Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

From Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

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Volume 187, issue C, 2020

Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools

Umut Dur, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez

Assortative matching with network spillovers

Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen

Estimating information cost functions in models of rational inattention

Ambuj Dewan and Nathaniel Neligh

Testing, disclosure and approval

Jacopo Bizzotto, Jesper Rüdiger and Adrien Vigier

Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty

Jian Li and Junjie Zhou

Rational buyers search when prices increase

Luis Cabral and Sonia Gilbukh

A theoretical foundation of ambiguity measurement

Yehuda Izhakian

The income fluctuation problem and the evolution of wealth

Qingyin Ma, John Stachurski and Alexis Akira Toda

Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

Roberto Burguet and Ramon Caminal

On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

Kang Rong, Qianfeng Tang and Yongchao Zhang

Pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games and their relationship to non-atomic games

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game

Parkash Chander and Myrna Wooders

Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks

Wang Xiang

Reverse Calculus and nested optimization

Andrew Clausen and Carlo Strub

Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design

Daniel Krähmer

Fifty years of the Journal of Economic Theory

Karl Shell

An informational rationale for action over disclosure

Alexandre N. Kohlhas

Promises and endogenous reneging costs

Yuval Heller and David Sturrock

Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: A potential game approach

Minoru Osawa and Takashi Akamatsu

On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities

Jeffrey Mensch

Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions

Jinwoo Kim and Youngwoo Koh

Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions

Simon Loertscher and Leslie M. Marx

Inefficient sorting under output sharing

Wing Tung Lam

The moral hazard problem with high stakes

Hector Chade and Jeroen Swinkels

Volume 186, issue C, 2020

Costly information acquisition

Christopher Chambers, Ce Liu and John Rehbeck

Temptation and forward-guidance

Marco Airaudo

Risk sharing with private and public information

Piotr Denderski and Christian A. Stoltenberg

Risk, ambiguity, and Giffen assets

Joshua Lanier

On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme

Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction

Nina Bobkova

Institutionalization, delegation, and asset prices

Shiyang Huang, Zhigang Qiu and Liyan Yang

Recursive equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998)

Dan Cao

Stable near-rational sunspot equilibria

George Evans and Bruce McGough

Media see-saws: Winners and losers in platform markets

Simon Anderson and Martin Peitz

Savage for dummies and experts

Mohammed Abdellaoui and Peter Wakker

Asymptotic stability in the Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic for cooperative games

André Casajus, Michael Kramm and Harald Wiese

Cycles of credit expansion and misallocation: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Feng Dong and Zhiwei Xu

A general equilibrium theory of banks' capital structure

Douglas Gale and Piero Gottardi

A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold

Yi Chen

The ethics of intergenerational risk

Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio

Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments

Yunan Li

Volume 185, issue C, 2020

Community enforcement using modal actions

Sam Jindani

Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring

Maximilian Mihm and Russell Toth

Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria

Olivier Bochet and Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture

Ingela Alger, Jörgen Weibull and Laurent Lehmann

Obvious manipulations

Peter Troyan and Thayer Morrill

Competitive real options under private information

Leandro Gorno and Felipe Iachan

Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment

Alexander Koch and Julia Nafziger

Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Ville Korpela, Michele Lombardi and Hannu Vartiainen

Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule

Justin Burkett and Kyle Woodward

All or nothing: State capacity and optimal public goods provision

Felix Bierbrauer and Justus Winkelmann

Targeted search in matching markets

Anton Cheremukhin, Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria and Antonella Tutino

Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics

William H. Sandholm, Segismundo Izquierdo and Luis Izquierdo

More apples vs. better apples: Distribution and innovation-driven growth

Robert Kane and Pietro Peretto

Social norms in networks

Philip Ushchev and Yves Zenou

Risk apportionment: The dual story

Louis R. Eeckhoudt, Roger Laeven and Harris Schlesinger

Incomplete market demand tests for Kreps-Porteus-Selden preferences

Felix Kubler, Larry Selden and Xiao Wei