Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 168, issue C, 2017

Ordinal aggregation results via Karlin's variation diminishing property pp. 1-11

Michael Choi and Lones Smith

Generalised mean-risk preferences pp. 12-26

Daniel Schoch

On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts pp. 27-43

Daisuke Hirata and Yusuke Kasuya

LeChatelier–Samuelson principle in games and pass-through of shocks pp. 44-54

Alexei Alexandrov and Özlem Bedre-Defolie

Optimal target criteria for stabilization policy pp. 55-106

Marc Giannoni and Michael Woodford

Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints pp. 107-142

Yuichiro Kamada and Fuhito Kojima

Community leaders and the preservation of cultural traits pp. 143-176

Anja Prummer and Jan-Peter Siedlarek

Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games pp. 177-208

Shih En Lu

Market selection pp. 209-236

Leonid Kogan, Stephen Ross, Jiang Wang and Mark Westerfield

Debt enforcement and the value of money pp. 237-251

Mariana Rojas Breu

A tractable model of indirect asset liquidity pp. 252-260

Lucas Herrenbrueck and Athanasios Geromichalos

Instability of belief-free equilibria pp. 261-286

Yuval Heller

Randomized strategies and prospect theory in a dynamic context pp. 287-300

Vicky Henderson, David Hobson and Alex S.L. Tse

Awareness of unawareness: A theory of decision making in the face of ignorance pp. 301-328

Edi Karni and Marie-Louise Vierø

Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability pp. 329-371

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi

Stability with one-sided incomplete information pp. 372-399

Sushil Bikhchandani

Stochastic idiosyncratic cash flow risk and real options: Implications for stock returns pp. 400-431

Harjoat Bhamra and Kyung Hwan Shim

Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility pp. 432-471

Marcin Pęski

Volume 167, issue C, 2017

Decentralizing constrained-efficient allocations in the Lagos–Wright pure currency economy pp. 1-13

Ayushi Bajaj, Tai-Wei Hu, Guillaume Rocheteau and Mario Rafael Silva

Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium pp. 14-38

Iván Arribas and Amparo Urbano

Measuring discrimination using principles of stochastic dominance pp. 39-52

Michael Hoy and Rachel Huang

Information and coordination frictions in experimental posted offer markets pp. 53-74

Leif Helland, Espen Moen and Edgar Preugschat

Net trade and market efficiency in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) pp. 75-85

Hui Ou-Yang and Weili Wu

Toward a theory of monopolistic competition pp. 86-115

Mathieu Parenti, Philip Ushchev and Jacques Thisse

Transparency of outside options in bargaining pp. 116-147

Ilwoo Hwang and Fei Li

Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions pp. 148-176

T. Renee Bowen, Ying Chen, Hülya Eraslan and Jan Zapal

Dynamic entry in vertically differentiated markets pp. 177-205

Raphael Auer and Philip Sauré

Steady states in matching and bargaining pp. 206-228

Mihai Manea

Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender pp. 229-268

Jonas Hedlund

Corrigendum to “Rationality and coherent theories of strategic behavior” [J. Econ. Theory 70 (1) (1996) 1–31] pp. 269-273

Xiao Luo and Yongchuan Qiao

Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value pp. 274-284

André Casajus and Koji Yokote

Bilateral trading in divisible double auctions pp. 285-311

Songzi Du and Haoxiang Zhu

Volume 166, issue C, 2016

Dynamic costs and moral hazard: A duality-based approach pp. 1-50

Guy Arie

Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule pp. 51-93

Niall Hughes

Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders pp. 94-123

Tingjun Liu

The market for conservation and other hostages pp. 124-151

Bard Harstad

Equilibrium using credit or money with indivisible goods pp. 152-163

Han Han, Benoit Julien, Asgerdur Petursdottir and Liang Wang

Utility representation of an incomplete and nontransitive preference relation pp. 164-185

Hiroki Nishimura and Efe Ok

Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach pp. 186-211

John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima and Yusuke Narita

Dissolving a partnership dynamically pp. 212-241

Matthew Van Essen and John Wooders

Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring pp. 242-281

Tomasz Piskorski and Mark Westerfield

Gale–Nikaido–Debreu and Milgrom–Shannon: Communal interactions with endogenous community structures pp. 282-303

Daniil Musatov, Alexey Savvateev and Shlomo Weber

Approval voting and scoring rules with common values pp. 304-310

David S. Ahn and Santiago Oliveros

Optimal sharing rules in repeated partnerships pp. 311-323

Hajime Kobayashi, Katsunori Ohta and Tadashi Sekiguchi

Social learning with endogenous observation pp. 324-333

Yangbo Song

Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion pp. 334-361

Gabriel Carroll

Non-exclusive dynamic contracts, competition, and the limits of insurance pp. 362-395

Laurence Ales and Pricila Maziero

Discounted quotas pp. 396-444

Alexander Frankel

Satisficing and stochastic choice pp. 445-482

Victor Aguiar, Maria Jose Boccardi Chalela and Mark Dean

Customer relationship and sales pp. 483-516

Shouyong Shi

Random extensive form games pp. 517-535

Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko

Network security and contagion pp. 536-585

Daron Acemoglu, Azarakhsh Malekian and Asu Ozdaglar

Robust contracting with additive noise pp. 586-604

Gabriel Carroll and Delong Meng

An evolutionary theory of monogamy pp. 605-628

Marco Francesconi, Christian Ghiglino and Motty Perry