Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).

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Volume 219, issue C, 2024

Public goods in networks with constraints on sharing

Stefanie Gerke, Gregory Gutin, Sung-Ha Hwang and Philip R. Neary

Short-covering bubbles

Bernardo Guimaraes and Pierluca Pannella

A microfounded approach to currency substitution and government policy

Florian Madison

Who saves more, the naive or the sophisticated agent?

Max Groneck, Alexander Ludwig and Alexander Zimper

Efficient risk sharing and separation

Árpád Ábrahám and Sarolta Laczó

Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and narrow banking

Stephen Williamson

Volume 218, issue C, 2024

Collective decision through an informed mediator

Yunan Li and Xingtan Zhang

Search theory of imperfect competition with decreasing returns to scale

Guido Menzio

A theory of debt maturity and innovation

Yuliyan Mitkov

Bivariate scoring rules: Unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule

Patrick Lederer

Contagion management through information disclosure

Jonas Hedlund, Allan Hernandez-Chanto and Carlos Oyarzun

On bankruptcy in general equilibrium with uncertainty

Klaus Ritzberger and Dimitrios Tsomocos

Heterogeneous overreaction in expectation formation: Evidence and theory

Heng Chen, Xu Li, Guangyu Pei and Qian Xin

Adaptive preferences: An evolutionary model of non-expected utility and ambiguity aversion

Philipp Sadowski and Todd Sarver

On comparisons of information structures with infinite states

M. Khan, Haomiao Yu and Zhixiang Zhang

On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking

Xiang Han

Redistributive fiscal policy and marginal propensities to consume

Mariano Spector

Volume 217, issue C, 2024

Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents

Jan Starmans

Delegating trial and error

Deniz Okat and John G.F. Nash

Conflicting objectives in kidney exchange

Jörgen Kratz

Money under the mattress: Inflation and lending of last resort

Gadi Barlevy, Daniel Bird, Daniel Fershtman and David Weiss

Haves and have-nots: A theory of economic sufficientarianism

Christopher Chambers and Siming Ye

Make it 'til you fake it

Raphael Boleslavsky and Curtis R. Taylor

On existence of Berk-Nash equilibria in misspecified Markov decision processes with infinite spaces

Robert M. Anderson, Haosui Duanmu, Aniruddha Ghosh and M. Khan

Fiscal stimulus with imperfect expectations: Spending vs. tax policy

Riccardo Bianchi-Vimercati, Martin Eichenbaum and Joao Guerreiro

Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition

Ian Ball and Xin Gao

Panics and prices

Yu Awaya and Vijay Krishna

Contagion and equilibria in diversified financial networks

Victor Amelkin, Santosh Venkatesh and Rakesh Vohra

Who wants to be an auctioneer?

Sergei Severinov and Gabor Virag

A model of approval with an application to list design

Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti and Levent Ülkü

Communication on networks and strong reliability

Marie Laclau, Ludovic Renou and Xavier Venel

Economic distributions, primitive distributions, and demand recovery in monopolistic competition

Simon Anderson and André de Palma

Regret, responsibility, and randomization: A theory of stochastic choice

Pedram Heydari

Arbitrage with financial constraints and market power

Vincent Fardeau

CCP auction design

Wenqian Huang and Haoxiang Zhu

Volume 216, issue C, 2024

Selling information in competitive environments

Alessandro Bonatti, Munther Dahleh, Thibaut Horel and Amir Nouripour

Unilateral stability in matching problems

Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein

Asset pricing with time preference shocks: Existence and uniqueness

John Stachurski, Ole Wilms and Junnan Zhang

Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences

Ernesto Rivera Mora

Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto and Arunava Sen

The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces

Satoshi Fukuda

Making predictions based on data: Holistic and atomistic procedures

Jacob Glazer and Ariel Rubinstein

Shuttle diplomacy

Piero Gottardi and Claudio Mezzetti

A simple and general axiomatization of average utility maximization for infinite streams

Chen Li and Peter Wakker

Informational separability and entropy

Jianrong Tian

Fragile meaning - an experiment

Andreas Blume, Charles Noussair and Bohan Ye

Strategic limitation of market accessibility: Search platform design and welfare

Christopher Teh, Chengsi Wang and Makoto Watanabe

Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

The network origins of the gains from trade

Maarten Bosker and Bastian Westbrock

Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling

Seungjin Han, Alex Sam and Youngki Shin