Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search pp. 139-168: Michael Peters
Quantified Beliefs and Believed Quantities pp. 169-185: Dov Samet
Dynamic Efficiency of Conservation of Renewable Resources under Uncertainty pp. 186-214: Lars Olson and Santanu Roy
Stability of Functional Rational Expectations Equilibria pp. 215-250: David Kelly and Jamsheed Shorish

Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language pp. 1-36: Andreas Blume
The Value of Limited Altruism pp. 37-70: Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
Uniqueness of an Equilibrium in Infinite-Horizon Economies Subject to Taxes and Externalities pp. 71-78: Wilbur Coleman
Walrasian Allocations without Price-Taking Behavior pp. 79-106: Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij
A Role for Monetary Policy when Prices Reveal Information: An Example pp. 107-115: H. M. Polemarchakis and G. Seccia
Minimum Distribution-Sensitivity, Poverty Aversion, and Poverty Orderings pp. 116-137: Buhong Zheng

General Equilibrium When Economic Growth Exceeds Discounting pp. 141-162: Jonathan Burke
Continuous Approximations of Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics pp. 163-191: Valentina Corradi and Rajiv Sarin
On the Indices of Zeros of Nash Fields pp. 192-217: Stefano DeMichelis and Fabrizio Germano
Money with Idiosyncratic Uninsurable Returns to Capital pp. 218-240: Miquel Faig
Economists' Models of Learning pp. 241-261: Joel Sobel
On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information pp. 262-270: Ezra Einy, Diego Moreno and Benyamin Shitovitz

Limits of Markets and Limits of Governments: An Introduction to a Symposium on Political Economy pp. 1-6: Varadarajan Chari
Large Poisson Games pp. 7-45: Roger Myerson
Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies pp. 46-79: Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo
Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt pp. 80-105: Avinash Dixit and John Londregan
The Economic Effects of Restrictions on Government Budget Deficits pp. 106-137: Christian Ghiglino and Karl Shell

Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games pp. 149-190: Barton Lipman and Ruqu Wang
Welfarism in Economic Domains pp. 191-204: Miguel Gines-Vilar and Francisco Marhuenda
On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories pp. 205-232: Yves Sprumont
A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies pp. 233-239: Jonas Hackner
Efficient Intertemporal Allocations with Recursive Utility pp. 240-259: Bernard Dumas, Raman Uppal and Tan Wang
Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information pp. 260-276: Hongbin Cai

Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models pp. 1-47: Bruno Jullien
On Ranking Opportunity Sets in Economic Environments pp. 48-71: Prasanta K. Pattanaik and Yongsheng Xu
Blocking Efficacy of Small Coalitions in Myopic Economies pp. 72-86: Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García, Carmelo Nunez-Sanz and Mario Pascoa
Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection pp. 87-109: Anil Arya, Jonathan Glover and Uday Rajan
Incompatibility of Usual Conditions for Equilibrium Existence in Continuum Economies without Ordered Preferences pp. 110-117: Erik Balder
Indeterminacy with Non-separable Utility pp. 118-143: Rosalind Bennett and Roger Farmer
A Comment on "A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Vol. 71 (1996), 260-288, by Michael Raith pp. 144-145: Jim Jin

Decomposable Choice under Uncertainty pp. 169-197: Simon Grant, Atsushi Kajii and Ben Polak
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer pp. 198-233: Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale
Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency pp. 234-273: Hongbin Cai
The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences pp. 274-299: Levent Kockesen, Efe Ok and Rajiv Sethi
Fiscal Federalism Revisited pp. 300-317: Charles Blackorby and Craig Brett
Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence pp. 318-342: Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Rann Smorodinsky

Financial Fragility and the Exchange Rate Regime pp. 1-34: Roberto Chang and Andres Velasco
Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors pp. 35-65: Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Peter Klibanoff and Emre Ozdenoren
The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities pp. 66-95: Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti
Cone Conditions in General Equilibrium Theory pp. 96-121: Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Rabee Tourky and Nicholas C. Yannelis
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition, Demand Uncertainty, and Asymmetric Outcomes pp. 122-141: Stanley S. Reynolds and Bart Wilson
Production Externalities and Two-way Distortion in Principal-multi-agent Problems pp. 142-166: Ben Lockwood

Characterizing Common Priors in the Form of Posteriors pp. 127-179: Yossi Feinberg
Manipulation through Bribes pp. 180-198: James Schummer
Path Independent Inequality Measures pp. 199-222: James Foster and Artyom A. Shneyerov
A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence pp. 223-247: Ana Fernandes and Christopher Phelan
Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information pp. 248-279: S. Aiyagari and Stephen Williamson
On Monitoring and Collusion in Hierarchies pp. 280-291: Anke Kessler
Asymptotic Efficiency in Dynamic Principal-Agent Problems pp. 292-301: Holger M. Muller

Cheap Talk and Burned Money pp. 1-16: David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks
Rational Equilibrium Asset-Pricing Bubbles in Continuous Trading Models pp. 17-58: Mark Loewenstein and Gregory A. Willard
The Knowledge Problem, Entrepreneurial Discovery, and Austrian Market Process Theory pp. 59-85: Andrew Yates
Are Probabilities Used in Markets ? pp. 86-90: Larry Epstein
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings pp. 91-105: Ruth Martinez, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo
Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? pp. 106-120: Colin Campbell and Dan Levin