Journal of Economic Theory

1969 - 2025

Current editor(s): A. Lizzeri and K. Shell

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Volume 165, issue C, 2016

The impact of competition on prices with numerous firms pp. 1-24

Xavier Gabaix, David Laibson, Deyuan Li, Hongyi Li, Sidney Resnick and Casper de Vries

Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries pp. 25-36

Bo Chen, Satoru Fujishige and Zaifu Yang

Market design and the stability of general equilibrium pp. 37-68

Jacob Goeree and Luke Lindsay

Responsive affirmative action in school choice pp. 69-105

Battal Dogan

On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching pp. 106-123

Deniz Dizdar and Benny Moldovanu

A theory of robust experiments for choice under uncertainty pp. 124-151

Simon Grant, J. Kline, I. Meneghel, John Quiggin and R. Tourky

Choosing peers: Homophily and polarization in groups pp. 152-178

Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv

Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions pp. 179-208

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Assignment problems with complementarities pp. 209-241

Thành Nguyen, Ahmad Peivandi and Rakesh Vohra

Ambiguity aversion in the long run: “To disagree, we must also agree” pp. 242-256

Aloisio Araujo, Pietro da Silva and José Faro

Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems pp. 257-262

Sophie Bade

Objective and subjective foundations for multiple priors pp. 263-291

Maxwell B. Stinchcombe

Optimal consumption and savings with stochastic income and recursive utility pp. 292-331

Chong Wang, Neng Wang and Jinqiang Yang

How fast do equilibrium payoff sets converge in repeated games? pp. 332-359

Johannes Hörner and Satoru Takahashi

Delegated portfolio management, optimal fee contracts, and asset prices pp. 360-389

Yuki Sato

Self-control and bargaining pp. 390-413

Shih En Lu

Memorable consumption pp. 414-455

Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson

Informed seller with taste heterogeneity pp. 456-471

Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta

Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk–dove games: Theory and experiment in continuous time pp. 472-486

Volker Benndorf, Ismael Martínez-Martínez and Hans-Theo Normann

Dynamic portfolio choice with frictions pp. 487-516

Nicolae Gârleanu and Lasse Pedersen

Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information pp. 517-564

Rene Saran

Social learning and delay in a dynamic model of price competition pp. 565-600

Masaki Aoyagi, Manaswini Bhalla and Hikmet Gunay

Endogenous information acquisition and countercyclical uncertainty pp. 601-642

Jess Benhabib, Xuewen Liu and Pengfei Wang

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach pp. 643-671

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors pp. 672-706

Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara

Volume 164, issue C, 2016

Introduction to the symposium issue on money and liquidity pp. 1-9

Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Ricardo Lagos and Randall Wright

Search-based models of money and finance: An integrated approach pp. 10-31

Alberto Trejos and Randall Wright

A search-based model of the interbank money market and monetary policy implementation pp. 32-67

Morten Bech and Cyril Monnet

Money and credit as means of payment: A new monetarist approach pp. 68-100

Sébastien Lotz and Cathy Zhang

Financial frictions, the housing market, and unemployment pp. 101-135

William Branch, Nicolas Petrosky-Nadeau and Guillaume Rocheteau

Scarce collateral, the term premium, and quantitative easing pp. 136-165

Stephen Williamson

Monetary policy with asset-backed money pp. 166-186

David Andolfatto, Aleksander Berentsen and Christopher Waller

Liquidity and asset prices in a monetary model with OTC asset markets pp. 187-217

Fabrizio Mattesini and Ed Nosal

Monetary exchange and the irreducible cost of inflation pp. 218-229

Russell Wong

Volume 163, issue C, 2016

Induced uncertainty, market price of risk, and the dynamics of consumption and wealth pp. 1-41

Yulei Luo and Eric Young

Admissibility and assumption pp. 42-72

Byung Soo Lee

Market making with asymmetric information and inventory risk pp. 73-109

Hong Liu and Yajun Wang

Labor supply with job assignment under balanced growth pp. 110-140

Claudio Michelacci and Josep Pijoan-Mas

Welfare effects of taxation in oligopolistic markets pp. 141-166

Jonas Häckner and Mathias Herzing

Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions pp. 167-177

Tommy Andersson and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes pp. 178-221

Jun Xiao

Informational herding with model misspecification pp. 222-247

Aislinn Bohren

Assortative matching and risk sharing pp. 248-275

Sanxi Li, Hailin Sun, Tong Wang and Jun Yu

Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality pp. 276-287

Jernej Copic and Clara Ponsati

The culture of entrepreneurship pp. 288-317

Shankha Chakraborty, Jon C. Thompson and Etienne B. Yehoue

A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types pp. 318-341

Akira Okada

Bounded computational capacity equilibrium pp. 342-364

Penélope Hernández and Eilon Solan

Assignment reversals: Trade, skill allocation and wage inequality pp. 365-409

Thomas Sampson

Robust option pricing: Hannan and Blackwell meet Black and Scholes pp. 410-434

Peter DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Yishay Mansour

Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case pp. 435-466

Lucas Rentschler and Theodore Turocy

Continuous Markov equilibria with quasi-geometric discounting pp. 467-494

Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor

Reference dependent ambiguity pp. 495-524

Maximilian Mihm

Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects pp. 525-556

Kiminori Matsuyama, Iryna Sushko and Laura Gardini

Mechanism design and intentions pp. 557-603

Felix Bierbrauer and Nick Netzer

Public information and uninformed trading: Implications for market liquidity and price efficiency pp. 604-643

Bing Han, Ya Tang and Liyan Yang

Monetary mechanisms pp. 644-657

Chao Gu and Randall Wright

Limits of acyclic voting pp. 658-683

John Duggan

Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities pp. 684-698

Rabah Amir and Natalia Lazzati

Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination pp. 699-727

Rohan Dutta and Ryosuke Ishii

Bounded memory Folk Theorem pp. 728-774

Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona and Hamid Sabourian

A test for risk-averse expected utility pp. 775-785

Christopher Chambers, Ce Liu and Seung-Keun Martinez

Heterogeneous beliefs and trading inefficiencies pp. 786-818

William Branch and Bruce McGough

QWERTY is efficient pp. 819-825

Bernardo Guimaraes and Ana Elisa Pereira

Common belief foundations of global games pp. 826-848

Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin and Muhamet Yildiz

Optimal sequential delegation pp. 849-888

Daniel Krähmer and Eugen Kovac

Graphical potential games pp. 889-899

Yakov Babichenko and Omer Tamuz

Seeking ergodicity in dynamic economies pp. 900-924

Takashi Kamihigashi and John Stachurski

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains pp. 925-954

Debasis Mishra

Lexicographic beliefs and assumption pp. 955-985

Eddie Dekel, Amanda Friedenberg and Marciano Siniscalchi