Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 135, issue 1, 2007

Commitment and self-control pp. 1-34

Jawwad Noor

Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting pp. 35-67

Fahad Khalil, David Martimort and Bruno Parigi

On the size and structure of group cooperation pp. 68-89

Matthew Haag and Roger Lagunoff

A two-person game of information transmission pp. 90-104

Jerry Green and Nancy L. Stokey

Strategies as states pp. 105-130

Michael Mandler

Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty pp. 131-143

Ricardo Arlegi

The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information pp. 144-158

Geoffroy de Clippel

Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment pp. 159-170

Begoña Domínguez

Money, credit and banking pp. 171-195

Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera and Christopher Waller

On the learnability of majority rule pp. 196-213

Yuval Salant

Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs pp. 214-235

Jihong Lee and Hamid Sabourian

The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences pp. 236-252

Jaehoon Kim and Mark Fey

Reserve price signaling pp. 253-268

Hongbin Cai, John Riley and Lixin Ye

The structure of strategy-proof social choice -- Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces pp. 269-305

Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe

Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences pp. 306-338

Susanna Esteban, Eiichi Miyagawa and Matthew Shum

Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities pp. 339-356

Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein

Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible pp. 357-381

Subir Bose and Jinhua Zhao

Efficiency results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring pp. 382-413

Yuichi Yamamoto

Wealth inequality, preference heterogeneity and macroeconomic volatility in two-sector economies pp. 414-441

Christian Ghiglino and Alain Venditti

Stochastic stability in networks with decay pp. 442-457

Francesco Feri

When can changes in expectations cause business cycle fluctuations in neo-classical settings? pp. 458-477

Paul Beaudry and Franck Portier

Public goods in networks pp. 478-494

Yann Bramoullé and Rachel Kranton

Equilibrium in the two-player, k-double auction with affiliated private values pp. 495-513

Ohad Kadan

Finding all equilibria in games of strategic complements pp. 514-532

Federico Echenique

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability pp. 533-544

Stefan Maus, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities pp. 545-550

José Rodrigues-Neto

More strategies, more Nash equilibria pp. 551-557

Sophie Bade, Guillaume Haeringer and Ludovic Renou

Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits pp. 558-566

Braz Camargo

A note on recursive multiple-priors pp. 567-571

Katsutoshi Wakai

Brown's original fictitious play pp. 572-578

Ulrich Berger

Ordering infinite utility streams pp. 579-589

Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont and Kotaro Suzumura

Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions pp. 590-593

Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolás Porteiro

Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] pp. 594-595

Michael Peters

Volume 134, issue 1, 2007

Ambiguous events and maxmin expected utility pp. 1-33

Massimiliano Amarante and Emel Filiz-Ozbay

Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable pp. 34-60

Thorsten Koeppl

Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication pp. 61-92

Masaki Aoyagi

Credulity, lies, and costly talk pp. 93-116

Navin Kartik, Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani

Information transmission in coalitional voting games pp. 117-137

Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra

Speed and quality of collective decision making: Imperfect information processing pp. 138-154

Elisabeth Schulte and Hans Peter Gruner

Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game pp. 155-174

Marilda Sotomayor

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives pp. 175-194

Yeneng Sun and Nicholas C. Yannelis

Coordination and delay in global games pp. 195-225

Amil Dasgupta

Optimal search auctions pp. 226-248

Jacques Crémer, Yossi Spiegel and Charles Zheng

Voting over income taxation pp. 249-286

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Efe Ok

Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships pp. 287-316

Martin Cripps, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Deliberative voting pp. 317-338

Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv

Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities pp. 339-360

Timothy Van Zandt and Xavier Vives

Optimal accumulation in an endogenous growth setting with human capital pp. 361-378

Frédéric Docquier, Oliver Paddison and Pierre Pestieau

Limited observability as a constraint in contract design pp. 379-404

Stefan Krasa and Steven R. Williams

Optimal bunching without optimal control pp. 405-420

Georg Nöldeke and Larry Samuelson

Two criteria for social decisions pp. 421-447

Marc Fleurbaey

Short-memory equilibrium in stochastic overlapping generations economies pp. 448-469

Alessandro Citanna and Paolo Siconolfi

The existence, uniqueness, and optimality of the terminal wealth depletion time in life-cycle models of saving under uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint pp. 470-493

Siu Leung

Mixed bundling auctions pp. 494-512

Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Benny Moldovanu

Indeterminacy in dynamic models: When Diamond meets Ramsey pp. 513-536

Teresa Lloyd-Braga, Carine Nourry and Alain Venditti

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems pp. 537-547

Lars Ehlers

Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees pp. 548-556

Yongsheng Xu and Lin Zhou

Bilateral bargaining in networks pp. 557-565

Arnold Polanski

Uniform payoff security and Nash equilibrium in compact games pp. 566-575

Paulo Monteiro and Frank Page

Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights pp. 576-582

Maarten Janssen and Vladimir Karamychev

Global stability condition on the plane: A general law of demand pp. 583-592

Anjan Mukherji