Journal of Economic Theory
1969 - 2025
Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell
From Elsevier
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Volume 188, issue C, 2020
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs

- Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux
- Weakening transferable utility: The case of non-intersecting Pareto curves

- Thomas Demuynck and Tom Potoms
- Repeated delegation

- Elliot Lipnowski and João Ramos
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information

- Stefan Terstiege and Cédric Wasser
- The optimal quantity of money and partially-liquid assets

- Ugo Zannini
- Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets

- Simone Galperti and Isabel Trevino
- Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs

- Dan Bernhardt, Tingjun Liu and Takeharu Sogo
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

- Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Calibrated uncertainty

- Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
- Network formation with multigraphs and strategic complementarities

- Sumit Joshi, Ahmed Saber Mahmud and Sudipta Sarangi
- Multigenerational transmission of culture

- Daniel Spiro
- The permissible and the forbidden

- Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

- Naomi Utgoff
- The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints

- Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
- A general theory of subjective mixtures

- Paolo Ghirardato and Daniele Pennesi
- How noise affects effort in tournaments

- Mikhail Drugov and Dmitry Ryvkin
- Too much waste, not enough rationing: The failure of stochastic, competitive markets

- David de Meza and Francesco Reito
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets

- Orhan Aygun and Bertan Turhan
- Just-noticeable difference as a behavioural foundation of the critical cost-efficiency index

- Pawel Dziewulski
- Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity imply a bias of screening

- Sander Heinsalu
Volume 187, issue C, 2020
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools

- Umut Dur, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez
- Assortative matching with network spillovers

- Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen
- Estimating information cost functions in models of rational inattention

- Ambuj Dewan and Nathaniel Neligh
- Testing, disclosure and approval

- Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger and Adrien Vigier
- Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty

- Jian Li and Junjie Zhou
- Rational buyers search when prices increase

- Luis Cabral and Sonia Gilbukh
- A theoretical foundation of ambiguity measurement

- Yehuda Izhakian
- The income fluctuation problem and the evolution of wealth

- Qingyin Ma, John Stachurski and Alexis Akira Toda
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

- Roberto Burguet and Ramon Caminal
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

- Kang Rong, Qianfeng Tang and Yongchao Zhang
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games

- Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck
- Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game

- Parkash Chander and Myrna Wooders
- Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks

- Wang Xiang
- Reverse Calculus and nested optimization

- Andrew Clausen and Carlo Strub
- Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design

- Daniel Krähmer
- Fifty years of the Journal of Economic Theory

- Karl Shell
- An informational rationale for action over disclosure

- Alexandre N. Kohlhas
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs

- Yuval Heller and David Sturrock
- Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: A potential game approach

- Minoru Osawa and Takashi Akamatsu
- On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities

- Jeffrey Mensch
- Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions

- Jinwoo Kim and Youngwoo Koh
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

- Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx
- Inefficient sorting under output sharing

- Wing Tung Lam
- The moral hazard problem with high stakes

- Hector Chade and Jeroen Swinkels
Volume 186, issue C, 2020
- Costly information acquisition

- Christopher Chambers, Ce Liu and John Rehbeck
- Temptation and forward-guidance

- Marco Airaudo
- Risk sharing with private and public information

- Piotr Denderski and Christian Stoltenberg
- Risk, ambiguity, and Giffen assets

- Joshua Lanier
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

- R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction

- Nina Bobkova
- Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices

- Shiyang Huang, Zhigang Qiu and Liyan Yang
- Recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998)

- Dan Cao
- Stable near-rational sunspot equilibria

- George Evans and Bruce McGough
- Media see-saws: Winners and losers in platform markets

- Simon Anderson and Martin Peitz
- Savage for dummies and experts

- Mohammed Abdellaoui and Peter Wakker
- Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

- André Casajus, Michael Kramm and Harald Wiese
- Cycles of credit expansion and misallocation: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

- Feng Dong and Zhiwei Xu
- A general equilibrium theory of banks' capital structure

- Douglas Gale and Piero Gottardi
- A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold

- Yi Chen
- The ethics of intergenerational risk

- Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

- Yunan Li