Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions pp. 157-173: Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein
On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard pp. 174-191: Christopher Phelan
Market Demand Functions in the Capital Asset Pricing Model pp. 192-206: Jean-Marc Bottazzi, Thorsten Hens and Andreas Loffler
Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates pp. 207-223: Jack Robles
Equilibrium in a Finite Local Public Goods Economy pp. 224-244: Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber
Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing under Economies of Scale pp. 245-275: Maria-Angeles de Frutos
The First-Best Sharing Rule in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Exponential Utility pp. 276-280: Holger M. Muller
On the Intransitivity of Preferences Consistent with Similarity Relations pp. 281-287: Xavier Vilà

Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of Firm Dynamics pp. 1-45: Ariel Pakes and Richard Ericson
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? pp. 46-71: Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Pollution Claim Settlements under Correlated Information pp. 72-105: Martin Pesendorfer
Network Mechanisms, Informational Efficiency, and Hierarchies pp. 106-141: Thomas Marschak and Stefan Reichelstein
Correlated Types and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Budget Balance pp. 142-151: Masaki Aoyagi

Factor Analysis and Arbitrage Pricing in Large Asset Economies pp. 231-262: Nabil I. Al-Najjar
A Classical Model of Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency Wages and Macroeconomic Policy pp. 263-285: Bruno Jullien and Pierre Picard
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk pp. 286-298: Vincent Crawford
Experimentation and Competition pp. 299-320: Arthur Fishman and Rafael Rob
A New Approach to the Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy in Vector Lattices pp. 321-328: Rabee Tourky
Dynamic Programming Solution of Incentive Constrained Problems pp. 329-354: Aldo Rustichini
Credit Market Imperfections and the Separation of Ownership from Control pp. 355-381: Daron Acemoglu
A Quasiordering Is the Intersection of Orderings pp. 382-387: David Donaldson and John Weymark

Arbitrage and the Flattening Effect of Large Numbers pp. 1-31: Louis Makowski and Joseph Ostroy
A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money pp. 32-54: Melvyn Coles and Randall Wright
Reputation with Noisy Precommitment pp. 55-75: David Levine and Cesar Martinelli
Competition in Multi-characteristics Spaces: Hotelling Was Almost Right pp. 76-102: Andreas Irmen and Jacques Thisse
Coordination and Externalities pp. 103-129: Juan D. Carrillo
Why Imitate, and If So, How?,: A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits pp. 130-156: Karl H. Schlag
A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules pp. 157-166: Stephen Ching and Shigehiro Serizawa
Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games pp. 167-175: Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro, Peter Borm and Freek van Megen
Habit Persistence in Overlapping Generations Economies under Pure Exchange pp. 176-186: Amartya Lahiri and Mikko Puhakka
Sunspots and the Sequential Regularity of Competitive Equilibria pp. 187-194: Atsushi Kajii
Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games? pp. 195-218: Alvaro Sandroni
Representability of Interval Orders pp. 219-227: Esteban Oloriz, Juan Carlos Candeal and Esteban Indurain

Optimal Taxes without Commitment pp. 231-259: Jess Benhabib and Aldo Rustichini
Birth-Date Dependent Population Ethics: Critical-Level Principles pp. 260-284: Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring pp. 285-299: Nolan H. Miller
On Opportunity Inequality Measurement pp. 300-329: Efe Ok
Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games with Infinitely Many Players pp. 330-353: Taesung Kim and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Approximately Competitive Equilibria in Large Finite Economies pp. 354-376: Matthew Jackson and Alejandro Manelli
A Model of Multiproduct Price Competition pp. 377-401: Yair Tauman, Amparo Urbano and Junichi Watanabe
Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Choice with Borrowing Constraints pp. 402-431: Jean-Luc Vila and Thaleia Zariphopoulou
Noise-Proof Equilibria in Two-Action Signaling Games pp. 432-460: Hans Carlsson and Sudipto Dasgupta

Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics pp. 1-14: Tilman Börgers and Rajiv Sarin
The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player pp. 15-33: Sandeep Baliga, Luis Corchon and Tomas Sjostrom
Non-Exclusive Conventions and Social Coordination pp. 34-57: Sanjeev Goyal and Maarten Janssen
Reinterpreting the Kernel pp. 58-80: Roberto Serrano
On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries pp. 81-101: Rodney Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin
Location, Location, Location pp. 102-127: Simon Anderson, Jacob Goeree and Roald Ramer
A Model of Temporary Search Market Equilibrium pp. 128-153: Michael Rauh
Extrinsic Uncertainty and the Informational Role of Prices pp. 154-180: Tito Pietra and Paolo Siconolfi
Prisoners' Dilemma in Duopoly (Super)Games pp. 181-191: Luca Lambertini
The Nucleolus Is Contested-Garment-Consistent: A Direct Proof pp. 192-196: Jean-Pierre Benoit
Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets pp. 197-204: Tayfun Sonmez
Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem pp. 205-213: Sungwhee Shin and Sang-Chul Suh
Hierarchies of Processors with Endogenous Capacity pp. 214-222: Andrea Prat
A Comment on Rothschild and Stiglitz's "Increasing Risk: I. A Definition" pp. 223-228: Moshe Leshno, Haim Levy and Yishay Spector