Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Volume 212, issue C, 2023

Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations

Tymon Tatur

Rational inattention with multiple attributes

David Walker-Jones

Block-recursive equilibria in heterogeneous-agent models

Leo Kaas

Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms

Yishu Zeng

Self-evident events and the value of linking

Jimmy Chan and Wenzhang Zhang

Speculation in procurement auctions

Shanglyu Deng

The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works

Tatiana Mayskaya and Arina Nikandrova

Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fabrizio Panebianco and Paolo Pin

Equality in legislative bargaining

Kirill S. Evdokimov

The effects of rivalry on scientific progress under public vs private learning

Heidrun Hoppe-Wewetzer, Georgios Katsenos and Emre Ozdenoren

Collateral and bank screening as complements: A spillover effect

Sonny Biswas

Strategic mistakes

Joel P. Flynn and Karthik A. Sastry

Private disclosure with multiple agents

Shuguang Zhu

Foreseen risks

João F. Gomes, Marco Grotteria and Jessica A. Wachter

Uniformly self-justified equilibria

Felix Kubler and Simon Scheidegger

Regulating oligopolistic competition

Kai Hao Yang and Alexander K. Zentefis

Information design in optimal auctions

Yi-Chun Chen and Xiangqian Yang

Asset bubbles and inflation as competing monetary phenomena

Guillaume Plantin

Market-making with search and information frictions

Benjamin Lester, Ali Shourideh, Venky Venkateswaran and Ariel Zetlin-Jones

Volume 211, issue C, 2023

Contagion in graphons

Selman Erol, Francesca Parise and Alexander Teytelboym

Random utility models with ordered types and domains

Jose Apesteguia and Miguel A. Ballester

Market areas in general equilibrium

Gianandrea Lanzara and Matteo Santacesaria

When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication

Ying Chen and Atara Oliver

Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

Ludmila Matysková and Alfonso Montes

Comparing information in general monotone decision problems

Yonggyun Kim

Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication

Toru Suzuki

Selecting a winner with external referees

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubiński

Volume 210, issue C, 2023

The paradox of safe asset creation

Anatoli Segura and Alonso Villacorta

Doubts about the model and optimal policy

Anastasios Karantounias

The A/B testing problem with Gaussian priors

Eduardo M. Azevedo, David Mao, José Luis Montiel Olea and Amilcar Velez

Capability accumulation and conglomeratization in the information age

Jun Chen, Matthew Elliott and Andrew Koh

Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining

Zizhen Ma

Extrapolative asset pricing

Kai Li and Jun Liu

Endogenous liquidity and volatility

Guillaume Rocheteau and Lu Wang

Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games

Avi Lichtig and Ran Weksler

Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited

Salvador Barberà and Walter Bossert

Asset bubbles, entrepreneurial risks, and economic growth

Takeo Hori and Ryonghun Im

The negative value of private information in illiquid markets

Mahdi Nezafat and Mark Schroder

Maxmin expected utility in Savage's framework

Dino Borie

When (not) to publicize inspection results

Eilon Solan and Chang Zhao

Repeated communication with private lying costs

Harry Pei

Herding through booms and busts

Edouard Schaal and Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel

Public disclosure and private information acquisition: A global game approach

Zhifeng Cai and Feng Dong

Marital preferences and stable matching in cultural evolution

Victor Hiller, Jiabin Wu and Hanzhe Zhang

Allocating losses: Bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation

Todd Keister and Yuliyan Mitkov

Volume 209, issue C, 2023

Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Christian Basteck and Lars Ehlers

Moral hazard and subjective evaluation

Shingo Ishiguro and Yosuke Yasuda

Optimal transparency of monitoring capability

Teck Yong Tan

Optimal technology design

Daniel F. Garrett, George Georgiadis, Alex Smolin and Balázs Szentes

Public education expenditures, growth and income inequality

Lionel Artige and Laurent Cavenaile

A test of (weak) certainty independence

Christian König-Kersting, Christopher Kops and Stefan Trautmann

Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge

Yi-Chun Chen, Takashi Kunimoto and Yifei Sun

Motivated naivete

Rui Tang and Mu Zhang

Sufficient conditions for a “simple” decentralization with consumption externalities

Elena del Mercato and Van-Quy Nguyen

Existence of an equilibrium in arrowian markets for consumption externalities

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Elena del Mercato and Paolo Siconolfi

The strategic decentralization of recruiting

Yi Chen, Thomas Jungbauer and Zhe Wang

Structural unemployment, underemployment, and secular stagnation

Ken-ichi Hashimoto, Yoshiyasu Ono and Matthias Schlegl

Learning with limited memory: Bayesianism vs heuristics

Kalyan Chatterjee and Tai-Wei Hu

Dynamic banking with non-maturing deposits

Urban Jermann and Haotian Xiang

A central limit theorem, loss aversion and multi-armed bandits

Zengjing Chen, Larry Epstein and Guodong Zhang

Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains

Souvik Roy and Soumyarup Sadhukhan

Random quasi-linear utility

Erya Yang and Igor Kopylov