Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
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Volume 208, issue C, 2023

Mediated talk: An experiment

Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai and Wooyoung Lim

Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests

Bin Liu and Jingfeng Lu

Legislative informational lobbying

Arnaud Dellis

The Luce model with replicas

José Heleno Faro

Optimal contingent delegation

Tan Gan, Ju Hu and Xi Weng

Rational inattention in the frequency domain

Kyle Jurado

On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers

James Albrecht, Xiaoming Cai, Pieter Gautier and Susan Vroman

Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting

Esat Doruk Cetemen, Felix Zhiyu Feng and Can Urgun

A new approach to the uniqueness of equilibrium with CRRA preferences

Dong Chul Won

The analogical foundations of cooperation

Philippe Jehiel and Larry Samuelson

Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment

Denis Shishkin and Pietro Ortoleva

Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies

Nilanjan Roy

Rational inattention when decisions take time

Benjamin Hebert and Michael Woodford

Schumpeterian competition in a Lucas economy

Daniel Andrei and Bruce I. Carlin

Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion

Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari

Markets for financial innovation

Ana Babus and Kinda Hachem

Evolutionary foundation for heterogeneity in risk aversion

Yuval Heller and Ilan Nehama

Volume 207, issue C, 2023

Symmetry in n-player games

Asaf Plan

Communication with endogenous deception costs

Ran Eilat and Zvika Neeman

Comment on “A theoretical foundation of ambiguity measurement” [J. Econ. Theory 187 (2020) 105001]

Ruonan Fu, Bertrand Melenberg and Nikolaus Schweizer

Pledge-and-review bargaining

Bard Harstad

Global manipulation by local obfuscation

Fei Li, Yangbo Song and Mofei Zhao

Homophily and influence

Arnold Polanski and Fernando Vega-Redondo

On perfect pairwise stable networks

Philippe Bich and Mariya Teteryatnikova

Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem

Ashwin Kambhampati

Information design through scarcity and social learning

Alexei Parakhonyak and Nick Vikander

Task allocation and on-the-job training

Mariagiovanna Baccara, SangMok Lee and Leeat Yariv

Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms

Vincent Meisner and Jonas von Wangenheim

Bargaining in small dynamic markets

Francesc Dilme

Epidemics with behavior

Christoph Carnehl, Satoshi Fukuda and Nenad Kos

Equilibrium social activity during an epidemic

David McAdams, Yangbo Song and Dihan Zou

Decentralizability of efficient allocations with heterogeneous forecasts

Shurojit Chatterji and Atsushi Kajii

Volume 206, issue C, 2022

Corrigendum to “Relation Between a Social Welfare Function and the Gini Index of Income Inequality” Journal of Economic Theory 4 (1972): 98-100

Oded Stark

Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts

Dmitry Orlov

Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications

Segismundo Izquierdo and Luis Izquierdo

Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions

Alex Suzdaltsev

Bounded memory in a changing world: Biases in behaviour and belief

Kalyan Chatterjee, Konstantin Guryev and Tai-Wei Hu

Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab

Maxim Goryunov and Alexandros Rigos

Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection

Bruno Barsanetti and Braz Camargo

Misallocation inefficiency in partially directed search

Stanislav Rabinovich and Ronald Wolthoff

Relationship externalities

Selman Erol and Rakesh Vohra

Hiding and herding in market entry

Francis Bloch, Simona Fabrizi and Steffen Lippert

Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models

Daniel Clark, Drew Fudenberg and Kevin He

Optimal epidemic control in equilibrium with imperfect testing and enforcement

Thomas Phelan and Alexis Akira Toda

Equilibrium characterization and shock propagation in conflict networks

Jin Xu, Yves Zenou and Junjie Zhou

Volume 205, issue C, 2022

Learning about profitability and dynamic cash management

Jean-Paul Décamps and Stéphane Villeneuve

Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

Jin Yong Jung

Price skimming: Commitment and delay in bargaining with outside option

Dongkyu Chang and Jong Jae Lee

Sequential vote buying

Ying Chen and Jan Zapal

Personal power dynamics in bargaining

Renee Bowen, Ilwoo Hwang and Stefan Krasa

On the empirical relevance of correlated equilibrium

Daniel Friedman, Jean Paul Rabanal, Olga A. Rud and Shuchen Zhao

Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations

Florian Brandl and Dominik Peters

When does centralization undermine adaptation?

Shuo Liu and Dimitri Migrow

Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games

Mehmet Ekmekci and Lucas Maestri

Incomplete contracts versus communication

Andreas Blume, Inga Deimen and Sean Inoue

Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

Benjamin Balzer, Antonio Rosato and Jonas von Wangenheim

Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice

Wonki Cho, Isa E. Hafalir and Wooyoung Lim

Stochastic choice with limited memory

Ece Yegane

Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games

Sam Jindani

The evolution of risk attitudes with fertility thresholds

Arthur Robson and Larry Samuelson

Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment

Philipp Külpmann and Christoph Kuzmics