Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 182, issue C, 2019

An impossibility theorem for wealth in heterogeneous-agent models with limited heterogeneity pp. 1-24

John Stachurski and Alexis Akira Toda

Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains pp. 25-105

Shurojit Chatterji and Huaxia Zeng

The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments pp. 106-142

Deniz Dizdar, Benny Moldovanu and Nora Szech

Market selection with idiosyncratic uncertainty pp. 143-160

Markus Sihvonen

No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors pp. 161-184

Alia Gizatulina and Ziv Hellman

Private Bayesian persuasion pp. 185-217

Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko

Public goods with ambiguity in large economies pp. 218-246

Narayana Kocherlakota and Yangwei Song

Efficient investments in the implementation problem pp. 247-278

Kentaro Tomoeda

Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition pp. 279-328

Yunan Li

Savings, asset scarcity, and monetary policy pp. 329-359

Lukas Altermatt

Information acquisition and use by networked players pp. 360-401

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information pp. 402-432

Vinicius Carrasco, William Fuchs and Satoshi Fukuda

Volume 181, issue C, 2019

Survival in speculative markets pp. 1-43

Pietro Dindo

Evolved attitudes to idiosyncratic and aggregate risk in age-structured populations pp. 44-81

Arthur Robson and Larry Samuelson

Frictional asset markets and the liquidity channel of monetary policy pp. 82-120

Lucas Herrenbrueck

Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement pp. 121-142

Samson Alva and Vikram Manjunath

A powerful tool for analyzing concave/convex utility and weighting functions pp. 143-159

Peter Wakker and Jingni Yang

News media and delegated information choice pp. 160-196

Kristoffer Nimark and Stefan Pitschner

What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs pp. 197-237

Galit Ashkenazi-Golan and Ehud Lehrer

The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games pp. 238-273

Simin He, Theo Offerman and Jeroen van de Ven

Recursive utility and parameter uncertainty pp. 274-288

Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Eran Shmaya

Rational status quo pp. 289-308

Itzhak Gilboa and Fan Wang

Testing constant absolute and relative ambiguity aversion pp. 309-332

Aurelien Baillon and Lætitia Placido

Too good to be truthful: Why competent advisers are fired pp. 333-360

Christoph Schottmüller

The cyclical behavior of the Beveridge Curve in the housing market pp. 361-381

Miroslav Gabrovski and Victor Ortego-Marti

Robust incentives for information acquisition pp. 382-420

Gabriel Carroll

Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game pp. 423-460

Ratul Lahkar and Saptarshi Mukherjee

Directed attention and nonparametric learning pp. 461-496

Ian Dew-Becker and Charles G. Nathanson

The economics of green consumption, cultural transmission and sustainable technological change pp. 497-546

Emeline Bezin

Revealed preferences under uncertainty: Incomplete preferences and preferences for randomization pp. 547-585

Elena Cettolin and Arno Riedl

Reputation building through costly adjustment pp. 586-626

Francesc Dilme

Volume 180, issue C, 2019

On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations pp. 1-10

Kym Pram

Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games pp. 11-49

Wei He and Yeneng Sun

Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers pp. 50-80

Daeyoung Jeong

Matching with single-peaked preferences pp. 81-99

Sophie Bade

Opportunistic conformism pp. 100-134

Gary Charness, Michael Naef and Alessandro Sontuoso

Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security pp. 135-166

Charles Zheng

Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable pp. 167-177

Jun Zhang

Pivotal persuasion pp. 178-202

Jimmy Chan, Seher Gupta, Fei Li and Yun Wang

Inattention and belief polarization pp. 203-228

Kristoffer Nimark and Savitar Sundaresan

Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization pp. 229-243

Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers and Arunava Sen

Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules pp. 244-273

Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko

Communication under language barriers pp. 274-303

Francesco Giovannoni and Siyang Xiong

Learning about analysts pp. 304-335

Jesper Rüdiger and Adrien Vigier

Repeated implementation: A practical characterization pp. 336-367

Helmuts Azacis and Péter Vida

Unique monetary equilibrium with inflation in a stationary Bewley–Aiyagari model pp. 368-382

Tai-Wei Hu and Eran Shmaya

Optimal learning before choice pp. 383-437

T. Tony Ke and J. Miguel Villas-Boas

Volume 179, issue C, 2019

Robust consumption and portfolio policies when asset prices can jump pp. 1-56

Yacine Ait-Sahalia and Felix Matthys

School choice with vouchers pp. 57-72

Mustafa Afacan

An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information pp. 73-98

Gary Charness, Dan Levin and David Schmeidler

All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals pp. 99-130

Chang Koo Chi, Pauli Murto and Juuso Välimäki

Stability in games with continua of equilibria pp. 131-162

Sebastian Bervoets and Mathieu Faure

Communicating subjective evaluations pp. 163-199

Matthias Lang

Optimal climate policies in a dynamic multi-country equilibrium model pp. 200-239

Elmar Hillebrand and Marten Hillebrand

The informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets pp. 240-274

Christoph Siemroth

Inference of preference heterogeneity from choice data pp. 275-311

Annie Liang

Ambiguous persuasion pp. 312-365

Dorian Beauchêne, Jian Li and Ming Li

Experimentation with reputation concerns – Dynamic signalling with changing types pp. 366-415

Caroline Thomas

Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade pp. 416-454

David Delacretaz, Simon Loertscher, Leslie Marx and Tom Wilkening

Bayesian updating rules and AGM belief revision pp. 455-475

Pathikrit Basu

A note on optimal experimentation under risk aversion pp. 476-487

R Keller, Vladimír Novák and Tim Willems