Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 114, issue 2, 2004

Blackwell's ordering and public information pp. 179-197

Colin Campbell

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices pp. 198-230

Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Martín Uribe

Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly pp. 231-254

Juan Delgado and Diego Moreno

Local coordination and market equilibria pp. 255-279

Shurojit Chatterji and Sayantan Ghosal

Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games pp. 280-309

Jason Shachat and Mark Walker

The evolution of exchange pp. 310-328

Assaf Ben-Shoham, Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij

Are inefficient entrepreneurs driven out of the market? pp. 329-344

Pablo Beker

Non-marketed options, non-existence of equilibria, and non-linear prices pp. 345-357

Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Paulo Monteiro and Rabee Tourky

Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems pp. 358-369

Lars Ehlers

Corrigendum to "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions" [J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004) 153-169] pp. 370-371

Andrzej Skrzypacz and Hugo Hopenhayn

Volume 114, issue 1, 2004

A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination pp. 1-30

Andrea Moro and Peter Norman

An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment pp. 31-55

Dana Heller

Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games pp. 56-87

Igal Milchtaich

A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment pp. 88-103

Rohan Pitchford and Christopher M. Snyder

Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information pp. 104-131

Dino Gerardi

Informed manipulation pp. 132-152

Archishman Chakraborty and Bilge Yilmaz

Tacit collusion in repeated auctions pp. 153-169

Andrzej Skrzypacz and Hugo Hopenhayn

All equilibria of the Vickrey auction pp. 170-177

Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues

Volume 113, issue 2, 2003

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? pp. 147-181

Ilya Segal

A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility pp. 182-198

Hiroyuki Adachi

Core of convex distortions of a probability pp. 199-222

G. Carlier and R. A. Dana

Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade pp. 223-234

Karsten Fieseler, Thomas Kittsteiner and Benny Moldovanu

A complete characterization of Pareto optimality for general OLG economies pp. 235-252

Antonio Molina-Abraldes and Juan Pintos-Clapés

Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition pp. 253-264

Simon Anderson and Régis Renault

Non-addictive habits: optimal consumption-portfolio policies pp. 265-285

Jerome Detemple and Ioannis Karatzas

A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution pp. 286-301

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

Branching bandits: a sequential search process with correlated pay-offs pp. 302-315

R Keller and Alison Oldale

On the consistency of stationary Markov equilibria with an exogenous distribution pp. 316-324

Norio Takeoka

Volume 113, issue 1, 2003

Recursive multiple-priors pp. 1-31

Larry Epstein and Martin Schneider

IID: independently and indistinguishably distributed pp. 32-50

Larry Epstein and Martin Schneider

From evolutionary to strategic stability pp. 51-75

Stefano Demichelis and Klaus Ritzberger

An equilibrium analysis of information aggregation and fluctuations in markets with discrete decisions pp. 76-103

Paul Beaudry and Francisco Gonzalez

Learnability and rationality of choice pp. 104-117

Gil Kalai

Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining pp. 118-130

Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan

Stochastic growth: a duality approach pp. 131-143

Herve Roche

Volume 112, issue 2, 2003

Viscous demand pp. 189-231

Roy Radner

Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study pp. 232-260

Timothy Cason and Daniel Friedman

Asymmetric English auctions pp. 261-288

Vijay Krishna

Stable schedule matching under revealed preference pp. 289-306

Ahmet Alkan and David Gale

Existence of a monetary steady state in a matching model: indivisible money pp. 307-324

Tao Zhu

Risk aversion and allocation to long-term bonds pp. 325-333

Jessica Wachter

Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents pp. 334-342

Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel

Quasi-stationary cardinal utility and present bias pp. 343-352

Takashi Hayashi

Time-consistent policies pp. 353-364

Larry Karp and In Ho Lee

Robert W. Rosenthal pp. 365-368

Roy Radner and Debraj Ray

Volume 112, issue 1, 2003

A dual characterization of incentive efficiency pp. 1-34

Belén Jerez

Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games pp. 35-65

John Conlon

Optimal random monetary policy with nominal rigidity pp. 66-78

Bill Dupor

Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions pp. 79-105

Masaki Aoyagi

The economics of 'new blood' pp. 106-156

Derek Laing, Theodore Palivos and Ping Wang

Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments pp. 157-172

Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sonmez

Temporary bubbles pp. 173-183

Philippe Michel and Bertrand Wigniolle