Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Self-Selection Consistent Functions pp. 263-277: Salvador Barberà and Carmen Bevia
Convergence Results for Unanimous Voting pp. 278-297: Cesar Martinelli
Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation pp. 298-317: Lars Ehlers
Intensity of the Sense of Fairness: Measurement and Behavioral Characterization pp. 318-337: Edi Karni and Zvi Safra
Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies pp. 338-369: Andres Erosa and Martin Gervais
Information Processing Hierarchies pp. 370-407: Hakan Orbay
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences pp. 408-434: Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem pp. 435-449: Andrew McLennan
Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk pp. 450-468: Sandeep Baliga and Stephen Morris
Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices pp. 469-482: Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki
Utility in Case-Based Decision Theory pp. 483-502: Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler and Peter Wakker
Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Consumer Inventories pp. 503-517: Pilky Hong, Randolph McAfee and Ashish Nayyar
Endogenous Verifiability and Optimality in Agency pp. 518-530: Shingo Ishiguro
Completing the State Space with Subjective States pp. 531-539: Emre Ozdenoren

Introduction to a General Equilibrium Approach to Economic Growth pp. 1-17: Christian Ghiglino
Factor Saving Innovation pp. 18-41: Michele Boldrin and David Levine
Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting pp. 42-72: Per Krusell, Burhanettin Kuruscu and Anthony Smith
On Non-existence of Markov Equilibria in Competitive-Market Economies pp. 73-98: Manuel S. Santos
Equilibrium Dynamics in a Two-Sector Model with Taxes pp. 99-119: Salvador Ortigueira and Manuel S. Santos
Poverty Traps, Indeterminacy, and the Wealth Distribution pp. 120-139: Christian Ghiglino and Gerhard Sorger
Intersectoral Externalities and Indeterminacy pp. 140-157: Kazuo Nishimura and Alain Venditti
Optimal Growth Models with Bounded or Unbounded Returns: A Unifying Approach pp. 158-187: Cuong Le van and Lisa Morhaim
Ramsey Equilibrium in a Two-Sector Model with Heterogeneous Households pp. 188-225: Robert Becker and Eugene N. Tsyganov
On the Long-Run Distribution of Capital in the Ramsey Model pp. 226-243: Gerhard Sorger
Trade and Indeterminacy in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model pp. 244-260: Kazuo Nishimura and Koji Shimomura

Production Externalities and Urban Configuration pp. 275-303: Marcus Berliant, Shin-Kun Peng and Ping Wang
Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade pp. 304-339: Diego Moreno and John Wooders
Vintage Human Capital, Demographic Trends, and Endogenous Growth pp. 340-375: Raouf Boucekkine, David de la Croix and Omar Licandro
Imitation and Experimentation in Changing Contests pp. 376-404: Francesco Squintani and Juuso Välimäki
Strategy-proof Location on a Network pp. 405-428: James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra
Utility Representation of an Incomplete Preference Relation pp. 429-449: Efe Ok
On the Economic Meaning of Machina's Frechet Differentiability Assumption pp. 450-461: Zvi Safra and Uzi Segal
Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice pp. 462-472: Koichi Tadenuma
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction pp. 473-478: Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Introduction to Experimental Game Theory pp. 1-15: Vincent Crawford
Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining pp. 16-47: Eric J. Johnson, Colin Camerer, Sankar Sen and Talia Rymon
A Backward Induction Experiment pp. 48-88: Ken Binmore, John McCarthy, Giovanni Ponti, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked
Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison pp. 89-103: Elena Katok, Martin Sefton and Abdullah Yavas
A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication pp. 104-136: Miguel Costa-Gomes
Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games pp. 137-188: Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong
Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis pp. 189-226: Jason Shachat
Prudence, Justice, Benevolence, and Sex: Evidence from Similar Bargaining Games pp. 227-246: John van Huyck and Raymond Battalio
Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions pp. 247-272: Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt and Thomas Palfrey

Fiscal Constitutions pp. 255-281: Costas Azariadis and Vincenzo Galasso
Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard pp. 282-310: Edward Prescott and Robert Townsend
The Principle of Strong Diminishing Transfer pp. 311-333: Alain Chateauneuf, Thibault Gajdos and Pierre-Henry Wilthien
Asynchronous Choice and Markov Equilibria pp. 334-350: V Bhaskar and Fernando Vega-Redondo
Binary Games with State Dependent Stochastic Choice pp. 351-376: Toshimasa Maruta
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Distorted Dynamic Economies with Capital and Labor pp. 377-410: Manjira Datta, Leonard Mirman and Kevin Reffett
Existence and Welfare Properties of Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Multiple Divisible and Indivisible Commodities and Linear Production Technologies pp. 411-428: Gerard van der Laan, Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang
"Timing Is Everything" and Marital Bliss pp. 429-443: Yosef Blum and Uriel G. Rothblum
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems pp. 444-460: Patrick W. Schmitz
A Simple Selling and Buying Procedure pp. 461-474: David Perez-Castrillo and Marilda Sotomayor
Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms pp. 475-487: Alexander Kovalenkov

Introduction to Political Science pp. 1-10: David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey Banks and Aldo Rustichini
Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model pp. 11-30: Hülya Eraslan
Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining pp. 31-48: Hülya Eraslan and Antonio Merlo
Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game pp. 49-87: Matthew Jackson and Boaz Moselle
Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections pp. 88-105: Jeffrey Banks, John Duggan and Michel Le Breton
Distributive Politics and Electoral Competition pp. 106-130: Jean-François Laslier and Nathalie Picard
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate pp. 131-161: Enriqueta Aragones and Thomas Palfrey
Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies pp. 162-189: Andrea Prat
Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy pp. 190-218: Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew Jackson and Michel Le Breton
Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games pp. 219-251: Roger Myerson