Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu (repec@elsevier.com).

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Volume 215, issue C, 2024

A population's feasible posterior beliefs

Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko

Optimal prize design in team contests with pairwise battles

Xin Feng, Qian Jiao, Zhonghong Kuang and Jingfeng Lu

A theory of international unions with exits

Michal Kobielarz

As strong as the weakest node: The impact of misinformation in social networks

Manuel Mueller-Frank

Price impact under heterogeneous beliefs and restricted participation

Michail Anthropelos and Constantinos Kardaras

Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks

Arnold Polanski

Irreversible investment under predictable growth: Why land stays vacant when housing demand is booming

Rutger-Jan Lange and Coen N. Teulings

Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns

Alvaro J. Name Correa and Huseyin Yildirim

Volume 214, issue C, 2023

Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A dynamic perspective

Hans Gersbach, Matthew Jackson, Philippe Muller and Oriol Tejada

Preference for Knowledge

Hendrik Rommeswinkel, Hung-Chi Chang and Wen-Tai Hsu

Virus dynamics with behavioral responses

Krishna Dasaratha

On the voluntary disclosure of redundant information

Snehal Banerjee, Bradyn Breon-Drish, Ron Kaniel and Ilan Kremer

A fiscal theory of money and bank liquidity provision

Ping He, Zehao Liu and Chengbo Xie

Coherence without rationality at the zero lower bound

Guido Ascari, Sophocles Mavroeidis and Nigel McClung

Signaling covertly acquired information

Mehmet Ekmekci and Nenad Kos

Information, market power and welfare

Youcheng Lou and Rohit Rahi

Connecting friends

Sihua Ding

Bargaining under almost complete information

Deepal Basak

A model of the gold standard

Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Daniel Sanches

Endogenous criteria for success

Rene Kirkegaard

The ratchet effect: A learning perspective

V Bhaskar and Nikita Roketskiy

Sequential Bayesian persuasion

Wenhao Wu

Volume 213, issue C, 2023

Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat

Igor Letina, Shuo Liu and Nick Netzer

Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation

Priyanka Shende and Manish Purohit

A complete characterization of infinitely repeated two-player games having computable strategies with no computable best response under limit-of-means payoff

Jakub Dargaj and Jakob Grue Simonsen

Signaling, screening, and core stability

Yusuke Kamishiro, Rajiv Vohra and Roberto Serrano

Money-metrics in local welfare analysis: Pareto improvements and equity considerations

Edward E. Schlee and M. Ali Khan

A model of the formation of multilayer networks

Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Sumit Joshi, Ahmed Saber Mahmud and Sudipta Sarangi

Strength of preference over complementary pairs axiomatizes alpha-MEU preferences

Lorenz Hartmann

Best-response dynamics in directed network games

Péter Bayer, György Kozics and Nóra Gabriella Szőke

Talent, basic research and growth

Carmen Marchiori and Enrico Minelli

Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition

Chen Lyu

Testing negative value of information and ambiguity aversion

Christopher Kops and Illia Pasichnichenko

The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring

Guilherme Carmona and Krittanai Laohakunakorn

Semi-endogenous or fully endogenous growth? A unified theory

Guido Cozzi

Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games

Xi Weng, Fan Wu and Xundong Yin

Co-essentiality of money and credit: A mechanism-design view

Hugo van Buggenum and Stanislav Rabinovich

Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion

Shouyong Shi

On sustainable equilibria

Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki and Lucas Pahl

Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

Mehmet Barlo and Nuh Aygün Dalkıran

Competition in costly talk

Federico Vaccari

Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship under incomplete information

Ethem Akyol

Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders

Ryuji Sano

Volume 212, issue C, 2023

Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations

Tymon Tatur

Rational inattention with multiple attributes

David Walker-Jones

Block-recursive equilibria in heterogeneous-agent models

Leo Kaas

Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms

Yishu Zeng

Self-evident events and the value of linking

Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang

Speculation in procurement auctions

Shanglyu Deng

The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works

Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova

Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fabrizio Panebianco and Paolo Pin

Equality in legislative bargaining

Kirill S. Evdokimov

The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning

Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer, Georgios Katsenos and Emre Ozdenoren

Collateral and bank screening as complements: A spillover effect

Sonny Biswas

Strategic mistakes

Joel P. Flynn and Karthik A. Sastry

Private disclosure with multiple agents

Shuguang Zhu

Foreseen risks

João F. Gomes, Marco Grotteria and Jessica A. Wachter

Uniformly self-justified equilibria

Felix Kubler and Simon Scheidegger

Regulating oligopolistic competition

Kai Hao Yang and Alexander K. Zentefis

Information design in optimal auctions

Yi-Chun Chen and Xiangqian Yang

Asset bubbles and inflation as competing monetary phenomena

Guillaume Plantin

Market-making with search and information frictions

Benjamin Lester, Ali Shourideh, Venky Venkateswaran and Ariel Zetlin-Jones