Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Consumption-Portfolio Policies: An Inverse Optimal Problem pp. 257-293: Hua He and Huang Chi-fu
Intertemporal Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Beliefs pp. 294-320: Jerome Detemple and Murthy Shashidhar
A Statistical Equilibrium Theory of Markets pp. 321-345: Duncan Foley
Monopolistic Competition, Increasing Returns, and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies pp. 346-362: Rivard Brian A.
Strategic Information Manipulation in Duopolies pp. 363-384: Leonard Mirman, Samuelson Larry and Edward Schlee
An Equilibrium Result for Games with Private Information and Infinitely Many Players pp. 385-393: Erik Balder and Aldo Rustichini
A Ricardo Model with Economies of Scale pp. 394-419: Gomory Ralph E.
Two Problems in Applying Ljung's Projection Algorithms to the Analysis of Decentralized Learning pp. 420-427: Diego Moreno and Walker Mark
The Strategic Effects of Long-Term Debt in Imperfect Competition pp. 428-443: Jacob Glazer
Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand Supergames pp. 444-468: Val Lambson
Choquet Expected Utility with a Finite State Space: Commutativity and Act-Independence pp. 469-479: Hong Chew Soo and Edi Karni
The Conjunction of Direct and Indirect Separability pp. 480-498: Charles Blackorby and Russell R. Robert
A Generalization of Kaneko's Ratio Equilibrium for Economies with Private and Public Goods pp. 499-512: Dimitrios Diamantaras and Simon Wilkie

On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games pp. 1-23: Elmes Susan and Philip Reny
Endogenous Availability, Cartels, and Merger in an Equilibrium Price Dispersion pp. 24-47: Randolph McAfee
Switching Costs and Sectoral Adjustments in General Equilibrium with Uninsured Risk pp. 48-69: Avinash Dixit and Rob Rafael
Dual Pareto Efficiency pp. 70-85: Luenberger David G.
An N-Person Pure Bargaining Game pp. 86-102: Chae Suchan and Yang Jeong-Ae
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players pp. 103-135: Drew Fudenberg and David Levine
Second Price Auctions without Expected Utility pp. 136-151: William Neilson
WARP Does Not Imply SARP for More Than Two Commodities pp. 152-160: Hans Peters and Peter Wakker
Convergence Theorems on the Core of a Public Goods Economy: Sufficient Conditions pp. 161-185: John Conley
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Walrasian Social Choice pp. 186-208: Nagahisa Ryo-ichi
On the Non-neutrality of Money with Incomplete Markets pp. 209-220: Piero Gottardi
A Simpler Mechanism That Stops Agents from Cheating pp. 221-229: Glover Jonathan
Destroying the Pretending Equilibria in the Demski-Sappington-Spiller Model pp. 230-237: Rudolf Kerschbamer
Atavistic Dynamics in a Two-Sector Economy pp. 238-252: Daniel Berkowitz

Intertemporal Transfer Institutions pp. 189-205: Joan Esteban and József Sákovics
Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information pp. 206-229: Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
Sustainable Plans and Debt pp. 230-261: Varadarajan Chari and Patrick Kehoe
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees pp. 262-289: Salvador Barberà, Faruk Gul and Stacchetti Ennio
The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority-Rule Division Game pp. 290-301: Baron David and Ehud Kalai
Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard pp. 302-330: Biglaiser Gary and Claudio Mezzetti
The First-Order Approach to the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Exponential Utility pp. 331-371: Schattler Heinz and Sung Jaeyoung
Measuring Social Mobility pp. 372-394: Valentino Dardanoni
On the Convergence of Informational Cascades pp. 395-411: Lee In Ho
Comparative Statics under Uncertainty for a Class of Economic Agents pp. 412-422: Ormiston Michael B. and Edward Schlee
Stationary Equilibria in an Overlapping Generations Economy with Stochastic Production pp. 423-435: Yong Wang

Dynamically Consistent Beliefs Must Be Bayesian pp. 1-22: Larry Epstein and Le Breton Michel
Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules pp. 23-41: Thomas Piketty
Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games pp. 42-73: James Bergin and W. Bentley Macleod
Expectationally Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study pp. 74-103: Ramon Marimon, Stephen Spear and Shyam Sunder
Preemptive Innovation pp. 104-119: Lippman Steven A. and Mamer John W.
The Demand for Housing: Theoretical Considerations pp. 120-138: Richard Dusansky and Paul Wilson
Lp-Frechet Differentiable Preference and Local Utility Analysis pp. 139-159: Tan Wang
Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game pp. 160-168: Piccione Michele and Rubinstein Ariel
Ignorance in Agency Problems pp. 169-183: Tracy Lewis and David Sappington
Erratum: Volume 57, Number 1 (1992), in the article Savage's Theorem with a Finite Number of States, by Faruk Gul, pages 99-110 pp. 184-184: Faruk Gul

Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games pp. 217-240: Abrea Dilip, Pearce David and Stacchetti Ennio
Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games pp. 241-276: George Mailath, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Andrew Postlewaite
Adverse Selection in the Overlapping Generations Model: The Case of Pure Exchange pp. 277-305: Costas Azariadis and Bruce Smith
Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment pp. 306-321: Chaim Fershtman and Daniel Seidmann
Social Welfare and Measurement of Segregation pp. 322-334: Tomas Philipson
Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition pp. 335-353: Mario Pascoa
A Model of Choice Where Choice Is Determined by an Ordered Set of Irreducible Criteria pp. 354-377: Moldau Juan Hersztajn
An Elementary Approach to Approximate Equilibria with Infinitely Many Commodities pp. 378-409: Nomura Yoshimasa
Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing pp. 410-427: Hideshi Itoh
Subjective Expected Utility Theory with State-Dependent Preferences pp. 428-438: Edi Karni
Convexity and Sunspots: Another Remark pp. 439-442: Gerhard Sorger

Logical Structure of Common Knowledge pp. 1-13: Hyun Song Shin
Non-transitive Smooth Preferences pp. 14-41: Al-Najjar Nabil
How Different Can Strategic Models Be? pp. 42-61: Dutta Prajit K. and Sundaram Rangarajan K.
Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives pp. 62-82: Greenberg Joseph and Shlomo Weber
The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model pp. 83-113: Bernard Caillaud and Benjamin Hermalin
Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game pp. 114-139: Klaus Schmidt
Search Market Equilibrium, Bilateral Heterogeneity, and Repeat Purchases pp. 140-158: Roland Benabou
An Axiomatic Foundation for Regret Theory pp. 159-180: Robert Sugden
Sunspot Equilibria and Efficiency in Economies with Incomplete Financial Markets: A Remark pp. 181-190: Tito Pietra
The Declining Price Anomaly pp. 191-212: Randolph McAfee and Daniel Vincent