Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Volume 221, issue C, 2024

Learning from a black box

Shaowei Ke, Brian Wu and Chen Zhao

Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games

Takuma Habu, Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid

Inefficient labor market sorting

Carsten Eckel and Stephen Yeaple

Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators

Ivan Geffner and Joseph Y. Halpern

The paradox of search intensity

Chao He and Xiaodong Fan

Data-driven contract design

Justin Burkett and Maxwell Rosenthal

Logic-based updating

Jinling Ma and Chen Zhao

Risk aversion with nothing to lose

Stefano Pegoraro

Volume 220, issue C, 2024

Increasing returns and the efficient acquisition of information

Michael Mandler

The perils of fiscal feedback rules

Maxime Menuet, Alexandru Minea and Patrick Villieu

Partially directed search in the labor market

Liangjie Wu

Influencer marketing and product competition

Lin William Cong and Siguang Li

The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game

Chenghong Luo, David Perez-Castrillo and Chaoran Sun

Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form

Po-Hsuan Lin and Thomas Palfrey

Disaster learning and aggregate investment

Yingjie Niu, Jinqiang Yang and Zhentao Zou

The Ramsey steady-state conundrum in heterogeneous-agent economies

YiLi Chien and Yi Wen

Sequential trading with coarse contingencies

Sarah Auster, Jeremy Kettering and Asen Kochov

Fomenting conflict

Martin Szydlowski

Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts

Justin Burkett and Maxwell Rosenthal

Optimal influence design in networks

Daeyoung Jeong and Euncheol Shin

Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers

Yi Liu and Fan Wu

Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule

Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai and William Thomson

Branching-independent random utility model

Elchin Suleymanov

Nested replicator dynamics, nested logit choice, and similarity-based learning

Panayotis Mertikopoulos and William Sandholm

Consumer heterogeneity and inefficiency in oligopoly markets

Guofu Tan and Junjie Zhou

Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection

Sarah Auster and Piero Gottardi

Do taxspots matter?

A. Citanna and M. Tvede

The central bank, the treasury, or the market: Which one determines the price level?

Jean Barthélemy, Eric Mengus and Guillaume Plantin

Volume 219, issue C, 2024

Public goods in networks with constraints on sharing

Stefanie Gerke, Gregory Gutin, Sung-Ha Hwang and Philip R. Neary

Short-covering bubbles

Bernardo Guimaraes and Pierluca Pannella

A microfounded approach to currency substitution and government policy

Florian Madison

Who saves more, the naive or the sophisticated agent?

Max Groneck, Alexander Ludwig and Alexander Zimper

Efficient risk sharing and separation

Árpád Ábrahám and Sarolta Laczó

Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and narrow banking

Stephen Williamson

Volume 218, issue C, 2024

Collective decision through an informed mediator

Yunan Li and Xingtan Zhang

Search theory of imperfect competition with decreasing returns to scale

Guido Menzio

A theory of debt maturity and innovation

Yuliyan Mitkov

Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule

Patrick Lederer

Contagion management through information disclosure

Jonas Hedlund, Allan Hernandez-Chanto and Carlos Oyarzun

On bankruptcy in general equilibrium with uncertainty

Klaus Ritzberger and Dimitrios Tsomocos

Heterogeneous overreaction in expectation formation: Evidence and theory

Heng Chen, Xu Li, Guangyu Pei and Qian Xin

Adaptive preferences: An evolutionary model of non-expected utility and ambiguity aversion

Philipp Sadowski and Todd Sarver

On comparisons of information structures with infinite states

M. Khan, Haomiao Yu and Zhixiang Zhang

On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking

Xiang Han

Redistributive fiscal policy and marginal propensities to consume

Mariano Spector

Volume 217, issue C, 2024

Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents

Jan Starmans

Delegating trial and error

Deniz Okat and John G.F. Nash

Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange

Jörgen Kratz

Money under the mattress: Inflation and lending of last resort

Gadi Barlevy, Daniel Bird, Daniel Fershtman and David Weiss

Haves and have-nots: A theory of economic sufficientarianism

Christopher Chambers and Siming Ye

Make it 'til you fake it

Raphael Boleslavsky and Curtis R. Taylor

On existence of Berk-Nash equilibria in misspecified Markov decision processes with infinite spaces

Robert M. Anderson, Haosui Duanmu, Aniruddha Ghosh and M. Khan

Fiscal stimulus with imperfect expectations: Spending vs. tax policy

Riccardo Bianchi-Vimercati, Martin Eichenbaum and Joao Guerreiro

Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition

Ian Ball and Xin Gao

Panics and prices

Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna

Contagion and equilibria in diversified financial networks

Victor Amelkin, Santosh Venkatesh and Rakesh Vohra

Who wants to be an auctioneer?

Sergei Severinov and Gabor Virag

A model of approval with an application to list design

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti and Levent Ülkü

Communication on networks and strong reliability

Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou and Xavier Venel

Economic distributions, primitive distributions, and demand recovery in monopolistic competition

Simon Anderson and André de Palma

Regret, responsibility, and randomization: A theory of stochastic choice

Pedram Heydari

Arbitrage with financial constraints and market power

Vincent Fardeau

CCP auction design

Wenqian Huang and Haoxiang Zhu