Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 50, issue 2, 1990

Liquidity and interest rates pp. 237-264

Robert Lucas

Indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium in stochastic overlapping generations models pp. 265-284

Stephen Spear, Sanjay Srivastava and Michael Woodford

Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition pp. 285-299

Dilip Abreu and Arunava Sen

Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example pp. 300-308

Eddie Dekel

A model of electoral competition with incomplete information pp. 309-325

Jeffrey Banks

Recursive utility and the Ramsey problem pp. 326-345

John Boud

Subjective evaluations of n-person games pp. 346-361

Douglas H. Blair and Richard McLean

An overlapping generations model core equivalence theorem pp. 362-380

Charalambos D. Aliprantis and Owen Burkinshaw

Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games pp. 381-413

Inkoo Cho and Joel Sobel

Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle pp. 414-423

Donald E. Campbell

Coherent behavior in noncooperative games pp. 424-444

Robert F. Nau and Kevin F. McCardle

Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests pp. 445-458

Daniel Seidmann

Maximal elements of weakly continuous relations pp. 459-464

Donald E. Campbell and Mark Walker

Volume 50, issue 1, 1990

Determinacy of equilibria in dynamic models with finitely many consumers pp. 1-21

Timothy Kehoe, David Levine and Paul Romer

Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games pp. 22-36

Martin Osborne

The logical foundations of urban economics are consistent pp. 37-53

Yorgos Papageorgiou and David Pines

Nonexpected utility preferences in a temporal framework with an application to consumption-savings behaviour pp. 54-81

Soo Hong Chew and Larry Epstein

An axiomatization of the single-series Ginis pp. 82-92

Walter Bossert

Partially-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in a competitive economy pp. 93-126

Lawrence M. Ausubel

Equilibrium without independence pp. 127-154

Vincent Crawford

Competitive equilibria and the core of overlapping generations economies pp. 155-174

Joan Esteban and T. Millan

Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information pp. 175-192

Hiroshi Osano

Multivariate decision-making under risk aversion pp. 193-203

Lars Olson

Demand for risky financial assets: A portfolio analysis pp. 204-213

Michael Landsberger and Isaac Meilijson

Mean-variance efficiency when investors are not required to invest all their money pp. 214-218

Hans Ehrbar

Monetary taxation in a monetary exchange economy pp. 219-233

Richard Dusansky

Volume 49, issue 2, 1989

A unifying approach to axiomatic non-expected utility theories pp. 207-240

Soo Hong Chew and Larry Epstein

Utility functionals with nonpaternalistic intergenerational altruism pp. 241-265

Hajime Hori and Sadao Kanaya

The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems pp. 266-277

Maria Jose Herrero

An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games pp. 278-293

Joseph Greenberg

Countervailing incentives in agency problems pp. 294-313

Tracy Lewis and David Sappington

A note on stochastic dominance and inequality measures pp. 314-323

Pietro Muliere and Marco Scarsini

Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs: A differential game approach pp. 324-338

Robert Driskill and Stephen McCafferty

Finite and infinite complexity in axioms of rational choice or Sen's characterization of preference-compatibility cannot be improved pp. 339-346

Avraham Beja

Some classes of functions that preserve the inequality and welfare orderings of income distributions pp. 347-359

Patrick Moyes

Existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with productive capital pp. 360-375

Oded Galor and Harl E. Ryder

Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply pp. 376-378

Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin

Equilibrium with incomplete markets without ordered preferences pp. 379-382

Jan Werner

Volume 49, issue 1, 1989

Small talk and cooperation: A note on bounded rationality pp. 1-9

Eitan Zemel

Cournot-Walras and locally consistent equilibria pp. 10-32

Robert Gary-Bobo

Optimal consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices follow a diffusion process pp. 33-83

John C. Cox and Chi-fu Huang

On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering pp. 84-92

Walter Bossert

A consistent bargaining set pp. 93-112

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta and Rajiv Vohra

Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities pp. 113-134

Peter Hammond, Mamoru Kaneko and Myrna Wooders

The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies pp. 135-168

Mamoru Kaneko and Myrna Wooders

A simple model of optimum life-cycle consumption with earnings uncertainty pp. 169-178

Eytan Sheshinski

Arc-connectedness of the set of efficient allocations in overlapping-generations economies pp. 179-188

Jonathan Burke

On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading pp. 189-194

Toshihide Matsuo

Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system pp. 195-202

Joseph Greenberg

Volume 48, issue 2, 1989

Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-referential linear stochastic models pp. 337-368

Albert Marcet and Thomas Sargent

Large symmetric games are characterized by completeness of the desirability relation pp. 369-385

Ezra Einy and Abraham Neyman

Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly pp. 386-415

Xavier Vives

Equilibrium without uniform conditions pp. 416-427

Aloisio Araujo and Paulo Monteiro

Efficiency in repeated games with imperfect monitoring pp. 428-442

Hitoshi Matsushima

A dictionary for voting paradoxes pp. 443-475

Donald G. Saari

Stable equilibria and forward induction pp. 476-496

Eric van Damme

Commodity price fluctuations: Price dependent delays and nonlinearities as explanatory factors pp. 497-509

Michael C. Mackey

Product variety and competitive discounts pp. 510-525

Daniel Spulber

On the optimality and stability of competitive paths in continuous time growth models pp. 526-547

Gerhard Sorger

Volume 48, issue 1, 1989

Introduction: Symposium on Noncooperative Bargaining pp. 1-17

Peter Linhart, Roy Radner and Mark Satterthwaite

A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information pp. 18-46

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Raymond J. Deneckere

Bargaining with common values pp. 47-62

Daniel Vincent

Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information pp. 63-106

W. Leininger, P. B. Linhart and Roy Radner

Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency pp. 107-133

Mark A. Satterthwaite and Steven R. Williams

The bilateral monopoly model: Approaching certainty under the split-the-difference mechanism pp. 134-151

Elizabeth M. Broman

Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables pp. 152-178

P. B. Linhart and Roy Radner

The sealed-bid mechanism: An experimental study pp. 179-220

Roy Radner and Andrew Schotter

Cheap talk can matter in bargaining pp. 221-237

Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons

Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions pp. 238-263

Steven Matthews and Andrew Postlewaite

Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans pp. 264-303

Roger Myerson

The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms pp. 304-332

Thomas Gresik and Mark A. Satterthwaite