Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 178, issue C, 2018

Ambiguous partially observable Markov decision processes: Structural results and applications pp. 1-35

Soroush Saghafian

Dynamic persuasion pp. 36-58

Takakazu Honryo

Large strategic dynamic interactions pp. 59-81

Ehud Kalai and Eran Shmaya

Payment instruments and collateral in the interbank payment system pp. 82-104

Hajime Tomura

Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values pp. 105-123

André Casajus

Banking and shadow banking pp. 124-152

Ji Huang

Financial contracting with enforcement externalities pp. 153-189

Lukasz A. Drozd and Ricardo Serrano-Padial

A case for incomplete markets pp. 191-221

Lawrence Blume, Timothy Cogley, David Easley, Thomas Sargent and Viktor Tsyrennikov

Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences pp. 222-245

Yves Sprumont

The path to equilibrium in sequential and simultaneous games: A mousetracking study pp. 246-274

Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo and Ashish Sachdeva

Inefficient stage Nash is not stable pp. 275-293

Thomas Norman

Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms pp. 294-317

Yi-Chun Chen and Jiangtao Li

Limited attention, competition and welfare pp. 318-359

Andreas Hefti

Probability weighting, stop-loss and the disposition effect pp. 360-397

Vicky Henderson, David Hobson and Alex S.L. Tse

Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions pp. 398-435

Yeon-Koo Che, Daniele Condorelli and Jinwoo Kim

Intergenerational altruism with future bias pp. 436-454

Francisco Gonzalez, Itziar Lazkano and Sjak Smulders

Optimal monetary interventions in credit markets pp. 455-487

Luis Araujo and Tai-Wei Hu

The signaling effect of raising inflation pp. 488-516

Jean Barthélemy and Eric Mengus

Bertrand competition under network externalities pp. 517-550

Masaki Aoyagi

Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion pp. 551-594

Rosario Macera

Volume 177, issue C, 2018

Invariance of the equilibrium set of games with an endogenous sharing rule pp. 1-33

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

Stress tests and information disclosure pp. 34-69

Itay Goldstein and Yaron Leitner

A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors pp. 70-100

Feng Gao, Alex Xi He and Ping He

Damned if you do and damned if you don't: Two masters pp. 101-125

Rohan Dutta, David Levine and Salvatore Modica

Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand pp. 126-161

James Peck

Dual random utility maximisation pp. 162-182

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships pp. 183-221

Volker Nocke and Patrick Rey

Equilibrium and matching under price controls pp. 222-244

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions pp. 245-279

Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, Nenad Kos, Matthias Messner, Paulo Monteiro and Humberto Moreira

Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles pp. 280-314

Julien Bengui and Toan Phan

Riemannian game dynamics pp. 315-364

Panayotis Mertikopoulos and William Sandholm

Hierarchical experimentation pp. 365-404

Chia-Hui Chen and Junichiro Ishida

Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof pp. 405-425

Itai Ashlagi and Yannai A. Gonczarowski

Social learning and the shadow of the past pp. 426-460

Yuval Heller and Erik Mohlin

Development, fertility and childbearing age: A Unified Growth Theory pp. 461-494

Hippolyte d'Albis, Angela Greulich and Gregory Ponthiere

An efficient ascending auction for private valuations pp. 495-517

Oleg Baranov

Government guarantees and financial stability pp. 518-557

Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, Itay Goldstein and Agnese Leonello

Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare pp. 558-593

Rohit Rahi and Jean-Pierre Zigrand

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission pp. 594-615

Alexander Frug

Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets pp. 616-658

Bruno Sultanum

Coalition-proof full efficient implementation pp. 659-677

Mikhail Safronov

Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: Ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility pp. 678-707

Luciano De Castro and Nicholas C. Yannelis

The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets pp. 708-733

Tadashi Hashimoto

Sharing sequential values in a network pp. 734-779

Ruben Juarez, Chiu Yu Ko and Jingyi Xue

Random intertemporal choice pp. 780-815

Jay Lu and Kota Saito

On the cost of misperception: General results and behavioral applications pp. 816-847

Olivier Gossner and Jakub Steiner

Pricing long-lived securities in dynamic endowment economies pp. 848-878

Jerry Tsai and Jessica A. Wachter

Volume 176, issue C, 2018

Savage's theorem under changing awareness pp. 1-54

Franz Dietrich

The single-peaked domain revisited: A simple global characterization pp. 55-80

Clemens Puppe

Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas pp. 81-117

Kentaro Tomoeda

The time cost of information in financial markets pp. 118-157

Chad Kendall

Time consistency and time invariance in collective intertemporal choice pp. 158-169

Antony Millner and Geoffrey Heal

Volatile capital flows and financial integration: The role of moral hazard pp. 170-192

Tomoo Kikuchi, John Stachurski and George Vachadze

How (not) to integrate blood subtyping technology to kidney exchange pp. 193-231

Tayfun Sönmez, Utku Unver and Özgür Yılmaz

Vote-motivated candidates pp. 232-254

Constantine Sorokin and Alexei Zakharov

Information design and capital formation pp. 255-292

Andrés Carvajal, Marzena Rostek and Guillaume Sublet

On uniqueness of time-consistent Markov policies for quasi-hyperbolic consumers under uncertainty pp. 293-310

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

Investment and bilateral insurance pp. 311-341

Emilio Espino, Julian Kozlowski and Juan Sanchez

Are biased beliefs fit to survive? An experimental test of the market selection hypothesis pp. 342-371

Chad Kendall and Ryan Oprea

A simple model of competition between teams pp. 372-392

Kfir Eliaz and Qinggong Wu

Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited pp. 393-407

Lars Ehlers

Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection pp. 408-443

Juan Escobar and Gastón Llanes

Planning for the long run: Programming with patient, Pareto responsive preferences pp. 444-478

Urmee Khan and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

Implementation via rights structures pp. 479-502

Semih Koray and Kemal Yildiz

Childcare and commitment within households pp. 503-551

Paula Gobbi

Secular stagnation: Theory and remedies pp. 552-618

Jean-Baptiste Michau

Imperfect information transmission and adverse selection in asset markets pp. 619-649

Michael Choi

Dynamic rational inattention: Analytical results pp. 650-692

Bartosz Maćkowiak, Filip Matejka and Mirko Wiederholt

Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents pp. 693-726

Yangwei Song

Mood-driven choices and self-regulation pp. 727-760

Maximilian Mihm and Kemal Ozbek

Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection pp. 761-802

Ilwoo Hwang

Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis pp. 803-833

Fuhito Kojima, Akihisa Tamura and Makoto Yokoo

Optimal government policies in models with heterogeneous agents pp. 834-858

Radim Boháček and Michal Kejak

A college admissions clearinghouse pp. 859-885

M. Bumin Yenmez

College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized pp. 886-934

Isa Hafalir, Rustamdjan Hakimov, Dorothea Kübler and Morimitsu Kurino

Aspiration-based choice pp. 935-956

Begum Guney, Michael Richter and Matan Tsur

Undefeated equilibria of the Shi–Trejos–Wright model under adverse selection pp. 957-986

Ayushi Bajaj