Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information pp. 159-184: Antonio Cabrales
On the Communication Complexity of Expected-Profit Maximization pp. 185-202: James Jordan and Dingbo Xu
Notes on Sequence Economies, Transaction Costs, and Uncertainty pp. 203-218: Kenneth Arrow and Frank Hahn
Multi-Commodity Consumer Search pp. 219-244: J. Rupert J. Gatti
Dynamical Systems with a Continuum of Randomly Matched Agents pp. 245-267: Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model pp. 268-279: Maria Saez-Marti and Jörgen Weibull
Complementarity between Import Competition and Import Promotion pp. 280-285: Sugata Marjit and Hamid Beladi

A General Extension Theorem for Binary Relations pp. 1-16: John Duggan
R&D Cooperation and Growth pp. 17-49: Guido Cozzi
An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations pp. 50-76: James Bergin and John Duggan
A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands pp. 77-99: Brett Katzman
Real Business Cycles, Investment Finance, and Multiple Equilibria pp. 100-122: Brian Hillier and Jonathan Rougier
Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core pp. 123-147: Rajiv Vohra
Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? pp. 148-156: Tayfun Sonmez

Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive pp. 169-225: Louis Makowski, Joseph Ostroy and Uzi Segal
Innovation, Growth, and Welfare-Improving Cycles pp. 226-257: Patrick Francois and Shouyong Shi
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities pp. 258-293: Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu and Ennio Stacchetti
Markov Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games pp. 294-327: Subir K. Chakrabarti
On Renegotiation-Proof Collusion under Imperfect Public Information pp. 328-336: Kiho Yoon

Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games pp. 1-23: Josef Hofbauer and Gerhard Sorger
A Model of Optimal Growth Strategy pp. 24-51: Philippe Askenazy and Cuong Le van
Starting Small and Renegotiation pp. 52-90: Joel Watson
Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids pp. 91-121: Zvika Neeman and Gerhard O. Orosel
On Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Common Agency Games pp. 122-139: Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber
Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships pp. 140-156: Roland Strausz
The Decomposition of Risk in Denumerable Populations with ex ante Identical Individuals pp. 157-165: Guillaume Rabault

Limit Laws for Non-additive Probabilities and Their Frequentist Interpretation pp. 145-195: Massimo Marinacci
Optimal Regulation with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions pp. 196-215: Mark Armstrong
Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox pp. 216-226: Bhaskar Chakravorti
A Voluntary Participation Game with a Non-excludable Public Good pp. 227-242: Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Takehiko Yamato
The Relationship between Two Dual Methods of Comparative Statics pp. 243-250: Michael Caputo
Sequential Moves and Tacit Collusion: Reaction-Function Cycles in a Finite Pricing Duopoly pp. 251-267: Klaus Wallner

Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability pp. 1-40: Douglas Gale and Robert Rosenthal
Rationing a Commodity along Fixed Paths pp. 41-72: Herve Moulin
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement pp. 73-94: Michel Balinski and Tayfun Sonmez
Stochastic Revealed Preference and the Theory of Demand pp. 95-110: Taradas Bandyopadhyay, Indraneel Dasgupta and Prasanta K. Pattanaik
Price-Independent Welfare Prescriptions and Population Size pp. 111-119: Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
Simple Pareto-Improving Policies pp. 120-133: Michael Mandler

Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms pp. 161-195: Makoto Shimoji and Joel Watson
Decentralization and Collusion pp. 196-232: Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom
Intrinsic Preference for Information pp. 233-259: Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii and Ben Polak
The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction pp. 260-285: R. Cressman and K. H. Schlag
Beyond Nash Bargaining Theory: The Nash Set pp. 286-307: Roberto Serrano and Ken-Ichi Shimomura
Repeated Implementation pp. 308-317: Ehud Kalai and John Ledyard

Cournot-Nash and Lindahl Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies pp. 1-18: Benyamin Shitovitz and Menahem Spiegel
Constant Risk Aversion pp. 19-42: Zvi Safra and Uzi Segal
Money Taxes and Efficiency When Sunspots Matter pp. 43-68: Todd Keister
Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation pp. 69-89: Olivier Gossner
Are Two a Good Representative for Many? pp. 90-104: Rudolf Kerschbamer and Nina Maderner
An Axiomatic Approach to Complete Patience and Time Invariance pp. 105-144: Massimo Marinacci
A Dynamic Model of Differentiated Oligopoly with Capital Accumulation pp. 145-155: Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini