497-519

Jeheil Phillippe

Revisiting Dynamic Duopoly with Consumer Switching Costs pp. 520-530

Padilla A. Jorge

A Model of Auction Contracts with Liquidated Damages pp. 531-555

Keith Waehrer

Economies with a Unique Equilibrium: A Simple Proof of Arc-connectedness in the Two-Agent Case pp. 556-565

Yves Balasko

On the Existence of Endogenous Cycles pp. 566-577

Yves Balasko and Christian Ghiglino

Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information pp. 578-589

Sandeep Baliga and Serrano Roberto

Temporary Equilibrium Dynamics with Bayesian Learning pp. 590-598

Shurojit Chatterji

Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof pp. 599-608

Serizawa Shigehiro

Volume 67, issue 1, 1995

(s, S) Equilibria in Stochastic Games pp. 1-39

Dutta Prajit K. and Aldo Rustichini

Uncertainty, Risk-Neutral Measures and Security Price Booms and Crashes pp. 40-82

Larry Epstein and Tan Wang

Multiproduct Equilibrium Price Dispersion pp. 83-105

Randolph McAfee

Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple Conditions for Probabilistically Sophisticated Choice pp. 106-128

Mark Machina and David Schmeidler

Repeated Games with Asymptotically Finite Horizons pp. 129-152

B. Douglas Bernheim and Dasgupta Aniruddha

Transactions Costs, Technological Choice, and Endogenous Growth pp. 153-177

Valerie Bencivenga, Smith Bruce D. and Starr Ross M.

The Speed of Information Revelation in a Financial Market Mechanism pp. 178-204

Xavier Vives

The Real Value of Money under Endogenous Beliefs pp. 205-222

Graziella Bertocchi and Yong Wang

Evolution and Market Competition pp. 223-250

Guo Ying Luo

Multidimensional Generalizations of the Relative and Absolute Inequality Indices: The Atkinson-Kolm-Sen Approach pp. 251-265

Tsui Kai-Yuen

Perceptrons Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma pp. 266-284

Inkoo Cho

A Market to Implement the Core pp. 285-294

Serrano Roberto