Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 143, issue 1, 2008

Long persuasion games pp. 1-35

Francoise Forges and Frederic Koessler

Informal insurance in social networks pp. 36-58

Francis Bloch, Garance Genicot and Debraj Ray

Moral hazard with bounded payments pp. 59-82

Ian Jewitt, Ohad Kadan and Jeroen Swinkels

Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns pp. 83-113

Amil Dasgupta and Andrea Prat

Investment dynamics with common and private values pp. 114-139

Dan Levin and James Peck

Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak first? pp. 140-152

Nicolas Houy and Lucie Ménager

Deadlines and distractions pp. 153-176

Maria Saez-Marti and Anna Sjögren

Operators for the adjudication of conflicting claims pp. 177-198

William Thomson and Chun-Hsien Yeh

Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects pp. 199-215

Francois Maniquet

Trees and extensive forms pp. 216-250

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Contagion and efficiency pp. 251-274

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer

"Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting pp. 275-291

Jacques Dreze, Michel Le Breton, Alexey Savvateev and Shlomo Weber

Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited pp. 292-301

Ulrich Berger

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data pp. 302-330

Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv

Solving optimal growth models with vintage capital: The dynamic programming approach pp. 331-373

Giorgio Fabbri and Fausto Gozzi

Taxation, agency conflicts, and the choice between callable and convertible debt pp. 374-404

Christopher A. Hennessy and Yuri Tserlukevich

Collateral secured loans in a monetary economy pp. 405-424

Leo Ferraris and Makoto Watanabe

Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin pp. 425-441

Robin Boadway and Laurence Jacquet

A characterization of inefficiency in stochastic overlapping generations economies pp. 442-468

Gaetano Bloise and Filippo Calciano

Uncertainty and the specificity of human capital pp. 469-498

Martin Gervais, Igor Livshits and Cesaire Meh

Future fiscal and budgetary shocks pp. 499-518

Hian Hoon and Edmund Phelps

Imperfect competition and indeterminacy of aggregate output pp. 519-540

Pengfei Wang and Yi Wen

Growing through chaotic intervals pp. 541-557

Laura Gardini, Iryna Sushko and Ahmad Naimzada

Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities pp. 558-570

Alberto Galasso

Full revelation of information in Sender-Receiver games of persuasion pp. 571-584

Jérôme Mathis

The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions pp. 585-595

Jinwoo Kim

An integral equation representation for overlapping generations in continuous time pp. 596-609

Chris Edmond

Income effects and indeterminacy in a calibrated one-sector growth model pp. 610-623

Nir Jaimovich

Volume 142, issue 1, 2008

Introduction to monetary and macro economics pp. 1-4

Narayana Kocherlakota and Randall Wright

A model of banknote discounts pp. 5-27

Laurence Ales, Francesca Carapella, Pricila Maziero and Warren Weber

Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs pp. 28-47

David Andolfatto and Ed Nosal

Endogenous supply of fiat money pp. 48-72

Luis Araujo and Braz Camargo

Production subsidies and redistribution pp. 73-99

Marina Azzimonti, Eva de Francisco and Per Krusell

Multiplicity in general financial equilibrium with portfolio constraints pp. 100-127

Suleyman Basak, David Cass, Juan Manuel Licari and Anna Pavlova

Efficient propagation of shocks and the optimal return on money pp. 128-148

Ricardo Cavalcanti and Andres Erosa

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt pp. 149-177

Satyajit Chatterjee, P. Dean Corbae and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull

Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism pp. 178-195

Hiroshi Fujiki, Edward Green and Akira Yamazaki

Bidding for money pp. 196-217

Benoit Julien, John Kennes and Ian King

Injecting rational bubbles pp. 218-232

Narayana Kocherlakota

A dynamic model of settlement pp. 233-246

Thorsten Koeppl, Cyril Monnet and Ted Temzelides

Money and capital as competing media of exchange pp. 247-258

Ricardo Lagos and Guillaume Rocheteau

Endogenous groups and dynamic selection in mechanism design pp. 259-293

Gabriel Madeira and Robert Townsend

General equilibrium with nonconvexities and money pp. 294-317

Guillaume Rocheteau, Peter Rupert, Karl Shell and Randall Wright

An overlapping-generations model with search pp. 318-331

Tao Zhu

Volume 141, issue 1, 2008

Competing auctions with endogenous quantities pp. 1-27

Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela and Xianwen Shi

Intrinsic correlation in games pp. 28-67

Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg

Representation and aggregation of preferences under uncertainty pp. 68-99

Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Marc Tallon and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud

Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation pp. 100-113

Philippe Mongin

An efficient solution to the informed principal problem pp. 114-133

Sergei Severinov

Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies pp. 134-151

Hitoshi Matsushima

Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities pp. 152-183

Konrad Podczeck and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Endogenous buyer-seller choice and divisible money in search equilibrium pp. 184-199

Miquel Faig

Efficiency and prices in economies of overlapping generations pp. 200-224

Gaetano Bloise

Debt policy, corporate taxes, and discount rates pp. 225-254

Mark Grinblatt and Jun Liu

Existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium in a two-sector overlapping generations model pp. 255-275

Jinlu Li and Shuanglin Lin

A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem pp. 276-281

Mihai Manea